scholarly journals The Significance of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Religious Belief

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Wawrzyniak

AbstractThis article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.

Author(s):  
Leonie Westenberg

Carol Winkelmann, in her book ‘The Language of Battered Women’ describes not only the fact that domestic abuse is almost a daily occurrence in the lives of many women but that the language of religion and faith is often used by women in attempts to explain, understand and cope with such abuse . While religious belief and domestic violence may seem contradictory in terms of religious values of faith, virtue and love, research demonstrates that domestic violence in religious families and amidst religious congregations is prevalent. In fact, religious beliefs and practices are often embedded in cultural contexts and thus perpetuate patriarchal notions of dominance, power and submission. Abused Christian women, for example, are more likely to seek help from (male) ministers and others in positions of authority in their local church communities and are equally more likely to remain in or return to unsafe relationships, citing their religious beliefs to support their avoidance of ‘family break-ups’ because of abuse. What, then, is the response of ministers and church authorities to domestic abuse in their congregations? Despite recent calls for the training of pastors and other religious leaders in an understanding of domestic violence and in the recognition of appropriate, helpful responses, the language of some Christian churches can be seen to foster notions of submission so that women and pastors alike can appear confused concerning the experience of abuse. Religious congregations, while acting in love to help the poor and needy, for example, often fail to recognise domestic abuse amongst their own members and, indeed, such a topic can remain taboo in some church communities. Women, in turning to their pastors or other Christian leaders for help, can be silenced by the language of the religion itself, so that the role of wives and mothers may be seen to be submissive and the ‘keeper of the home’; to leave an abusive relationship may thus ‘break-up’ a home and imply failure of the woman to understand her role and fulfil her ‘maternal vocation’. On the other hand, religious beliefs offer victims of domestic violence both hope and comfort. Religious practices, such as prayer, liturgies and corporal (physical) works of mercy, can provide solace and practical assistance for women who suffer abuse. Domestic violence in religious congregations can be addressed within the context of the faith itself, with an emphasis on love and respect, helping women to understand their dignity with avenues of help so that the women can remove themselves and their children from abusive relationships, and the religious congregation and its leaders can call the partners to accountability. This paper seeks to outline a picture of domestic violence in religious congregations, specifically Christian church communities, by drawing on current research in the Western world. It then describes the language of some religious congregations that perpetuates domestic violence, with emphasis on contemporary studies in religious belief and domestic abuse. Finally, the paper makes some suggestions on how religious belief and practice can, in contrast to perpetuating abuse through norms, serve to assist women as victims of domestic violence, and how the connections between domestic violence and religious language or belief can be severed.


Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (246) ◽  
pp. 427-452
Author(s):  
John W. Cook

I find myself in profound disagreement with Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion and hence in disagreement also with those philosophers who have undertaken to elaborate and defend Wittgenstein's position. My principal objection is to the idea that religion is a language-game (or perhaps that each religion is a language-game) and that because of the kind of language-game it is, religious believers are not to be thought of as necessarily harbouring beliefs about the world over and above their secular beliefs. I reject this position, not because I think that there are language-games and that religion happens not to be one, but because I find the very idea of a language-game to be indefensible. Put another way, I find myself out of sympathy with the recent idea that in philosophy of religion we ought to be discussing something called ‘religious language’ or ‘the kind of language involved in religious beliefs’.


1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (70) ◽  
pp. 109-132
Author(s):  
Alejandro Tomasini Bassols

In this paper I try to show, having recourse mainly to two Wittgensteinian concepts (viz., criteria and family resemblances), what the conditions for ascription of religious beliefs are. I emphasize the use of religious language and religious praxis. From this perspective, the question of how is a religious belief verified changes dramatically. The point of this analysis is to make clear why to interpret religious beliefs (and assertions) as factual beliefs is radically misguided. This does not mean that wc cannot speak at all of “religious verification”, but only that ‘verification’ in this context must mean something quite different from what it means in, say, scientific contexts. I discuss Hick’s views on “escatological verification” and try to show why the concept is spureous and, accordingly, why it cannot work. Finally, I attempt to show that the impossibility of empirical verification of religious belief commits a believer with a rejection of classical theism but not with any kind of irrationalism.


