The Case for Recognizing Peking Now—or in 1992

Worldview ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
Gerald F. Hyman

If Secretary of State Vance's “exploratory” trip to China proved nothing else, it demonstrated once again that because our relations with Taiwan are the main obstacles to recognizing the People's Republic of China, it is Taiwan, not mainland China, that poses the main problem for American foreign policy in Asia. To a man the Chinese reiterated their conditions for establishing relations: abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954; break diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and withdraw the American military personnel from the island. With respect to the general question of Taiwan, they all referred back to the PRC section of the Shanghai Communique (published jointly with our own):The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined” [The “Shanghai Communique,” February 27, 1972].

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-517
Author(s):  
Marian Nash (Leich)

On March 3,1997, President William J. Clinton transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as a treaty the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders, signed at Hong Kong on December 20,1996. In his letter of transmittal, President Clinton pointed out that, upon its entry into force, the Agreement would “enhance cooperation between the law enforcement communities of the United States and Hong Kong, and … provide a framework and basic protections for extraditions after the reversion of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997.” The President continued: Given the absence of an extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, this Treaty would provide the means to continue an extradition relationship with Hong Kong after reversion and avoid a gap in law enforcement. It will thereby make a significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts.The provisions of this Agreement follow generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. In addition, the Agreement contains several provisions specially designed in light of the particular status of Hong Kong. The Agreement’s basic protections for fugitives are also made expressly applicable to fugitives surrendered by the two parties before the new treaty enters into force.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-138 ◽  

The tenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 20 to December 20, 1955. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. José Maza (Chile) was unanimously elected President of the session. On the motion of the United States, the Assembly by a vote of 42 to 12 with 6 abstentions decided not to consider any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China during the tenth session.


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