scholarly journals Simple and Efficient Public-Key Encryption from Computational Diffie-Hellman in the Standard Model

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristiyan Haralambiev ◽  
Tibor Jager ◽  
Eike Kiltz ◽  
Victor Shoup
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
The Standard Model

Lattice-based completely non-malleable public-key encryption in the standard model

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reza Sepahi ◽  
Ron Steinfeld ◽  
Josef Pieprzyk
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
The Standard Model

Public-Key Encryption In The Standard Model Against Strong Leakage Adversary

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 1904-1914
Author(s):  
Janaka Alawatugoda
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Log P ◽  
Encryption Scheme ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
Security Parameter ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Encryption Schemes ◽  
Leakage Resilient

Abstract Over the years, security against adaptively chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2) is considered as the strongest security definition for public-key encryption schemes. With the uprise of side-channel attacks, new security definitions are proposed, addressing leakage of secret keys together with the standard CCA2 definition. Among the new security definitions, security against continuous and after-the-fact leakage-resilient CCA2 can be considered as the strongest security definition, which is called as security against (continuous) adaptively chosen-ciphertext leakage attacks (continuous CCLA2). In this paper, we present a construction of a public-key encryption scheme, namely LR-PKE, which satisfies the aforementioned security definition. The security of our public-key encryption scheme is proven in the standard model, under decision BDH assumption. Thus, we emphasize that our public-key encryption scheme LR-PKE is (continuous) CCLA2-secure in the standard model. For our construction of LR-PKE, we have used a strong one-time signature scheme and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol as underlying building blocks. The leakage bound is $0.15n\log p -1$ bits per leakage query, for a security parameter $k$ and a statistical security parameter $n$, such that $\log p \geq k$ and $n$ is a function of $k$. It is possible to see that LR-PKE is efficient enough to be used for real-world usage.

Efficient public key encryption with equality test in the standard model

2019 ◽  
Vol 755 ◽  
pp. 65-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Zhang ◽  
Jie Chen ◽  
Hyung Tae Lee ◽  
Haifeng Qian ◽  
Huaxiong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Equality Test

Updatable Public Key Encryption in the Standard Model

2021 ◽  
pp. 254-285
Author(s):  
Yevgeniy Dodis ◽  
Harish Karthikeyan ◽  
Daniel Wichs
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Public Key Encryption ◽  
The Standard Model
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