scholarly journals Trump Administration Announces Withdrawal from Four International Agreements

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-141

In October of 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States would withdraw from four international agreements. On October 3, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. Later that day, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that the United States was also withdrawing from the Optional Protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both withdrawals were triggered by pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases grounded in these treaties that were recently brought against the United States. Two weeks later, in an escalation of the ongoing trade dispute with China, the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the international body charged with overseeing the international mailing system. Finally, on October 22, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would be terminating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. Unlike other withdrawals undertaken by the Trump administration, this latest round involved three Article II treaties to which the Senate had provided its advice and consent. In addition, the international commitments withdrawn from in this round were long-standing ones, with U.S. participation in the UPU going back as far as 1875.

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-149

While Palestine considers itself a state, the United States does not currently recognize it as such. The relationship between the two has continued to deteriorate following the December 2017 announcement that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move its embassy there. Alleging that the embassy relocation violates international law, Palestine brought a case against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in September of 2018. The United States reacted by announcing its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Also in the fall of 2018, the Trump administration closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, curtailed its own Palestinian-focused mission in Jerusalem, and sharply cut U.S. funding focused on Palestinian interests.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Scott Anderson

Over the past two years, we have really seen the Trump administration make treaty withdrawal something of a signature move, from the Treaty of Amity with Iran to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, to the Optional Protocol for the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The administration has taken steps to remove the United States, rightly or wrongly, from a wide array of longstanding international legal obligations. And while it is far from unprecedented, the administration has done so at a little bit of a faster pace than certain prior administrations have—and has embedded a lot of these moves within a consistent critique of international institutions and international commitments that promises further change on the horizon.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
David P. Stewart

On July 7, 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of Humberto Leal García, a Mexican national who had been convicted some sixteen years ago in Texas of murder.1 Relying on the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘‘ICJ’’) in the Avena case,2 García contended that the United States had violated his right to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘‘Consular Convention’’).3 He sought the stay so that the U.S. Congress could consider enactment of proposed legislation to implement the ICJ decision.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected his argument, stating that ‘‘[t]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.’’5 García was executed by lethal injection that evening.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  

In its judgement from June 27, 2001, in the LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), the International Court of Justice made a number of watershed rulings: (a) The Court established that Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations creates individual rights for foreign nationals abroad, and not just rights protecting the interests of states that are a party to the Convention; (b) The Court ruled that, beyond the undisputed failure on the part of the U.S. to take the measures required by the Convention, the application of an American provision of criminal procedure in the LaGrand brothers' cases (a provision that prevented the domestic courts from reviewing the implications of the Convention violation admitted by the Americans) itself constituted a violation of Article 36(2) of the Convention; (c) The Court, as a remedy in the case of future violations of the Convention, ordered the United States to provide a procedure for the review and reconsideration of convictions secured in circumstances in which the obligations of the Convention had not been observed; and (d) as a separate matter the Court ruled that its provisional orders, issued pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, have binding effect.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-182

In the wake of President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimpose sanctions, Iran instituted proceedings against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its application, filed on July 16, 2018, Iran alleged that the re-imposition of sanctions constituted a violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity) between Iran and the United States. In order to prevent “irreparable damages” to the Iranian economy, Iran simultaneously filed a request for provisional measures. After the ICJ issued an order unanimously granting limited provisional measures on October 3, 2018, the United States announced its intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity. The United States issued its first phase of sanctions on August 7, 2018, and the remaining sanctions took effect on November 5, 2018.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Chachko

On October 3, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a unanimous order indicating limited provisional measures against the United States. Iran initiated the case, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), after the United States announced its decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and revoke related sanctions relief for Iran. While the ICJ found that it had prima facie jurisdiction to hear the case—contrary to the U.S. position—the provisional measures it granted fell significantly short of the relief Iran sought. The Court also hinted that it might accept a significant element of the U.S. jurisdictional objection at the merits stage of the case.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Bederman

Much of the scholarly attention given to the U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2008 decision in Medellín v. Texas has focused on the Court’s supposed ruling as to the presumptive nonself-execution of international agreements entered into by the United States, and the power of the president to implement such agreements without an act of Congress. Less heed has been paid to the impact and implications of the Court’s reasoning and analysis in interpreting the four international agreements at issue in the case: the 1945 United Nations Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and its Optional Protocol. Although the Court’s analysis of the self-execution questions is beyond the scope of my contribution to this Agora, I acknowledge that the jurisprudence of treaty interpretation fits uncomfortably with the calculus of an international agreement’s selfexecution into U.S. law. And while it may seem obscure to view the Medellín decision through the lens of treaty interpretation, that is what truly brings its importance into focus, so that its impact may ultimately be seen as clarifying the established norms of U.S. foreign relations law, particularly in the selection of appropriate sources for treaty construction and the deference to be granted to various foreign relations actors and institutions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. LE MON

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 1-83

1International Court of Justice — Provisional measures — Conditions for the indication of provisional measures — Prima facie basis for jurisdiction — Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955, between Iran and the United States of America — Whether acts of which Iran complained falling within material scope of the 1955 Treaty — Article XX, 1(c) and 1(d) of the 1955 Treaty — Whether Article XX restricting the Court’s jurisdiction — Plausibility of rights asserted — Whether Article XX making Iran’s asserted rights not plausible — Whether rights invoked by Iran arising under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — Defence available to United States of America — Link between measures requested and rights whose protection Iran seeking — Real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice — Evidence of irreparable prejudice — Continuing character of irreparable prejudice — Urgency in the circumstances — Humanitarian concerns — Non-aggravation and non-extension of the dispute — Binding character of provisional measuresEconomics, trade and finance — Economic sanctions — Sanctions imposed by the United States of America against Iran — Territorial extent — Whether capable of affecting rights under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955, between Iran and the United States of America — Provisional measures jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Diane A. Desierto

On February 3, 2021, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on preliminary objections in Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). The judgment rejected all of the United States’ preliminary objections, declared the admissibility of Iran's Application, and held that the Court has jurisdiction “on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955.”


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