Wolność religijna jako instrument ochrony prawnej przeciwników małżeństw jednopłciowych. Zmiany w prawie stanu Missisipi po wydaniu orzeczenia w sprawie Obergefell v. Hodges

Przedmiotem rozważań zawartych w niniejszym artykule są dokonywane ostatnio w Missisipi zmiany legislacyjne, będące reakcją zwolenników tradycyjnej koncepcji małżeństwa na legalizację małżeństw pomiędzy osobami tej samej płci. Szczególna uwaga zwrócona jest na Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act i Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act. Na ich kanwie przedstawiono reakcję konserwatywnych środowisk stanu Missisipi na orzeczenie Obergefell v. Hodges, jak również kontrreakcję ruchu LGBT. Przeprowadzone analizy uwidaczniają napięcie, jakie istnieje pomiędzy zasadami równości i wolności religijnej, interpretowanymi w myśl założeń przyjmowanych przez przeciwne strony sporu. Prowadzi to do konkluzji, że nie istnieją prawne możliwości rozwiązania tego konfliktu na drodze kompromisu. Zgodnie z tezą artykułu, gwarancje wolności religijnej mogą natomiast stać się instrumentem ochrony prawnej oponentów małżeństw homoseksualnych przed zarzutami o dyskryminację w sytuacjach, gdy wyznawana przez nich religia nie pozwala im na uznanie za małżeństwo związku osób tej samej płci.

Freedom of and from Religion

This chapter examines Supreme Court cases that were filed over the issue of freedom of and from religion in Texas. In 2011, Governor Rick Perry designated April 22–24 as official days of prayer for rain. Periodical subscriptions were exempted from sales tax. Then in a clear example of a preference for religion, the law was changed to exempt only “periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of that faith.” Texas Monthly paid the tax but sued for a refund. The chapter first considers the Texas Monthly lawsuit before discussing cases involving Alfred Smith and Galen Black, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Thomas Van Orden, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It also analyzes City of Boerne v. Flores involving historic zoning and a case involving prayer at a football game.

Insubstantial Burdens

This chapter articulates and defends a “partially subjectivist” way of defining burdens on religious belief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On this view, courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief. There is only a minor requirement that the plaintiffs have to satisfy, which is to show that the government is doing something that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs—a relatively easy hurdle to clear. In general, courts are ill-equipped to determine what people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to determining when those beliefs are substantially burdened. More strongly, there is a tradition that says evaluating when people’s religious beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business. The partially subjectivist view honors these principles.

Submarine Statutes

I define as “submarine statutes” a category of statutes that affect the meaning of later-passed statutes. A submarine statute calls for courts to apply future statutes differently than they would have otherwise. An example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which requires, in some circumstances, exemptions for religious exercise from otherwise compulsory statutory requirements. A new statute can only be understood if its interaction with RFRA is also understood. While scholars have debated the constitutionality of some statutes like these, mainly analyzing the legitimacy of their entrenching quality, I argue that submarine statutes carry an overlooked cost. Namely, they add complexity to the legal background of which a legislator must be aware if he or she is sensibly to express an intention in a new piece of legislation. The thicker the legislative waters are with submarines, the more legislatures are called to make common-law-like surveys of the legal landscape in order to understand the legislation they draft. I discuss several options for controlling the cognitive cost submarines impose on future legislation, including quasi-constitutionalization, super-statutization, and segregation.