DIMENSIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY: FREEDOM OF ACTION AND FREEDOM OF WILL

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
Robert Kane
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
Ultimate Responsibility ◽  
The Will ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
Freedom Of Action

Abstract:In this essay, I distinguish two dimensions of responsibility: (i) responsibility for expressing the will (character, motives, and purposes) one has in action (voluntarily and without constraint) and (ii) responsibility for having the will one expresses in action. I argue that taking both of these dimensions into account is necessary to do full justice to our understanding of moral responsibility and our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible in moral and legal contexts. I further argue that the distinction between these dimensions of responsibility is importantly related to understanding age-old debates about the freedom of the will. For the first dimension of responsibility is historically related to the freedom of action—the power to freely express the will one already has in action. While the second dimension is historically related to the freedom of the will—the power to freely form or shape that will one may later express in action. And I argue that while the freedom of action so defined may be compatible with determinism, the freedom of will, and the deeper responsibility associated with it for forming one’s own will, which I call “ultimate responsibility,” are not compatible with a thoroughgoing determinism. In arguing throughout the essay for these claims and for the need to take into account both of these dimensions to do full justice to our understanding of moral responsibility, I consider ordinary practices of holding persons responsible in a variety of moral and legal contexts, discussing in the process H. L. A. Hart’s “fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing” criterion for assessing responsibility and blame in legal and criminal contexts, the relevance of recent experimental studies about folk intuitions concerning assessments of responsibility and blame, Harry Frankfurt’s critique of the “principle of alternative possibilities,” the distinction between “will-settled” and “will-setting” actions, and contemporary critiques of the very possibility and intelligibility of an ultimate responsibility for forming one’s own will that would be incompatible with determinism.

Free Will, Responsibility, and Blame in Psychotherapy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Zürcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Patient’S Autonomy ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Therapeutic Context ◽  
The Relationship

Freedom of the will is not only an issue in the attribution of moral and legal responsibility—it also fundamentally shapes how we look at ourselves and how we interact with others. This is essential in everyday life but even more so in psychotherapy. In the debate on freedom of will, the main controversy is concerned with the relationship between determinism and free will. In this chapter, different positions are presented and discussed. The compatibilist viewpoint, which claims determinism and freedom of will to be compatible, is defended against competing theories and applied to psychotherapeutic work. Mental disorders affect free will in many ways, as is demonstrated by the examples. Nevertheless, a compatibilist approach to free will can be used as a resource to increase the patient’s autonomy. As a result, it is justified and sometimes appropriate within the therapeutic context to ascribe responsibility and, within certain limits, to express blame.

Horses, Pigeons, and the Therapy of Conversion: A Psychological Reading of Jonathan Edwards's Theology

1981 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 337-352
Author(s):  
David R. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Jonathan Edwards expected his inquiry on the Freedom of the Will to be the definitive work on that subject, establishing for all time the truth of predestination on the twin pillars of reason and revelation. He answered every objection of the Arminians with irrefutable scriptural texts, biting satire, and devastating logic. He brought the revolutionary insights of Locke and Newton to the defense of Reformed doctrine, restructuring ancient truths on the foundations of the latest science.The effort was immediately successful. For sixteen years no one dared to publish a rebuttal. Then, in 1770, with Edwards safely dead, James Dana of Wallingford, Connecticut, published An Examination of the Late President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will.

Will, the

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pink
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Late Antiquity ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Early Modern Europe ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Decision Making Capacity ◽  
The Will ◽  
To Come ◽  
Free Actions ◽  
Freedom Of Action

As traditionally conceived, the will is the faculty of choice or decision, by which we determine which actions we shall perform. As a faculty of decision, the will is naturally seen as the point at which we exercise our freedom of action – our control of how we act. It is within our control or up to us which actions we perform only because we have a capacity to decide which actions we shall perform, and it is up to us which such decisions we take. We exercise our freedom of action through freely taken decisions about how we shall act. From late antiquity onwards, many philosophers took this traditional conception of the will very seriously, and developed it as part of a general theory of specifically human action. Human action, on this theory, is importantly different from animal action. Not only do humans have a freedom of or control over their action which animals lack; but this freedom supposedly arises because humans can act on the basis of reason, while animal action is driven by appetite and instinct. Both this freedom and rationality involve humans possessing what animals are supposed to lack: a will or rational appetite – a genuine decision making capacity. From the sixteenth century on, this conception of the will and its role in human action met with increasing scepticism. There was no longer a consensus that human action involved mental capacities radically unlike those found in animals. And the idea that free actions are explained by free decisions of the will came to be seen as viciously regressive: if our freedom of action has to come from a prior freedom of will, why shouldn’t that freedom of will have to come from some yet further, will-generating form of freedom – and so on ad infinitum? Yet it is very natural to believe that we do have a decision making capacity, and that it is up to us how we exercise that capacity – that it is indeed up to us which actions we decide to perform. The will-scepticism of early modern Europe, which persists in much modern Anglophone philosophy of action, may then have involved abandoning a model of human action and human rationality that is deeply part of common sense. We need to understand this model far better before we can conclude that its abandonment by so many philosophers really was warranted.

