East European military expenditures in the 1970s: collective good or bargaining offer?

1983 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Reisinger
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Gross National Product ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Military Expenditures ◽  
Domestic Support ◽  
Nicolae Ceausescu ◽  
General Secretary

In late November 1978, Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, returned to Bucharest from a Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). In a series of speeches from 25 November through 1 December, he began to denounce efforts by the Soviet Union to integrate more fully the armies of the WTO members and to get the East European members to increase their defense expenditures. Ceausescu was making a dramatic (and apparently successful) appeal for domestic support for his resistance to Soviet pressure. Other WTO member-states, although less publicly, have also resisted this Soviet pressure. Romania is not the only East European state ignoring Soviet calls for higher defense spending. Poland, for example, has also shown a significant decline during the 1970s in the amount of its gross national product (GNP) spent on defense (D/GNP). East Germany, on the other hand, increased its expenditures dramatically over the same decade.

U.S. Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Ostrom ◽  
Robin F. Marra
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Defense Expenditure ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Military Expenditures ◽  
Multistep Model ◽  
The One ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

There is a glaring and potentially important discontinuity surrounding discussions of U.S. defense expenditure policy making. On the one hand, a growing body of empirically-based research questions whether the U.S. reacts in any significant fashion to the military expenditures of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, defense policy makers routinely justify defense increases as a response to similar increases by the Soviet Union. The discontinuity is resolved in the context of a multistep model of the defense expenditure policy-making process that incorporates a new estimate of Soviet defense spending and mass public opinion. Once formulated, the model provides answers to the following two questions: (1) Does the U.S., insofar as defense spending is concerned, react to the military expenditures of the Soviet Union? (2) If so, what is the magnitude of the reaction? The answers indicate that not only does the U.S. react to estimated Soviet defense spending, but that the reaction is directly responsible for a very substantial portion of the post-1978 increases in U.S. military expenditures.

Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 137-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Celeste A. Wallander
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Political Dissent ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Military Expenditures ◽  
Made In

The role of Western governments in the disintegration of the Soviet Union was complex. The two most important factors that undermined the Soviet state were the deepening economic chaos under Mikhail Gorbachev and the rapid growth of internal political dissent. Western policies tended to magnify both of these factors. This is not to say, however, that Gorbachev's original decision to embark on an economic reform program was simply the result of pressure created by Western defense spending and military deployments. The Soviet economy was plagued by severe weaknesses, of which the misallocation of resources and excessive military expenditures were only a small part. Gorbachev's initial economic reforms were spurred by his awareness of the country's general economic problems. After the first round of reforms failed, he sensed that arms control and reductions in military spending would be helpful for the next stage. Even so, the belated cuts he made in military spending (beginning in 1990) were of relatively little consequence. The West's refusal to pour money into the Soviet system without evidence of structural reform in the last years of the Soviet regime, and Western pressure on Gorbachev not to crack down on political dissent and separatism, did hasten the Soviet collapse. These policies denied the Soviet system resources that might have prolonged its survival, and they helped to deter Gorbachev from using decisive force against elements that were splitting the Soviet Union apart.

The Challenges to Social Control in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, 1964-1982

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-173
Author(s):  
Fedor L. Sinitsyn
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Social Control ◽  
Soviet System ◽  
State Archive ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Russian State ◽  
The Government ◽  
General Secretary

This article examines the development of social control in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964 to 1982. Historians have largely neglected this question, especially with regard to its evolution and efficiency. Research is based on sources in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Moscow Central State Archive (TSGAM). During Brezhnevs rule, Soviet propaganda reached the peak of its development. However, despite the fact that authorities tried to improve it, the system was ritualistic, unconvincing, unwieldy, and favored quantity over quality. The same was true for political education, which did little more than inspire sullen passivity in its students. Although officials recognized these failings, their response was ineffective, and over time Soviet propaganda increasingly lost its potency. At the same time, there were new trends in the system of social control. Authorities tried to have a foot in both camps - to strengthen censorship, and at the same time to get feedback from the public. However, many were afraid to express any criticism openly. In turn, the government used data on peoples sentiments only to try to control their thoughts. As a result, it did not respond to matters that concerned the public. These problems only increased during the era of stagnation and contributed to the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet system.

scholarly journals Dyplomacja Nicolae Ceauşescu wobec przemian politycznych w Polsce w 1989 roku

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 239-258
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Nowak
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Warsaw Pact ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Communist Leader ◽  
Armed Intervention ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Gorbachev Era ◽  
Nicolae Ceausescu

Nicolae Ceauşescu’s Diplomacy in the Face of Political Changes in Poland in 1989 In 1989, Romania belonged to the communist countries, which particularly strongly attacked communist Poland for carrying out democratic reforms. For many months the diplomacy of communist leader Nicolae Ceaşescu tried to organize a conference of socialist countries on the subject of Poland, but as a result of Moscow’s opposition it did not come to fruition. During the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union rejected the Brezhnev doctrine, while Romania actually urged its restoration. This was in contradiction with the current political line of Ceauşescu in favor of not interfering in the internal affairs of socialist countries. However, in 1989 it was a threat to communism, which is why historians also have polemics about Romanian suggestions for the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Poland. In turn, Romania did not allow Poland to interfere in the problems of the Polish minority in Bukovina.

Trial Balloons

2020 ◽  
pp. 84-105
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Force ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
East And West ◽  
General Secretary

This chapter is devoted to Konstantin Chernenko' efforts to shift superpower relations back to a détente-like footing during his time as a General Secretary of the Soviet Union. It examines attempts on the part of various Western leaders to carve out a role for themselves as the superpowers' chosen intermediary. It also investigates the balance of power between East and West, including how and why leaders in Washington and Moscow perceived and responded to each other as they did. The chapter analyzes the nuclear freeze movement, which has remained a political force to be reckoned with as the movement called for both superpowers to halt the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons. It talks about the freeze activists in the United States who shepherded the passage of nonbinding resolutions that support their cause in four state legislatures, the House, and the Senate.

Jewish Communist, Socialist, and Maverick Lawyers

2003 ◽  
pp. 329-343
Author(s):  
John Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Second Generation ◽  
Legal Reform ◽  
Labour Party ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Business Perspective ◽  
European Immigrants

This chapter reflects on Jewish communist, socialist, and maverick lawyers. Whereas many Jewish solicitors viewed their profession primarily from a business perspective—and were extremely successful in both business and professional terms—another group of solicitors from the same east European background were driven by more altruistic motives, impelled by a zealous pursuit of justice on behalf of their clients or devoted to active campaigning for specific legal reform. Some members of this latter group were communists; a larger number of the outstanding Jewish lawyers from the second generation of east European immigrants were associated with the Labour Party; still others were mavericks. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, it has become apparent that the recruitment of Jewish lawyers into the Communist Party was a passing phase born out of the frustrations of the 1930s, and the misplaced idealism of the early 1950s. Towards the end of the century, Jewish radicalism continued in new forms.

The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3)

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Political System ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
East European ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
External Context ◽  
Final Segment ◽  
Extended Analysis ◽  
The Impact

This is the concluding part of a three-part article that discusses the transformation of Soviet-East European relations in the late 1980s and the impact of the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. This final segment is divided into two main parts: First, it provides an extended analysis of the bitter public debate that erupted in the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991 about the “loss” of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The debate roiled the Soviet political system and fueled the hardline backlash against Mikhail Gorbachev. Second, this part of the article offers a concluding section that highlights the theoretical implications of the article as a whole. The article, as the conclusion shows, sheds light on recent literature concerning the diffusion of political innovations and the external context of democratization and political change.

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