International Monetary Fund

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 678-680

The government of Egypt paid $8,507,929.67 in gold and United States dollars to the International Monetary Fund on July 10,1950 in exchange for the equivalent amount in Egyptian pounds. Of the amount paid by Egypt to the Fund $829,766.03 was in gold and $7,678,163.64 in United States dollars. This payment, which became due in consequence of recent increases in Egypt's monetary reserves, fulfilled that country's obligation to use part of the increase to repurchase the Fund's holdings of Egyptian pounds in excess of 75 percent of Egypt's quota.

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-420

After consulting the International Monetary Fund, on unification of its exchange system, the government of Greece on April 9, 1953, eliminated all multiple currency practices and adjusted the official exchange rate from 15,000 drachmas per United States dollar to 30,000 drachmas per United States dollar. The Fund's announcement of this action by the Greek government added that it welcomed and concurred in these policies. Another proposal to adjust an official exchange rate was approved by the Fund on May 14; the government of Bolivia proposed to establish a new par value for the boliviano of 190 bolivianos per United States dollar. The previous par value was 60 bolivianos per United States dollar. At the same time a Bolivian proposal to simplify its exchange system was approved; effective May 14 the exchange system was to consist of an official and a free market. The official market would be for all trade transactions, government payments, registered capital, and certain specified invisibles. All present exchange taxes, multiple import and export rates, retention quotas, compensation and divisas propias arrangements were eliminated. The Fund welcomed these efforts toward monetary stabilization and emphasized “the importance of firm anti-inflationary measures as a basis for further progress towards the achievement of Bolivia's international equilibrium.”


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-323

During the month of November 1949 the International Monetary Fund sold $22.5 million to Brazil, and the government of Costa Rica repurchased $1.25 million. The Fund concurred in a change proposed by the United Kingdom government in the par value of the British Honduras dollar effective December 31, 1949. In terms of gold and in terms of the United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, the parities for the British Honduras dollar were: 0.622 grams of fine gold per British Honduras dollar and 1.429 British Honduras dollars per United States dollar.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 536-538

In its monthly summary of transactions, the International Monetary Fund announced in April 1949, that it had sold U.S. $7,500,000 to India for rupees during March. There were no other currency exchanges that month. In April, Brazil and Egypt made their first currency purchase from the Fund: Brazil exchanged cruzeiros for $15 million and Egypt $3 million for Egyptian pounds. This brought the total of currency transactions made by member countries of the Fund to $725,483,380.91 since the beginning of operations in March 1947. On May 24, the Fund announced the establishment of the initial par value for the Yugoslav dinar at 50 dinars per United States dollar, the rate proposed by the government of Yugoslavia. On May 3, the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were signed by the Siamese ambassador to the United States on behalf of Siam. This brought to a total of 48 the number of countries that were members of the two organizations. The Fund announced on May 27, the conclusion of consultations with the government of Ecuador on Ecuador's exchange system, and on related matters of credit and monetary policies. As a result of previous consultations with the Fund, Ecuador in June 1947 had introduced certain modifications in her then existing exchange control laws and regulations which were contained in the Emergency Law for International Transfers. As a result of discussions concluded in May the Emergency Law was to be continued for one year more on the understanding that in the meantime consultations between Ecuador and the Fund would take place regarding modifications in the present exchange system.


2019 ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-593
Author(s):  
Aike I. Würdemann

Abstract In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.


Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  

In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund, and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, the Government of the United Kingdom, acting through Her Majesty's Treasury, agrees to lend to the Fund up to the equivalent of SDR 9.92 billion.


Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  

In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund , and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, France agrees to lend to the Fund an SDR-denominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 11.06 billion, on the terms and conditions set out in this report.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1850206
Author(s):  
Kati Suominen

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), only a few years ago fading into obscurity in the thriving world economy, made a comeback during the 2008-2009 crisis. The G-20 re-tasked the Fund and tripled its lending capacity. Notwithstanding its new windfall and duties, the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness are in doubt. The main challenges center on disagreements between the Western European nations and emerging markets over the Fund’s governance and focus, a specter of disintegration of the global crisis management architecture by way of bilateral and regional financial arrangements (particularly in Asia), and limitations to the Fund’s responsiveness to major crises. Yet the threat of global financial instability persists, and the Fund is uniquely qualified to counter it. The United States, the Fund’s founder and main shareholder, has sponsored sound reforms to the Fund in the context of the G-20. However, farther-reaching paradigmatic changes are required for the Fund to effectively manage global economic instability in the 21st century: focusing the Fund’s analytical powers squarely on systemic risks and largest economies rather than on small, developing nations; turning the Fund from a crisis firefighter into a global preventive care unit that rewards members for sound policies; and making the Fund a bridge between public and private insurance markets.


1989 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Wulf

When Zambia introduced weekly foreign-exchange auctions in October 1985 in order to determine the value of the kwacha vis-à-vis the dollar, together with other measures aiming at liberalising external and internal trade and at restructuring the pattern of production, they were widely acclaimed as a model for reforms elsewhere in the continent. The Economist praised Zambia for ‘taking one of the bravest economic gambles that any African country has taken’,1 implying that even in the view of liberal commentators the Government ran a considerable risk in trying to implement this reform programme. The new measures enabled Zambia to reach a fresh stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund in early 1986, the previous one having broken down in 1985 because the authorities failed to meet the I.M.F.'s economic targets.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 710-712

On June 7, 1961, it was announced that the International Monetary Fund had entered into a stand-by arrangement authorizing the government of Ecuador to draw up to $10 million in currencies held by the Fund during the following twelve months. Then, on July 19 the Fund announced that it had concurred in the establishment of a new par value for Ecuador's currency, accompanied by a simplification of the country's exchange system. The par value as of that date was changed from 15 to 18 sucres per United States dollar, and Ecuador discontinued most of its multiple rate practices. Under the new system at least 90 percent of all trade and trade-connected transactions, including the export of such major products as bananas, coffee and cacao, was to be conducted within one percent either side of parity, while a small free market with a fluctuating rate, mainly for nonessential invisible transactions and unregistered capital transactions, was to continue to operate, chiefly as a means of controlling capital movements. During the period under review the Fund also entered into stand-by agreements wkh other Latin American countries. On July 14, 1961, the Fund announced a one-year stand-by arrangement with the government of El Salvador authorizing drawings in an amount equivalent to $11.25 million. The Fund's assistance was designed to help to support the country's reserve position and ensure the continued convertibility of its currency while measures were being adopted to improve El Salvador's internal situation through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.


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