Rethinking individual autonomy in medical decision-making for young adults reliant on caregiver support: A case report and analysis

There is a gap in the clinical bioethics literature concerning the approach to assessment of medical decision-making capacity of adolescents or young adults who demonstrate diminished maturity due to longstanding reliance on caregiver support, despite having reached the age of majority. This paper attempts to address this question via the examination of a particular case involving assessment of the decision-making capacity of a young adult pregnant patient who also had a physically disabling neurological condition. Drawing on concepts from adolescent bioethics and feminist critiques of bioethical theory, we argue that limited life experience, secondary to a disabling neurological condition, can result in a lack of adult-like capacity even in a patient who is legally an adult. In such cases, it may be that autonomy, to the extent that it is to be relevant and meaningful, must be viewed through a relational lens. Furthermore, clinicians may avoid unjustifiably paternalistic practices by working with the patient help her gain a better appreciation of the consequences of her decision, thereby calling forward her capacity rather than resorting to being directive in counseling. We conclude that lessons from this case can be used to approach ethically complex instances of medical decision-making in adult patients with normal cognition but diminished experiential maturity.

Doctors’ knowledge regarding decision-making capacity: A survey of anesthesiologists

Informed consent for anesthesia is an ethical and legal requirement. A patient must have adequate decision-making capacity (DMC) as a prerequisite to informed consent. In determining whether a patient has sufficient DMC, anesthesiologists must draw on their knowledge of DMC. Knowledge gaps regarding DMC may result in incorrect assessments of patients’ capacity. This could translate to an informed consent process that is ethically and legally unsound. This study examined the DMC-related knowledge of anesthesiologists in a group of four university-affiliated hospitals. The findings suggest that anesthesiologists have several areas of knowledge deficiency regarding DMC and DMC assessment. These findings could inform the development of undergraduate and postgraduate curricula.

Functional MRI to Assess Decision-Making Capacity of Older Adults With Dementia: A Proof of Concept Study

Assessment of decision-making capacity is essential to respect older adult dignity, particularly concerning major decision such as ageing in place. To date, it is the clinician's assessment, based on a global analysis of his clinical evaluation and neuropsychological tasks, which enables decision-making assessment. Given the difficulty it represents, and the ethical and societal issues raised, the research question concerns the contribution of neuro-imaging technologies as an aid to the evaluation of decision-making capacity. We included in our proof-of-concept study 4 healthy older patients and 2 older patients with dementia (mild stage) followed in a memory clinic. Each of the participants completed neuropsychological tests with a focus on executive functions, anosognosia and judgemental skills. Next, they performed a decision-making task, the Balloon Assessment Risk Task (BART) in functional MRI, and, finally, they participated in a semi-structured interview completed with interview of their caregiver. For both patients, their referring geriatrician was questioned a priori on his assessment of their decision-making capacity. The results showed a common activation pattern in functional MRI between the patient considered competent in decision-making and the healthy subjects, unlike the patient who was not clinically competent. The qualitative analysis highlighted major anosognosia in both pathological situations, but decision-making in everyday life situations differed between the 2 patients. This study shows the feasibility, on a sensitive topic, to explore the potential contribution of functional neuroimaging and semi-directed interviews as tools. It also demonstrates the value of conducting mixed research, combining neurosciences and social science to explore complex clinical issues.

Cognitive Overload: How to Protect Older Adults From Diminished Financial Decision-Making Capacity

The aging population in the US poses a major threat to the financial security of older adults and their families. Millions of older adults will need to successfully navigate a multitude of financial and legal issues if they are to safely manage their assets while they are alive, and then securely transfer trillions of dollars to their heirs in accordance with their wishes. But most older adults are less healthy than their younger counterparts, and 25% or more over 65 are likely to suffer from diminished decision-making capacity. In short, older adults in the US will have to make some of the most important financial decisions of their lives just as their decision-making capacity is in decline. We offer recommendations to make it easier for financial services firms, medical professionals, non-profit organizations, and technology companies to work together to find better solutions for managing the complex issues around diminished decision-making capacity that is only likely to worsen in the years ahead.

