scholarly journals Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present

2021 ◽  
pp. 110678
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Exit Option

scholarly journals First- and second-order sociality determine survival and reproduction in cooperative cichlids

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1819) ◽  
pp. 20151971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne Jungwirth ◽  
Michael Taborsky
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Reproductive Output ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Cichlid Fish ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Indirect Fitness ◽  
Fitness Benefits ◽  
Different Levels

Cooperative breeders serve as a model to study the evolution of cooperation, where costs and benefits of helping are typically scrutinized at the level of group membership. However, cooperation is often observed in multi-level social organizations involving interactions among individuals at various levels. Here, we argue that a full understanding of the adaptive value of cooperation and the evolution of complex social organization requires identifying the effect of different levels of social organization on direct and indirect fitness components. Our long-term field data show that in the cooperatively breeding, colonial cichlid fish Neolamprologus pulcher , both large group size and high colony density significantly raised group persistence. Neither group size nor density affected survival at the individual level, but they had interactive effects on reproductive output; large group size raised productivity when local population density was low, whereas in contrast, small groups were more productive at high densities. Fitness estimates of individually marked fish revealed indirect fitness benefits associated with staying in large groups. Inclusive fitness, however, was not significantly affected by group size, because the direct fitness component was not increased in larger groups. Together, our findings highlight that the reproductive output of groups may be affected in opposite directions by different levels of sociality, and that complex forms of sociality and costly cooperation may evolve in the absence of large indirect fitness benefits and the influence of kin selection.

scholarly journals The early evolution of cooperation in humans. On cheating, group identity and group size

Behaviour ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 153 (9-11) ◽  
pp. 1247-1266 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Czárán ◽  
Duur K. Aanen
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Low Frequency ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Spatially Explicit ◽  
Group Identities ◽  
Limited Dispersal ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Explicit Simulation ◽  
Group Diversity ◽  
Large Groups

The evolution of cooperation is difficult to understand, because cheaters — individuals who profit without cooperating themselves — have a benefit in interaction with cooperators. Cooperation among humans is even more difficult to understand, because cooperation occurs in large groups, making cheating a bigger threat. Restricting cooperation to members of one’s own group based on some tag-based recognition of non-group members (allorecognition) has been shown to stabilise cooperation. We address how spatial structure and group size affect the opportunities for cheating such tag-based cooperation in a spatially explicit simulation. We show that increased group diversity, under conditions of limited dispersal, reduces the selective opportunities for cheaters. A small number can already be sufficient to keep cheating at a low frequency. We discuss how marginal additional benefits of increased group size, above the benefits of local cooperation, can provide the selective pressure to reduce the number of group identities and discuss possible examples.

scholarly journals Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

2005 ◽  
Vol 272 (1570) ◽  
pp. 1373-1377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shinsuke Suzuki ◽  
Eizo Akiyama
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dyadic Interaction ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Stable Manner ◽  
Considerable Concern

The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communities where the effect of reputation is included. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups in which the reputation of individuals affects the decision-making process. This paper presents the following: (i) cooperation can evolve in a four-person case, (ii) the evolution of cooperation becomes difficult as group size increases, even if the effect of reputation is included, and (iii) three kinds of final social states exist. In medium-sized communities, cooperative species can coexist in a stable manner with betrayal species.

scholarly journals Group size effects in social evolution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Georg Nöldeke
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Basin Of Attraction ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Public Goods Games

AbstractHow the size of social groups affects the evolution of cooperative behaviors is a classic question in evolutionary biology. Here we investigate group size effects in the evolutionary dynamics of games in which individuals choose whether to cooperate or defect and payoffs do not depend directly on the size of the group. We find that increasing the group size decreases the proportion of cooperators at both stable and unstable rest points of the replicator dynamics. This implies that larger group sizes can have negative effects (by reducing the amount of cooperation at stable polymorphisms) and positive effects (by enlarging the basin of attraction of more cooperative outcomes) on the evolution of cooperation. These two effects can be simultaneously present in games whose evolutionary dynamics feature both stable and unstable rest points, such as public goods games with participation thresholds. Our theory recovers and generalizes previous results and is applicable to a broad variety of social interactions that have been studied in the literature.

scholarly journals High temperatures drive offspring mortality in a cooperatively breeding bird

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda R. Bourne ◽  
Susan J. Cunningham ◽  
Claire N. Spottiswoode ◽  
Amanda R. Ridley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Reproductive Success ◽  
Group Size ◽  
High Temperatures ◽  
Environmental Conditions ◽  
Cooperative Breeding ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Daily Maximum ◽  
Unexpected Result ◽  
Development Stages

AbstractAn improved understanding of life history responses to current environmental variability is required to predict species-specific responses to anthopogenic climate change. Previous research has suggested that cooperation in social groups may buffer individuals against some of the negative effects of unpredictable climates. We use a 15-year dataset on a cooperative-breeding arid-zone bird, the southern pied babbler Turdoides bicolor, to test i) whether environmental conditions and group size correlate with survival of young during three development stages (egg, nestling, fledgling), and ii) whether group size mitigates the impacts of adverse environmental conditions on reproductive success. Exposure to high mean daily maximum temperatures (mean Tmax) during early development was associated with reduced survival probabilities of young in all three development stages. No young survived when mean Tmax > 38°C across all group sizes. Low reproductive success at high temperatures has broad implications for recruitment and population persistence in avian communities given the rapid pace of advancing climate change. That impacts of high temperatures were not moderated by group size, a somewhat unexpected result given prevailing theories around the influence of environmental uncertainty on the evolution of cooperation, suggests that cooperative breeding strategies are unlikely to be advantageous in the face of rapid anthropogenic climate change.

Group Size, Memory, and Interaction Rate in the Evolution of Cooperation

1999 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Cox ◽  
T. J. Slockin ◽  
J. Steele
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interaction Rate

scholarly journals Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift

2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1854) ◽  
pp. 20170228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Chao ◽  
Santiago F. Elena
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Gene Products ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Defective Interfering Particles ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
High Level

The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.

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