Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeonho Hahm ◽  
Thomas König ◽  
Moritz Osnabrügge ◽  
Elena Frech

AbstractWhat type of trade agreement is the public willing to accept? Instead of focusing on individual concerns about market access and trade barriers, we argue that specific treaty design and, in particular, the characteristics of the dispute settlement mechanism, play a critical role in shaping public support for trade agreements. To examine this theoretical expectation, we conduct a conjoint experiment that varies diverse treaty-design elements and estimate preferences over multiple dimensions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) based on a nationally representative sample in Germany. We find that compared to other alternatives, private arbitration, known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), generates strong opposition to the trade agreement. As the single most important factor, this effect of dispute settlement characteristic is strikingly large and consistent across individuals’ key attributes, including skill levels, information, and national sentiment, among others.

Author(s):  
Amanda M Countryman ◽  
Andrew Muhammad

AbstractImport policies in the European Union have greatly restricted beef imports from all sources. The presence of a binding tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports in tandem with sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on biotechnological food products specifically inhibit beef imports from the United States and limit market access in the EU. Potential passage of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may lead to a loosening of non-tariff measures (NTM) that serve as technical barriers to trade and give rise to the coexistence of hormone and non-hormone beef products in the EU marketplace. This research assesses the potential changes in import demand for beef under a trade agreement that allows for imports of conventional beef as well as an expansion of the existing TRQ in the EU beef import market. Results confirm that EU imports of beef will increase from all sources with an expansion of the TRQ and that elimination of the NTM related to beef production practices leads to an increase in competiveness of U.S. and Australian beef in the EU import market.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-128
Author(s):  
Aneta Tyc

In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Reddie

AbstractThis article examines the controversial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in recent mega-free trade agreement. Below, I examine the origins of the ISDS concept and outline the controversy surrounding its use in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Then, I provide a theoretical discussion that outlines both the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in international trade agreements. Focusing on the latter endogenous factors, I then argue that not all international trade agreements are the same and that, as such, it is possible to develop a typology of international trade agreement across two variables (the number of parties and relative power) that impact the appropriateness of including an ISDS provision. I test this typology against the empirical record. Finally, I discuss potential innovations to the ISDS provisions and market-based mechanisms that address the dual challenges of discrimination and expropriation that ISDS is designed to address.1


2022 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fariz Mauldiansyah

Trade and investment play an important role in the practice of relations between countries in the prospective economic cooperation efforts to increase the economic growth of each country. In this regard, ASEAN also has legal instruments that regulate transactions and investments among other countries. In the trade regime, ASEAN has several agreements such as the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement, ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, and so on. Meanwhile in the investment regime, ASEAN has the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. One of the important components in a Regional Trade Agreement is the clause of a legally binding dispute settlement mechanism. In the trade regime, the system and mechanism of the dispute resolution procedures are separated from other trade agreements, the ASEAN Protocol on the Enhanced Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Meanwhile in the Investment regime, the system and mechanism of the dispute resolution procedure are regulated in the same agreement in the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. This article will describe the procedural mechanism for the dispute resolution framework of the trade and investment regime in ASEAN, as well as focus on each dispute resolution system with the preferences of each participating country, with differences in the use of the dispute system in the WTO. 


Author(s):  
Thomas Cottier

The chapter assesses recent developments in intellectual property protection in the EU–Canadian Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and extrapolates results of these negotiations to the pending EU–US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It discusses the likely implications of ever-increasing protection of IPRs on international trade, innovation, and technology transfer. Given the complex interaction of TRIPs and WIPO Agreements with the newly emerging agreements, the chapter finally examines the structure and operation of dispute settlement and how existing fragmentation could be overcome. Intellectual property, it is submitted, offers an important case to extend the jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement to preferential trade agreements.


Author(s):  
J. ANTHONY VANDUZER ◽  
MELANIE MALLET

Abstract Canadian commitments under trade and investment treaties have been an ongoing concern for Indigenous peoples. The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) is the first Canadian treaty to include a general exception for measures that a party state “deems necessary to fulfill its legal obligations to [I]ndigenous peoples.” This exception is likely to afford Canada broad, but not unlimited, discretion to determine what its legal obligations to Indigenous peoples require. There is a residual risk that Canada’s reliance on the exception could be challenged through the CUSMA dispute settlement process. A CUSMA panel would not have the expertise necessary to decide inevitably complex questions related to what Canada’s legal obligations to Indigenous peoples require. While state-to-state cases under the North American Free Trade Agreement have been rare, a CUSMA panel adjudication regarding the Indigenous general exception risks damaging consequences for Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples.


Author(s):  
P. Kadochnikov ◽  
M. Ptashkina

The US and the EU are negotiating a comprehensive Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The main purposes of the agreement are to stimulate economic growth and employment, to facilitate trade and investment and raise competitiveness on both sides of the Atlantic. The US and EU are the biggest trade and investment partners for each other, as well as most important partners for a number of other countries. The Trans-Atlantic free trade agreement would not only facilitate bilateral cooperation, but has a potential to set up new, more advanced international trade and investment rules and practices. The agreement is aimed, among other point, at resolving some of the existing problems in bilateral relations, such as differences in regulatory practices, market access conditions, government procurement, intellectual property rights (IPR) and investor protection. However, some of these differences are deeply inherent in the regulatory systems and have become the reasons for numerous disputes. Despite the fact that the negotiations on TTIP are still in progress, it is already possible to identify and assess the underlying differences that would potentially hamper the creation of deep provisions in the future agreement. The paper aims at analyzing the most difficult areas of negotiations and giving predictions for the future provisions. Firstly, the paper gives an overview of the scope and structure of bilateral relations between the US and EU. Secondly, the authors give detailed analysis of the most important points of the negotiation’s agenda, making stress on the underlying differences in domestic regulation and assessing the depth of those differences. The conclusions are as follows. While some of the areas, such as tariffs, labor and environment, SMEs, state enterprises and others, are relatively easy to agree upon, as both economies are striving to achieve high standards, negotiations on other issues, such as government procurement, NTM regulation and IPR are less likely to achieve high standards.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 309-315
Author(s):  
Robert Howse

Late last year, the European Commission unveiled an ambitious and complex proposal to replace investor-state arbitration with a transnational court, including an appellate instance, which has now been incorporated into its new bilateral agreements with Vietnam and Canada (CETA). The Commission was responding to strong public resistance to including investor protections in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the European Union and the United States. This resistance reflects a remarkable shift in emphasis from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the investment regime in what could be called loosely the antineoliberal globalization movement. The overarching concern is that international decision-makers with a neoliberal or procorporate bias will limit the policy space of sovereign states, especially in sensitive areas such as public services, the environment, health, and safety. While it is arguable that few of the actual outcomes in investor-state disputes can properly be understood in this way, the pursuit by Philip Morris of its attack on tobacco regulation through the investment regime has certainly provided a very obvious example for the activists. (The defeat of that challenge on jurisdictional grounds doesn’t really provide assurance about the substantive norms at issue and their consistency with policy space.)


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