Immunisation and the law : slippery slope to a healthy society

<p>The immunisation of children against communicable diseases is a crucial public health intervention with both individual and collective outcomes. Current New Zealand immunisation policy prioritises parental autonomy, but has not succeeded in actively targeting all of the factors that prevent parents from ever making informed immunisation decisions. Consequently, our coverage rates are unsatisfactory both in absolute (by reference to the goal of 'population immunity') and relative terms. In order to have a realistic chance of meeting the Ministry of Health's optimistic coverage targets, it is necessary to consider whether New Zealand's comparatively weak immunisation law could be strengthened to eliminate the phenomenon of 'passive' non-immunisation without fatally undermining the decision-making capacity of parents. If this is not possible, then either the goal of population immunity or the prioritisation of individual choice must be abandoned. Of the three options for law reform explored by this paper, two are thought to be unworkable because they would, or should, be perceived as failing to achieve the delicate balance between individual freedom and public good. These are, first, a universal mandatory immunisation requirement, which may be justifiable in principle but would almost certainly encounter prohibitive public opposition; and, secondly, a targeted law that would require beneficiaries to make active decisions about immunisation, and (it is submitted) represents an unwarranted misuse of the vulnerability of those dependent upon taxpayer support. The reform option recommended is more moderate and more equitable. Creating a legal presumption in favour of immunisation, at the point of entry into primary school, would shift New Zealand from its current paradigm of 'informed consent' - whereby parents must actively opt in to immunisation - to a United States-style model that required parents who wished to opt out of immunisation to undergo a 'informed refusal' process. The stringency of this process would depend upon the degree to which policy-makers were satisfied that only those parents whose deeply held convictions prevented them from being open to persuasion were attempting to invoke it. Unless the size of the anti-immunisation lobby significantly increases, it is suggested that an informed refusal requirement could successfully tackle the problem of passive non-immunisation, thereby discharging the State's responsibility to further the interest of all New Zealanders in achieving and maintaining population immunity levels.</p>

Immunisation and the law : slippery slope to a healthy society

<p>The immunisation of children against communicable diseases is a crucial public health intervention with both individual and collective outcomes. Current New Zealand immunisation policy prioritises parental autonomy, but has not succeeded in actively targeting all of the factors that prevent parents from ever making informed immunisation decisions. Consequently, our coverage rates are unsatisfactory both in absolute (by reference to the goal of 'population immunity') and relative terms. In order to have a realistic chance of meeting the Ministry of Health's optimistic coverage targets, it is necessary to consider whether New Zealand's comparatively weak immunisation law could be strengthened to eliminate the phenomenon of 'passive' non-immunisation without fatally undermining the decision-making capacity of parents. If this is not possible, then either the goal of population immunity or the prioritisation of individual choice must be abandoned. Of the three options for law reform explored by this paper, two are thought to be unworkable because they would, or should, be perceived as failing to achieve the delicate balance between individual freedom and public good. These are, first, a universal mandatory immunisation requirement, which may be justifiable in principle but would almost certainly encounter prohibitive public opposition; and, secondly, a targeted law that would require beneficiaries to make active decisions about immunisation, and (it is submitted) represents an unwarranted misuse of the vulnerability of those dependent upon taxpayer support. The reform option recommended is more moderate and more equitable. Creating a legal presumption in favour of immunisation, at the point of entry into primary school, would shift New Zealand from its current paradigm of 'informed consent' - whereby parents must actively opt in to immunisation - to a United States-style model that required parents who wished to opt out of immunisation to undergo a 'informed refusal' process. The stringency of this process would depend upon the degree to which policy-makers were satisfied that only those parents whose deeply held convictions prevented them from being open to persuasion were attempting to invoke it. Unless the size of the anti-immunisation lobby significantly increases, it is suggested that an informed refusal requirement could successfully tackle the problem of passive non-immunisation, thereby discharging the State's responsibility to further the interest of all New Zealanders in achieving and maintaining population immunity levels.</p>

Overriding Adolescent Refusals of Treatment

Adolescents are routinely treated differently to adults, even when they possess similar capacities. In this article, we explore the justification for one case of differential treatment of adolescents. We attempt to make philosophical sense of the concurrent consents doctrine in law: adolescents found to have decision-making capacity have the power to consent to—and thereby, all else being equal, permit—their own medical treatment, but they lack the power always to refuse treatment and so render it impermissible. Other parties, that is, individuals who exercise parental responsibility or a court, retain the authority to consent on an adolescent’s behalf. We explore four defences of the doctrine. We reject two attempts to defend the asymmetry in the power to consent to and refuse medical treatment by reference to transitional paternalism. We then consider and reject a stage of life justification. Finally, we articulate a justification based on the distinctiveness of adolescent well-being.

Should dementia sufferers be punished for past crimes?

<p>This paper examines whether we ought to prosecute historic offences committed by people who have subsequently developed dementia. Currently, a person with dementia might avoid conviction on the basis of their currently diminished capacity. They may be unfit to plead, for example. The problem is that advanced dementia may undermine persistence of personal identity. Once someone develops dementia, they may no longer be the person who committed the crime. If so, they would not need to be excused for their offending. They would simply not be liable. If we think persistence of personal identity is based on psychological factors – as most of us do – a person with advanced dementia will not be the same person as the one who committed the crime. They will not deserve prosecution, never mind punishment. This issue has been overlooked by legal theorists. Although much has been written on the legal significance of dementia, it has been primarily in the context of advance directives or decision-making capacity. I will argue that advanced dementia is a challenge to criminal responsibility.</p>