Overselling the Un Charter—Fact and Myth

For almost a decade commentators on international organization have nurtured the myth that the UN Charter was originally ‘oversold’ to the American public by enthusiastic supporters, who represented the organization as a panacea for the ills of twentieth-century world politics. So unrealistic were the expectations created by this publicity barrage, so the story runs, that subsequent disillusionment with die UN was inevitable. Although propagated with many variations, the myth finds a classic formulation in the words of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., uttered before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, July 8, 1953: ‘The United Nations,’ said Ambassador Lodge, ‘was oversold. It was advertised entirely as an automatic peace producer. All we had to do was sign on die dotted line—so it was said—and all our troubles would be over’. A recent volume on international relations, currently in use as a college text, restated the myth in a some what less extreme form: ‘Considered a towering edifice of strength in 1945, the United Nations was often shrugged off in the early 1950's with the damning phrase, ‘debating society.’ Because expectations had been so extravagant, the achievements of the United Nations seemed ridiculously trivial to many who had expected a Utopian revolution in international relations that the United Nations could not hope to provide.” Other variations on the theme are no doubt familiar to students of international organization. Use of the expression ‘myth’ implies no denial that ‘a veritable wave of propaganda and influence was generated on behalf of American membership’ in the UN. The country was flooded with information, from bodi government and private sources, designed to win over the public to the desirability of postwar international organization. It is also true that those engaged in selling the UN to the public tried to give their arguments an optimistic, hopeful tone. Recalling the League's fate, they emphasized the differences between the League and the proposed new organization rather than their patent similarities. Often they were guilty of oversimplifying the facts of world politics upon which the future of the UN would necessarily depend. The growing split between Russia and the Western allies, so ominous for the new organization, was not usually highlighted in speeches urging the establishment of the UN. A vigorous selling campaign was unquestionably conducted.