The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular Purposes of the TBT Agreement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 60-63
Author(s):  
Muhammad Waqas

The Dispute Settlement Board of WTO aims to solve the disputes of WTO members regarding international trade. Dispute settlement process involves the parties and third parties to a case, and it operates through the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions. Although the dispute settlement mechanism provides opportunities to the developing countries to seek remedies if they are aggrieved by any other country, yet there are certain challenges for the developing countries to participate effectively in DSM. The study finds out the challenges that caused the role of developing countries less significant in the WTO dispute settlement process. Moreover, several recommendations have also been made for making the role of developing countries more effective.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/ijssm.v1i2.10103 Int. J. Soc. Sci. Manage. Vol-1, issue-2: 60-63


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-277
Author(s):  
Mariana Clara de Andrade

Abstract Several factors triggered the legitimacy crisis which paralysed the WTO Appellate Body in December 2019. This article focuses on one of them: the criticism expressed by the United States that the ‘Appellate Body claims its reports are entitled to be treated as precedent’. This work describes the origins of the problem and examines the issue of the precedential value of adopted reports within the WTO dispute settlement. It argues that the problem cannot be addressed through textual attempts to better define the value of precedent, as some have suggested, but can be alleviated through the practice of adjudicators. Moreover, it argues that the criticisms regarding the precedential value of past reports is due to the inherent hierarchy ensuing from the existence of an appeals organ. Therefore, the demise of the Appellate Body may weaken the precedential value of past adopted reports.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-176
Author(s):  
Taro HAMADA ◽  
Yoshimichi ISHIKAWA

This study focuses on the dispute over Korea’s import bans and the additional testing and certification requirements for Japanese foods and analyses the relevant findings of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Although the Panel had found that Korea’s measures were inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), the Appellate Body reversed most of these findings. Korea notified that it had completed the implementation of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body. However, the DSM has failed to contribute in settling this dispute positively and meaningfully, since it remains uncertain whether Korea’s import bans are based on scientific principles. Furthermore, the Appellate Body failed to complete its legal analysis of the inconsistency of Korea’s measures based on fact-findings and the facts uncontested between both disputing parties.


2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Tarek Yahiaoui ◽  

The process of dispute settlement at WTO has been delegated to independent entities: private groups that consider cases as first instance structures, and the Appellate Body that hears appeals for special group summaries. For its part, the dispute settlement body (DSB), the political structure composed of all members of the Organization and its primary task is the general administration of the dispute settlement and decision-making system. The recommendations contained in the reports of the Special Groups and the Appellate Body are binding on the parties to the dispute only after the dispute settlement body has adopted them. However, this process of adoption is now almost automatic; in order not to adopt a resolution it is necessary for all members to agree unanimously, according to a technique known as the "reverse consensus" or "negative consensus", which we do not yet know a similar in the international law. The political control exercised by the dispute settlement body remains generally theoretical, because the reverse consensus technique imposed almost as a decision-making mechanism. As long as the complainant insists on his complaint, it is inconceivable that the parties to the dispute are not convinced of the outcome of the dispute and raise a consensus not to adopt a particular report. In fact, if members have not collectively endorsed the abstracts or solutions of special groups or the Appellate Body, they have not prevented the adoption of any report. The appeal procedure is without doubt the most prominent and authentic new addition to the Organization's dispute settlement mechanism established by the Marrakesh Accords. The parties to the dispute seen by the Special Group can only appeal to the Appellate Body within a specified period of the date of the distribution of its report to the members of the Organization. The designation given to this body raises the question: the appeal is aimed at amending or canceling a judgment of the first instance judge by second-tier judges and article 17 (13) of the memorandum of agreement goes in the same context, stating that: The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel". