Does the Fear of Terrorists Trump the Fear of Persecution in Asylum Outcomes in the Post–September 11 Era?

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (03) ◽  
pp. 431-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer S. Holmes ◽  
Linda Camp Keith

Historically, U.S. asylum policy has reflected both an effort to provide safe haven for deserving asylum seekers and the intent to promote national security and domestic policy priorities. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that asylum outcomes, at least in the aggregate, have been weighted more heavily by foreign policy considerations than humanitarian concerns. Since the mid 1990s, the United States government has reformed the asylum system in response to concerns of abuse by economic migrants, burgeoning caseloads, and national security threats. Although, as Davergne (2008) points out, “the most reviled of asylum seekers of the global era is the ‘economic refugee,’ under suspicion of fleeing poverty and poor prospects in search of a better life” rather than fleeing because of the fear of persecution (65), in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States in 1993 and 2001, the fears of economic opportunists abusing the system have combined with the broader fear of potential terrorists gaining legal entry into the country through an overburdened asylum system. Since 1995, Congress has passed two major acts to reform the asylum process in reaction to these fears. Both the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the 2005 Real ID Act were passed to prevent economic migrants and individuals who may pose security risks from entering the country on false claims of asylum. Following September 11, the U.S. government has pursued prosecution for documents fraud among asylum applicants and aggressively enforced safe third country requirements. And, like our European counterparts, the United States has increasingly taken more deterrent and preventative actions to discourage asylum applicants from choosing it as a target for asylum and prevent potential applicants from reaching its ports of entry. Critics fear that the draconian measures adopted in response to these fears are overly broad and worry that worthy applicants have been turned away at the border or denied asylum with increasing frequency, thus leading them to face the real possibility of torture and other forms of persecution. In this article, we examine changes in U.S. asylum policy and whether the heightened security concerns after September 11 have significantly influenced the U.S. asylum process and outcomes in U.S. immigration courts.

Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 13-20
Author(s):  
Andrew Morton ◽  
Wendy A. Young

This article outlines U.S. policy toward children asylum seekers. It highlights the gaps in U.S. detention and asylum policy which jeopardize the protection of children. It also discusses advances made in recent years, such as issuance of the U.S. “Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims” which establish evidentiary, procedural, and legal standards for asylum adjudicators dealing with children’s claims. Finally, it suggests reforms that are necessary to bring the United States into compliance with international law and to ensure that children are provided the refuge they deserve.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Patterson ◽  
Kevin Fauvell ◽  
Dennis Russom ◽  
Willie A. Durosseau ◽  
Phyllis Petronello ◽  
...  

Abstract The United States Navy (USN) 501-K Series Radiological Controls (RADCON) Program was launched in late 2011, in response to the extensive damage caused by participation in Operation Tomodachi. The purpose of this operation was to provide humanitarian relief aid to Japan following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake that struck 231 miles northeast of Tokyo, on the afternoon of March 11, 2011. The earthquake caused a tsunami with 30 foot waves that damaged several nuclear reactors in the area. It was the fourth largest earthquake on record (since 1900) and the largest to hit Japan. On March 12, 2011, the United States Government launched Operation Tomodachi. In all, a total of 24,000 troops, 189 aircraft, 24 naval ships, supported this relief effort, at a cost in excess of $90.0 million. The U.S. Navy provided material support, personnel movement, search and rescue missions and damage surveys. During the operation, 11 gas turbine powered U.S. warships operated within the radioactive plume. As a result, numerous gas turbine engines ingested radiological contaminants and needed to be decontaminated, cleaned, repaired and returned to the Fleet. During the past eight years, the USN has been very proactive and vigilant with their RADCON efforts, and as of the end of calendar year 2019, have successfully completed the 501-K Series portion of the RADCON program. This paper will update an earlier ASME paper that was written on this subject (GT2015-42057) and will summarize the U.S. Navy’s 501-K Series RADCON effort. Included in this discussion will be a summary of the background of Operation Tomodachi, including a discussion of the affected hulls and related gas turbine equipment. In addition, a discussion of the radiological contamination caused by the disaster will be covered and the resultant effect to and the response by the Marine Gas Turbine Program. Furthermore, the authors will discuss what the USN did to remediate the RADCON situation, what means were employed to select a vendor and to set up a RADCON cleaning facility in the United States. And finally, the authors will discuss the dispensation of the 501-K Series RADCON assets that were not returned to service, which include the 501-K17 gas turbine engine, as well as the 250-KS4 gas turbine engine starter. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the results and lessons learned of the program and discuss how the USN was able to process all of their 501-K34 RADCON affected gas turbine engines and return them back to the Fleet in a timely manner.


Author(s):  
Stephen G. Rabe

This chapter details how the first crisis for the Nixon administration came with the news that leftist Salvador Allende had captured a plurality of the vote in the September 1970 presidential election. It reviews the U.S. role in destabilizing the Allende government. The historical literature tends to give scant attention to the United States and Chile after September 11, 1973. To recount the complete story about the U.S. role in Chile demands investigating not only the war against Allende but also the myriad of ways that the Nixon and Ford administrations and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger bolstered the Pinochet dictatorship. The chapter also analyzes Kissinger's lead role in encouraging the overthrow of President Juan José Torres (1970–1971), the socialist political and military leader of Bolivia.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-855

On June 10, 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which the D.C. Circuit held that the United States could continue to detain an individual at Guantánamo Bay until the cessation of the hostilities that justified his initial detention, notwithstanding the extraordinary length of the hostilities to date. The case, Al-Alwi v. Trump, arises from petitioner Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his continued detention at the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was accompanied by a statement by Justice Breyer observing that “it is past time to confront the difficult question” of how long a detention grounded in the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks can be justified.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
Denis Goulet

Mexico's two thousand-mile border with the United States is unarmed, but it remains the locus of sharp conflicts. Last October, House Speaker "Tip" O'Neill, bowing to pressure from the Hispanic Caucus, withdrew the Simpson- Mazzoli bill on immigration reform over White House objections that "it is in the best interests of all Americans to have the nation regain control of its borders." Jorge Bustamante, director of Mexico's Center for Border Studies, argues, however, that such a bill would "leave all migrant workers, whether documented or not, in a state of virtual slavery, since they will have no access to the courts to plead for justice."


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.


Subject Asylum-seekers and Canada. Significance After an uptick in asylum claims in recent months, including via the United States, asylum policy is likely to feature more heavily in Canadian state and federal politics. Impacts New migrant flows to Canada will likely be triggered as the US government reduces its grants of Temporary Protected Status. Quebec’s government will face off against the Ottawa federal government over responsibility for new migrant arrivals. Ottawa and Washington will likely eventually update the Safe Third Country Agreement, but this could require bargaining. Canada may invest more in border policing and associated technologies.


1982 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Schoultz

In the 1970s the U.S. executive branch was forced to make a significant change in the procedure it uses to influence decisions by the multilateral development banks. This procedural change—from exclusive reliance on behind-the-scenes pressure to open voting in bank councils—reflects two more fundamental alterations: the relative diminution of U.S. power in bank councils and, especially, the development of increased congressional interest in formulating U.S. policy toward the banks. As a result of these two changes, the United States has identified publicly many of the policies it seeks to promote through the banks. Taken as a whole, the U.S. voting record indicates an abandonment of the verbal commitment to the liberal concept of maintaining the banks as apolitical financial institutions. Since the concept has never been a reliable guide to U.S. behavior in bank councils, its abandonment does not signify a major change in the relationship between the banks and the United States government. Rather, it signifies an opening of the U.S. political process, one that encourages public debate and multiple advocacy in the making of U.S. policy toward the banks.


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