The Idea of Incompleteness in the Internal Realism of Hilary Putnam

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Antonio Lizzadri
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Internal Realism

A Traveller's Guide to Putnam's “Narrow Path”

Dialogue ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Davies
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Relativism ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Human Face ◽  
Metaphysical Realism ◽  
Internal Realism ◽  
Present Volume ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Many

It is now over 15 years since Hilary Putnam first urged that we take the “narrow path” of internal realism as a way of navigating between “the swamps of metaphysics and the quicksands of cultural relativism and historicism” (1983, p. 226). In the opening lines of the Preface to Realism with a Human Face, a collection of Putnam's recent papers edited by James Conant, Putnam reaffirms his allegiance to this narrow path, unmoved by Realist murmurings from the swamps and laconic Rortian suggestions that only the quicksands are a proper metaphilosophical abode for those willing to confront our lack of epistemological and metaphysical foundations. If there are changes to be discerned in these writings, Putnam avers, they pertain only to the burden allotted to different considerations in the overall economy of his argument: “It might be said that the difference between the present volume and my work prior to The Many Faces of Realism is a shift in emphasis: a shift from emphasizing model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism to emphasizing conceptual relativity” (p. xi).

scholarly journals Linguagem e realidade: para uma teoria do significado segundo Hilary Putnam

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 281
Author(s):  
Jakob Hans Josef Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Linguistic Community ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Internal Realism ◽  
Theory Of Language ◽  
Scientific Standards

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p281In his work The meaning of meaning and Representation and Reality H. Putnam refutes the Aristotelian theory of language by defending his theory of an internal realism. The meaning (mental representation) of a word does not determine the reference of a word as in the conception of Aristotle. Language is a collective act of the human society and not an individual one. Scientific groups of experts can determine the meaning of a word by knowing the corresponding scientific standards and models. The determination of the meaning requires a public division of working to which trust and confidence belong. Furthermore without a benevolent interpretation and understanding, language and dialog of the linguistic community are not possible.

Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism

1998 ◽  
pp. 22-34
Author(s):  
Janos Boros
Keyword(s):  
Richard Rorty ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Circular Reasoning ◽  
Internal Realism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
As If

The notions of representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty to describe his and the neopragmatists' attitude toward traditional problems of epistemology. Rorty means that the history of philosophy shows that there are no final answers to the traditional questions about knowledge, truth, and representation; consequently, they should be rejected. Rorty thinks such questions should be eliminated from philosophy since there is no possibility to get outside of our mind and language. We cannot say anything about a mind-transcendent or language-transcendent, nonlocal or eternal reality. Hilary Putnam agrees with Rorty on this, but not with the conclusion that we should reject traditional philosophical questions. For Putnam, the epistemological questions are worthwhile asking and, although we cannot find the final correct answers, we should continue our investigations as if there were final answers. Our struggles with those problems can lead to refinements of the formulations and to cognitive developments. Putnam proposes a quasirealism which is often called "internal realism." Rorty rejects every refinement of realism as still realism and believes that the questions of knowledge, truth, and representation lead to regresses ad infinitum or to circular reasoning.

Narrow Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Central Topic ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
Narrow Content

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. It is widely conceded, thanks to famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, that there is a kind of mental content that is not narrow. But it is often maintained that there is also a kind of mental content that is narrow, and that such content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope. It carefully distinguishes a variety of conceptions of narrow content and a variety of explanatory roles that might be assigned to narrow content. It then argues that, once we pay sufficient attention to the details, there is no promising theory of narrow content in the offing.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽  
John Hawthorne
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Tyler Burge ◽  
Narrow Content ◽  
History Of ◽  
To Come

The Introduction outlines the history of the narrow content debate. It introduces the famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, discusses why the debate only came to prominence in the 1970s, and outlines what is to come.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Kirchin
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
General Methodology ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
The Difference

This chapter introduces the distinction between thin and thick concepts and then performs a number of functions. First, two major accounts of thick concepts—separationism and nonseparationism—are introduced and, in doing so, a novel account of evaluation is indicated. Second, each chapter is outlined as is the general methodology, followed, third, by a brief history of the discussion of thick concepts, referencing Philippa Foot, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Ryle, and Bernard Williams among others. Fourth, a number of relevant contrasts are introduced, such as the fact–value distinction and the difference between concepts, properties, and terms. Lastly, some interesting and relevant questions are raised that, unfortunately, have to be left aside.

Philosophy of Logic. Hilary Putnam

1973 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-133
Author(s):  
John Corcoran
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic

Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Hilary Putnam

Ethics ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-513
Author(s):  
Manley Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Hilary Putnam
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