Plutocracy, Platonism and Education in Brazil: Some Reflections on the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Lancet stated in its editorial on the 9th of May 2020 that the situation in Brazil was very problematic insofar as the COVID-19 pandemic was concerned. More than a year later, Brazil already registered more than half a million deaths from complications of COVID-19, which places it in second place in the world ranking of deaths despite having the seventh-largest population in the world. Despite this utterly tragic situation, in July 2021, almost 40% of the Brazilian population approved of the federal government's role in confronting the pandemic, and the Brazilian elites have defended openly the view that the economy was more important than individuals' lives. Given this context, in this article, we reflect on the issue of plutocracy, demonstrating its platonic authoritarian foundations, in order to understand the Brazilian elites' attitude toward the pandemic, which had no proper regard or care for the most vulnerable in society. Through this philosophical inquiry we indicate the importance of education, particularly of philosophy of education, in encouraging educationists and educational systems to reflect on problematic issues and self-reflect so as to identify possible educational deficiencies and shortcomings that created the conditions for individuals' attitudes of indifference to the victims of the pandemic and the vulnerable in society.

La saisie emotive du kairos avec des enfants : entre acte philosophique et geste didactique

Emotional Grasping of the Kairos in Children Talk: between Philosophical Act and Didactical Gesture. An essential gesture of animating a philosophical dialogue with children consists in grasping within their talk, an opportune word or turn of phrase, the kairos, and bouncing off it to advance reasoning. Based on the analysis of expert practices, we propose a typology of the emotional grasp of Kairos that reflects the tension between investigative and educational aims in these exchanges. Beyond the effect of surprise, regulation makes it possible to welcome and share one's emotions and to make them evolve into wonder, astonishment or doubt. Such trajectories are decisive for the future of the new idea. But other reactions are frequent, offering other opportunities for the current activity and children training in the long term. Keywords: educational dialogue, emotional regulation, kairos, opportunity, philosophical inquiry.

Que peut faire l’abduction dans le dialogue philosophique?

What Abduction can do in Philosophical Dialogue? According to Peirce, abduction is a hypothetic-forming process that is necessary to explore unknown areas of knowledge, but also a real scientific method associated with the enquiry. If there is philosophical enquiry, could abduction serve as an appropriate method for such an approach? If so, how can it be used and with a view to what result(s)? We ask whether abduction can bring a potential both for discovery and a logical requirement to the philosophical questioning. In this paper we focus on a philosophy that "is done", in the form of a common enquiry, the "community of philosophical inquiry". The present research explores the advantages and limitations of requiring such a method, in the context of the practice under study. Keywords: abduction, method, philosophical inquiry, inference, unknown

Place Matters

This article positions place within a phenomenological framework. Current philosophical inquiry shows little interest in place, yet academic disciplines concerned with spatial properties look to philosophy—and in particular phenomenology—to provide important contributions to overcome the limitations of quantitative methodologies, particularly with respect to sentiments of attachment to and identification with places. Seemingly, however, philosophy offers little support in this field. Place disappears from philosophical investigations during the Middle Ages and is replaced by considerations on space. Keeping the employment of phenomenological approaches in other academic disciplines in mind, this article sets out to explore traces of a re-emerging interest in place among twentieth-century phenomenologists. It proposes a phenomenological approach to place in which there is a shift from regarding place in terms of a where to understanding what a place is in human experience.

Thinking Otherwise: Speculative Imagining in PfC

<p>In the face of looming ecological catastrophe, ever-expanding neoliberalism and the ongoing integration of our lives into virtual spaces, there is an urgent need to expand people’s political imagination and responsiveness to these challenges. Engaging with philosophy outside the academic sphere – for example, in school and community contexts – can contribute to addressing this political need. Using the example of Philosophy for Children (PfC), an international educational movement, this thesis explores the potential for cross-paradigmatic approaches to philosophical inquiry. It observes that adherence to particular philosophical paradigms, as has largely been the case in PfC, binds the imagination to particular epistemic and political parameters and precludes ideas that contradict paradigmatic assumptions. Invoking the sensibility of Gillian Rose, I argue that we need a philosophy that permits people to imagine radically different political worlds in a manner that actively resists political ‘bubble-think’. This thesis illustrates how Rose’s cross-paradigmatic approach, speculative negotiation, can help to address some of the limits of paradigm thinking by inspiring a more transformative philosophy in contexts such as PfC. In doing so, this thesis contributes both to an expansion of the PfC programme and to questions surrounding the concrete practise of Rose’s rich theoretical oeuvre.</p>

