Chemical Evolution and the Evolutionary Definition of Life

2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 225-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul G. Higgs
2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera M. Kolb

Despite numerous attempts, we still do not have a satisfactory definition of life. It is generally accepted that one of the essential features of life is the ability of an organism to reproduce. This implies that mules, workers ants, and other sterile individuals are not alive. To correct this apparent problem, we suggest that life should be defined in two ways. First, we define life as a phenomenon, for which the reproduction of some, but not all, individuals is essential. Second, we define life as a set of characteristics of an individual organism, among which reproduction is not essential. We explore Aristotle's classifications of things that exist, in which he placed individual living beings as primary substances, above their species and genera, which are considered secondary substances. The definition of life as a phenomenon needs to link life to its origins. Life presumably emerged from abiotic matter via chemical evolution. We have examined Aristotle's concept of change in which potentiality goes to actuality, and its variant, Kauffman's concept of ‘adjacent possible’, for their possible application in prebiotic chemical evolution. We have found that these principles are somewhat useful in the back-engineering process, but that they have very little predictive value. We have also considered whether viruses should be considered alive, and have pointed to the need for astrobiology to include viruses in its studies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 353-365
Author(s):  
Herbert Spencer ◽  
Michael Taylor

Author(s):  
John Maynard Smith ◽  
Eors Szathmary

Imagine that, when the first spacemen step out of their craft onto the surface of one of the moons of Jupiter, they are confronted by an object the size of a horse, rolling towards them on wheels, and bearing on its back a concave disc pointing towards the Sun. They will at once conclude that the object is alive, or has been made by something alive. If all they find is a purple smear on the surface of the rocks, they will have to work harder to decide. This is the phenotypic approach to the definition of life: a thing is alive if it has parts, or ‘organs’, which perform functions. William Paley explained the machine-like nature of life by the existence of a creator: today, we would invoke natural selection. There are, however, dangers in assuming that any entity with the properties of a self-regulating machine is alive, or an artefact. In section 2.2, we tell the story of a self-regulating atomic reactor, the Oklo reactor, which is neither. This story can be taken in one of three ways. First, it shows the dangers of the phenotypic definition of life: not all complex entities are alive. Second, it illustrates how the accidents of history can give rise spontaneously to surprisingly complex machine-like entities. The relevance of this to the origin of life is obvious. In essence, the problem is the following. How could chemical and physical processes give rise, without natural selection, to entities capable of hereditary replication, which would therefore, from then on, evolve by natural selection? The Oklo reactor is an example of what can happen. Finally, section 2.2 can simply be skipped: the events were interesting, but do not resemble in detail those that led to the origin of life on Earth. There is an alternative to the phenotypic definition of life. It is to define as alive any entities that have the properties of multiplication, variation and heredity. The logic behind this definition, first proposed by Muller (1966), is that a population of entities with these properties will evolve by natural selection, and hence can be expected to acquire the complex adaptations for survival and reproduction that are characteristic of living things.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard A. J. M. Jagers op Akkerhuis

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