Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Among Three Players with Incomplete Information

2017 ◽  
pp. 40-52
Author(s):  
Yan Xiao ◽  
Deng-Feng Li
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Model

A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences

Econometrica ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Time Preferences ◽  
Bargaining Model

scholarly journals More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Gallop
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War ◽  
State Preferences

For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that bargaining is between exactly two participants. When we relax this assumption, in a three-player bargaining game, war is an equilibrium. Thus, a key finding of the bargaining model, that there is always an agreement that all states prefer war, is an artifact of dyadic analysis. By removing this limitation, we can find new factors that affect the risk of war: the number of actors, divergence in state preferences, alliance dynamics, and the issue being bargained over.

A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sushil Bikhchandani
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Model

An alternative incomplete information bargaining model for identifying the reasonable concession period of a BOT project

2015 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 1151-1159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Bao ◽  
Yi Peng ◽  
Jose Humberto Ablanedo-Rosas ◽  
Hongman Gao
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Concession Period ◽  
Bot Project

Policy bargaining and militarized conflict

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Bils ◽  
William Spaniel
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Information Uncertainty ◽  
Major Purpose ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Spatial Policy ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Bargaining Model Of War

Studies of bargaining and war generally focus on two sources of incomplete information: uncertainty over the probability of victory and uncertainty over the costs of fighting. We introduce uncertainty over preferences of a spatial policy and argue for its relevance in crisis bargaining. Under these conditions, standard results from the bargaining model of war break down: peace can be Pareto inefficient and it may be impossible to avoid war. We then extend the model to allow for cheap talk pre-play communication. Whereas incentives to misrepresent normally render cheap talk irrelevant, here communication can cause peace and ensure that agreements are efficient. Moreover, peace can become more likely as (1) the variance in the proposer’s belief about its opponent’s type increases and (2) the costs of war decrease. Our results indicate that one major purpose of diplomacy is simply to communicate preferences and that such communications can be credible.

Averaging of temporal memories under conditions of incomplete information

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document