Introduction

1992 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Natural Connection ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Physical Causation ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
Freedom Of Action

This chapter focuses on Cicero's treatise titled On Fate (De fato), which is part of the second group of his philosophical writings that dates from the period of Julius Caesar's ascendancy at the end of the Civil War and the period immediately after his assassination. It explains how De fato considers the relation of the gods to human affairs and problems that arise therefrom. It also discusses the natural connection between different occurrences that the Stoics spoke of as “sympathy” that may have some influence on human behaviour but not remove the freedom of action altogether. The chapter describes how Cicero is characteristically scornful of the arguments by Stoics and favors the view of Carneades that free will could be defended against the Stoics. It talks about the freedom of the will in antiquity that can be divided into areas concerned with physical causation and questions of logic.

The Struggle against Fate

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-67
Author(s):  
Benedetta Zavatta
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

This chapter examines the influence that reading Emerson had on Nietzsche’s treatment of the theme of fate and free will, which is closely tied to two other central themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy: the theme of moral responsibility for one’s own actions, and that of the construction of one’s character, or self-creation. Though rejecting Emerson’s metaphysical assumptions regarding the freedom of the will and of thought, Nietzsche used certain suggestions provided to him by Emerson to work out an account of freedom as agency whereby to be free is not to act in a completely unconditioned way but rather to act as master of one’s own drives and guided by one’s own values. This chapter also examines the feeling of freedom which Nietzsche describes as the feeling of the preponderance of one’s own force vis-à-vis the force of external circumstances. Thanks to his reading of Emerson, Nietzsche comes to consider this feeling as compatible with the perception of necessity or the presence of immutable facts in one’s own life.

scholarly journals Necessity, Responsibility and Character: Schopenhauer on Freedom of the Will

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Janaway
Keyword(s):  
Individual Agent ◽  
Human Actions ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Individual

AbstractThis paper gives an account of the argument of Schopenhauer's essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, drawing also on his other works. Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the ‘doers of our deeds’) is nonetheless unshakeable. To account for this Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. The paper highlights divergences between Schopenhauer and Kant over the intelligible character, which for Schopenhauer can be neither rational nor causal. It raises the questions whether the intelligible character may be redundant to Schopenhauer's position, and whether it can coherently belong to an individual agent, suggesting that for Schopenhauer a more consistent position would have been to deny freedom of will to the individual.

Free will

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Adult Human ◽  
Ultimate Cause ◽  
The Will ◽  
Freedom Of Action ◽  
The Way

‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for freedom of action is necessary for moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient. Philosophers give very different answers to these questions, hence also to two more specific questions about ourselves: (1) Are we free agents? and (2) Can we be morally responsible for what we do? Answers to (1) and (2) range from ‘Yes, Yes’ to ‘No, No’ – via ‘Yes, No’ and various degrees of ‘Perhaps’, ‘Possibly’, and ‘In a sense’. (The fourth pair of outright answers, ‘No, Yes’, is rare, but appears to be accepted by some Protestants.) Prominent among the ‘Yes, Yes’ sayers are the compatibilists, who hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Briefly, determinism is the view that everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does. According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses. Thus normal adult human beings in normal circumstances are able to act and choose freely. No one is holding a gun to their heads. They are not drugged, or in chains, or subject to a psychological compulsion. They are therefore wholly free to choose and act even if their whole physical and psychological make-up is entirely determined by things for which they are in no way ultimately responsible – starting with their genetic inheritance and early upbringing. Incompatibilists hold that freedom is not compatible with determinism. They point out that if determinism is true, then every one of one’s actions was determined to happen as it did before one was born. They hold that one cannot be held to be truly free and finally morally responsible for one’s actions in this case. They think compatibilism is a ‘wretched subterfuge…, a petty word-jugglery’, as Kant put it (1788: 189–90). It entirely fails to satisfy our natural convictions about the nature of moral responsibility. The incompatibilists have a good point, and may be divided into two groups. Libertarians answer ‘Yes, Yes’ to questions (1) and (2). They hold that we are indeed free and fully morally responsible agents, and that determinism must therefore be false. Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility. For suppose that not every event is determined, and that some events occur randomly, or as a matter of chance. How can our claim to moral responsibility be improved by the supposition that it is partly a matter of chance or random outcome that we and our actions are as they are? The second group of incompatibilists is less sanguine. They answer ‘No, No’ to questions (1) and (2). They agree with the libertarians that the truth of determinism rules out genuine moral responsibility, but argue that the falsity of determinism cannot help. Accordingly, they conclude that we are not genuinely free agents or genuinely morally responsible, whether determinism is true or false. One of their arguments can be summarized as follows. When one acts, one acts in the way one does because of the way one is. So to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have to be truly responsible for the way one is: one would have to be causa sui, or the cause of oneself, at least in certain crucial mental respects. But nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. So nothing can be truly morally responsible. Suitably developed, this argument against moral responsibility seems very strong. But in many human beings, the experience of choice gives rise to a conviction of absolute responsibility that is untouched by philosophical arguments. This conviction is the deep and inexhaustible source of the free will problem: powerful arguments that seem to show that we cannot be morally responsible in the ultimate way that we suppose keep coming up against equally powerful psychological reasons why we continue to believe that we are ultimately morally responsible.

