two sided markets
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2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yingxiu Zhao ◽  
Baojuan Shi

Two-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a platform adopts the coupon strategy, (i) the platform utility and participants’ utility are both greater and (ii) the number of participants is greater. In addition, as most research on two-sided markets and coupon strategy focuses on theoretical models, our study provides empirical support using data from Renrendai.com over 2018 to 2019.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-432
Author(s):  
Katalin Springel

This paper uses new, large-scale vehicle registry data from Norway and a two-sided market framework to show nonneutrality of different subsidies and estimate their impact on electric vehicle adoption when network externalities are present. Estimates suggest a strong positive connection between electric vehicle purchases and both consumer price and charging station subsidies. Counterfactual analyses suggest that between 2010 and 2015, every dollar spent on station subsidies resulted in more than twice as many additional electric vehicle purchases than the same amount spent on price subsidies. However, this relation inverts with increased spending, as station subsidies’ impact tapers off faster. (JEL D12, D62, D85, H25, L62, Q54)


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 2091-2109
Author(s):  
Martin Grossmann ◽  
Markus Lang ◽  
Helmut M. Dietl

This paper examines the dynamic competition between platform firms in two-sided markets with network externalities. In our model, two platforms compete with each other via a contest to dominate a certain market. If one platform wins the contest, it can serve the market for a certain duration as a monopolistic platform. Our paper shows that platform firms can compensate for cost disadvantages with network effects. A head start (e.g., technological advantage) does not guarantee future success for platform firms. Network effects and cost efficiency are decisive for future success. Interestingly, higher costs of a platform can induce higher platform profits in our dynamic model. Moreover, we find that a platform’s size and profit are not necessarily positively correlated. Our model also provides new insights with respect to the underlying causes for the emergence of market dominance. The combination of technological carry-over and network effects can explain a long-lasting dominance of a platform that benefits from a head start. The necessary preconditions for this emergence are convex costs, small network effects and high carry-over.


Author(s):  
Hiroshi Hirai ◽  
Ryosuke Sato

In this paper, we present a new model and mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments and is applicable to a variety of models that include multiunit auctions, matching markets, and reservation exchange markets. Our mechanisms are built on the polymatroidal network flow model by Lawler and Martel. Additionally, they feature nice properties such as the incentive compatibility of buyers, individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and strong budget balance. The first mechanism is a two-sided generalization of the polyhedral clinching auction by Goel et al. for one-sided markets. The second mechanism is a reduce-to-recover algorithm that reduces the market to be one-sided, applies the polyhedral clinching auction by Goel et al., and lifts the resulting allocation to the original two-sided market via the polymatroidal network flow. Both mechanisms are implemented by polymatroid algorithms. We demonstrate how our framework is applied to the Internet display advertisement auctions.


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