Thinking Otherwise: Speculative Imagining in PfC

<p>In the face of looming ecological catastrophe, ever-expanding neoliberalism and the ongoing integration of our lives into virtual spaces, there is an urgent need to expand people’s political imagination and responsiveness to these challenges. Engaging with philosophy outside the academic sphere – for example, in school and community contexts – can contribute to addressing this political need. Using the example of Philosophy for Children (PfC), an international educational movement, this thesis explores the potential for cross-paradigmatic approaches to philosophical inquiry. It observes that adherence to particular philosophical paradigms, as has largely been the case in PfC, binds the imagination to particular epistemic and political parameters and precludes ideas that contradict paradigmatic assumptions. Invoking the sensibility of Gillian Rose, I argue that we need a philosophy that permits people to imagine radically different political worlds in a manner that actively resists political ‘bubble-think’. This thesis illustrates how Rose’s cross-paradigmatic approach, speculative negotiation, can help to address some of the limits of paradigm thinking by inspiring a more transformative philosophy in contexts such as PfC. In doing so, this thesis contributes both to an expansion of the PfC programme and to questions surrounding the concrete practise of Rose’s rich theoretical oeuvre.</p>

Western Skeptic vs Indian Realist. Cross-Cultural Differences in Zebra Case Intuitions

The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries.

Expérimenter la pensée en schémas-images. Des adolescents s’interrogent « d’où viennent les pensées ? »

"Experimenting Thinking in Image Schemas. Teenagers are Wondering “Where Do Thoughts Come From?” An intellectual view of philosophy as an activity focusing on understanding abstract concepts and their relationships deprives philosophical exercise of the participation of the body and senses. If we reject the mind-body dualism, as Dewey, Johnson, etc. did, then we are constantly engaged in interactions with the world and others, and can thus consider the act of thinking from our own experiences. Inspired by an experimentalist conception of school and life, as well as the method of inquiry developed by Dewey, the Philosophy for Children program provides an inquiry process that invites participants to conceptualize and reason philosophically in a collaborative manner. Do these practices implement an embodied cognition? To find out, we selected a discussion as a case study and analyzed it based on the observation that the issue to be discussed by the participants - “where do thoughts come from?” contains two image schemas: path (come from) and source (where). We have noted a variety and a significant number of expressions (“they come from within”, “they come from what happens outside”, etc.) whose analysis enhances a better understanding of how an experience of understanding the origins of our thoughts fits into the discourse and contributes to a collective conceptualization of “thinking”. Keywords: image schemas, perceptual experience, conceptualisation, community of philosophical inquiry, experimentalism "

Obiter Dicta

Stitched together over five years of journaling, Obiter Dicta is a commonplace book of freewheeling explorations representing the transcription of a dozen notebooks, since painstakingly reimagined for publication. Organized after Theodor Adorno’s Minima Moralia, this unschooled exercise in aesthetic thought—gleefully dilettantish, oftentimes dangerously close to the epigrammatic—interrogates an array of subject matter (although inescapably circling back to the curiously resemblant histories of Western visual art and instrumental music) through the lens of drive-by speculation. Erick Verran’s approach to philosophical inquiry follows the brute-force literary technique of Jacques Derrida to exhaustively favor the material grammar of a signifier over hand-me-down meaning, juxtaposing outer semblances with their buried systems and our etched-in-stone intuitions about color and illusion, shape and value, with lessons stolen from seemingly unrelatable disciplines. Interlarded with extracts of Ludwig Wittgenstein but also Wallace Stevens, Cormac McCarthy as well as Roland Barthes, this cache of incidental remarks eschews what’s granular for the biggest picture available, leaving below the hyper-specialized fields of academia for a bird’s-eye view of their crop circles. Obiter Dicta is an unapologetic experiment in intellectual dot-connecting that challenges much long-standing wisdom about everything from illuminated manuscripts to Minecraft and the evolution of European music with lyrical brevity; that is, before jumping to the next topic.