Free will

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Adult Human ◽  
Ultimate Cause ◽  
The Will ◽  
Freedom Of Action ◽  
The Way

‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. Its central questions are ’What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ’What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for freedom of action is necessary for moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient. Philosophers give very different answers to these questions, hence also to two more specific questions about ourselves: (1) Are we free agents? and (2) Can we be morally responsible for what we do? Answers to (1) and (2) range from ’Yes, Yes’ to ’No, No’ – via ’Yes, No’ and various degrees of ’Perhaps’, ’Possibly’, and ’In a sense’. (The fourth pair of outright answers, ’No, Yes’, is rare, but appears to be accepted by some Protestants.) Prominent among the ’Yes, Yes’ sayers are the compatibilists, who hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Briefly, determinism is the view that everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does. According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses. Thus normal adult human beings in normal circumstances are able to act and choose freely. No one is holding a gun to their heads. They are not drugged, or in chains, or subject to a psychological compulsion. They are therefore wholly free to choose and act even if their whole physical and psychological make-up is entirely determined by things for which they are in no way ultimately responsible – starting with their genetic inheritance and early upbringing. Incompatibilists hold that freedom is not compatible with determinism. They point out that if determinism is true, then every one of one’s actions was determined to happen as it did before one was born. They hold that one cannot be held to be truly free and finally morally responsible for one’s actions in this case. They think compatibilism is a ‘wretched subterfuge…, a petty word-jugglery’, as Kant put it (1788: 189–90). It entirely fails to satisfy our natural convictions about the nature of moral responsibility. The incompatibilists have a good point, and may be divided into two groups. Libertarians answer ’Yes, Yes’ to questions (1) and (2). They hold that we are indeed free and fully morally responsible agents, and that determinism must therefore be false. Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility. For suppose that not every event is determined, and that some events occur randomly, or as a matter of chance. How can our claim to moral responsibility be improved by the supposition that it is partly a matter of chance or random outcome that we and our actions are as they are? The second group of incompatibilists is less sanguine. They answer ’No, No’ to questions (1) and (2). They agree with the libertarians that the truth of determinism rules out genuine moral responsibility, but argue that the falsity of determinism cannot help. Accordingly, they conclude that we are not genuinely free agents or genuinely morally responsible, whether determinism is true or false. One of their arguments can be summarized as follows. When one acts, one acts in the way one does because of the way one is. So to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have to be truly responsible for the way one is: one would have to be causa sui, or the cause of oneself, at least in certain crucial mental respects. But nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. So nothing can be truly morally responsible. Suitably developed, this argument against moral responsibility seems very strong. But in many human beings, the experience of choice gives rise to a conviction of absolute responsibility that is untouched by philosophical arguments. This conviction is the deep and inexhaustible source of the free will problem: powerful arguments that seem to show that we cannot be morally responsible in the ultimate way that we suppose keep coming up against equally powerful psychological reasons why we continue to believe that we are ultimately morally responsible.

Maimonides on Freedom of the Will and Moral Responsibility

1998 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moshe Sokol
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Natural Order ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Guide Of The Perplexed

Until fairly recently, the usual view of Maimonides' position on freedom of the will was that he was a strict libertarian. This is because he appears to assert unequivocally in several places in this Commentary to the Mishna, most notably in Shemonah Perakim 8 and in Mishneh Torah (Teshuva 5), that human choice is undetermined. Alexander Altman and Shlomo Pines challenged this view in recent years by arguing, mostly on the basis of Guide of the Perplexed 2.48, that Maimonides maintained an esoteric view according to which human choice is determined by the natural order, which is itself determined by God.

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