1981 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Millar

Much contemporary philosophy of religion is preoccupied with highly general problems about the nature of religious belief and of religious language, rather than with how to interpret, in detail, specific religious beliefs or forms of religious discourse. Among the matters of dispute there seem to be two of overriding importance. The first concerns the relation between religious beliefs and experience and centres on the question, what sorts of experience are relevant to the acceptance or rejection of religious beliefs. The second concerns whether or not religious beliefs have an explanatory function. Discussion of both these themes in relation to theistic belief is still largely dominated by conceptions of God and of his relation to the world which have been developed by natural theologians, particularly, though not exclusively, those who have worked within traditions significantly influenced by Thomas Aquinas. Thus the idea that religious beliefs have an explanatory function is commonly associated with the view that they present answers to questions raised by those alleged traits or features of the world which have been the concern of natural theologians and which have been described by means of concepts of ‘contingency’, ‘purposiveness’, ‘order’, and ‘design’. Consequently, the sort of experience often held to be relevant to the acceptance or rejection of theistic belief is that which is relevant to the application of these problematic concepts.


1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Michael McLain

What has Jerusalem to do with Athens? The everchanging contours of the answer to this question have taken an arresting shape with the confluence of existentialist theology and analytic philosophy. This improbable union has led to an impressive and attractive account of religious belief and its language. Under the influence of Kierkegaard, Buber, and others, existentialist theology has argued persuasively for the non-theoretical, practical character of religious belief; it has, of late, discovered inspiration and assistance for this position in the reflections of recent analytic philosophy on the difficulties involved in speculative philosophy. The resultant theological point of view is one which argues for a ‘practical’ interpretation of religion, one which holds that the meaning of religious language is to be found exclusively in its use. Religion is seen as a self-contained ‘form of life’, and its language is held to have its own peculiar ‘logic’. It follows that religious beliefs and conceptions are intelligible in their own right and do not need to be explicated or justified with the aid of an ontology or metaphysic. I propose in this essay to appraise a recent statement of this position, and, in so doing, explore the broad question of the bearing of analytic reflections on the question of Christian theology's relationship to philosophy.


Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier ◽  
Michael Weber

This chapter articulates and defends a “partially subjectivist” way of defining burdens on religious belief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On this view, courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief. There is only a minor requirement that the plaintiffs have to satisfy, which is to show that the government is doing something that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs—a relatively easy hurdle to clear. In general, courts are ill-equipped to determine what people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to determining when those beliefs are substantially burdened. More strongly, there is a tradition that says evaluating when people’s religious beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business. The partially subjectivist view honors these principles.


1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-97
Author(s):  
VINCENT BRÜMMER

In this response to Stenmark's critique of my views on rational theology, I concentrate on his distinction between the epistemic and the practical goals of religion and between descriptive and normative rational theology. With regard to the first distinction, I grant that truth claims play an essential role in religious belief and that it is indeed the task of philosophy of religion to decide on the meaning and rationality of such claims. I argue, however, that since such claims are internally related to the practical context of religious belief, their meaning and rationality cannot be determined apart from this context as is done in the kind of rational theology which Stenmark calls ‘scientific’. With regard to the second distinction, I reject Stenmark's view that philosophy of religion has a descriptive task with reference to religion, and hence also his claim that I have put forward a false description of ‘the religious language game’.


1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Stephen Evans

At the risk of a tremendous over-simplification, I believe it is helpful to categorize views of Christianity which have appeared in the west in the last two hundred years into three major groups. First there are the unbelievers, those for whom Christianity is straightforwardly untrue, unknowable, or unbelievable (or all three). This group would include those who try to salvage some form of essentially humanistic religion as well as those who simply turn away from religious belief altogether, either to put their ultimate hopes in political ideology, or science, or simply to attempt to limit themselves to hopes which are finite and non-ultimate in character.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen

AbstractNorenzayan et al.’s theoretical synthesis is highly plausible and commendable. However, the empirical evidence for the arguments on mentalizing, cognitive biases, and religious belief is currently not as strong as the writers suggest. Although certainly abundant and compelling, this evidence is indirect, contradictory, and weak and must be acknowledged as such. More direct studies are needed to support the theory.


1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Winfred George Phillips

In Brand Blanshard's major defence of reason in religion, Reason and Belief, he criticizes both Roman Catholics and Protestants for advocating contradictory theological doctrines and for believing beyond what the evidence supports. Claiming belief to be an ethical matter, with one morally responsible for one's religious beliefs, he holds that one is morally obligated in such metaphysical matters to believe only what the evidence warrants. Blanshard finds that religious beliefs typically fail to meet the standard of this ethics of belief, and thus his ethics appears inhospitable to religious belief.


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