Financial Security Analysis of E-Commerce Platform Based on Supply Chain for Heterogeneous Network Location Verification

The development of supply chain finance, its pricing strategy for bilateral business cooperation between e-commerce, banking institutions, and fourth-party logistics services providers has gained the attention of researchers. This paper combines the heterogeneous network location verification technology, starting from information asymmetry and Rubens bargaining game ideas, and combines it with game theory methods to provide a reference for bilateral cooperation decision-making on e-commerce platforms. The experiment results indicated the pricing decisions of e-commerce platforms which are affected by the efforts of the other party and the ability of bargaining. The quoted price increases with the decrease of the bank’s ability and the increase of the service provider’s ability. The pricing decisions of banks and service providers are only affected by the direct proportion of their respective business costs. When considering the introduction of incentive mechanism conditions, it is found that appropriate incentive conditions can increase the quotation of the e-commerce platform. The price quoted by the e-commerce platform that chooses to bargain with the bank is higher than the price quoted by the bank after negotiating with the service provider, which will help to better realize the benefits. Finally, the paper numerically analyzes the results of the bargaining game between e-commerce platforms and banks and fourth-party logistics service providers, and the numerical results verify the better performance.

A New Two-Stage Bargaining Game Approach for Intra- and Inter-WBAN Management

The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is an amalgamation of smart devices to operate the wireless body area network (WBAN) by using networking technologies. To reduce the burden on WBANs, they link to the mobile edge computing (MEC), on which captured medical data can be stored and analyzed. In this paper, we design a new control scheme to effectively share the limited computation and communication resources in the MEC-assisted WBAN (M-W) platform. Based on the bargaining game theory, our proposed scheme explores the mutual benefits of intra- and inter-WBAN interactions. To dynamically adapt the current system conditions, we shape each WBAN’s aspirations to reach a reciprocal consensus for different application services. Utilizing two control factors, we provide a unifying framework for the study of intra- and inter-WBAN bargaining problems to share the limited system resource. Based on the feasibility and real-time effectiveness, the main novelty of the proposed scheme is the ability to achieve a relevant tradeoff between efficiency and fairness through the interactive bargaining process. At last, the experimental results show that the proposed scheme achieves substantial performance improvements to the comparison schemes.

Efficiency decomposition in a three-stage network structure: Cooperative DEA, Nash bargaining game models and SOCP formulations

In this paper, for evaluating the efficiency in a three-stage DEA structure we use the additive and the multiplicative cooperative models that comply with the cooperation paradigm in the organizations, where for improving efficiency of system, stages cooperate together. Since the overall efficiency from the cooperative models may not be unique and consequently the stages’ efficiencies, then we combine them with the Nash bargaining game approach that besides maximizing efficiency scores for stages and the whole system, provides a unique and fair efficiency decomposition. Second order programming relaxation of the proposed nonlinear models are given in contrast to the parametric linear models in the literature. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed models are illustrated with two numerical examples.

A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

Tax Advisors and Tax Aggressiveness: A Bargaining Model

We study the bargaining game between a tax agency and a tax advisor-taxpayer team. Specifically, we focus on the factors that motivate tax aggressiveness, and the role of tax advisors in tax aggressiveness. We begin by characterizing the conditions under which tax advisors would give aggressive advice to their clients. Next, we analyze the optimal number of bargaining rounds for the tax agency. Third, we study the counteroffers that the tax agency makes in each round of the bargaining game. In addition, we investigate the conditions under which a high-tax taxpayer type would hire a reputable tax adviser. Last, we analyze when would the taxpayer accept or reject the tax advisor’s recommendation.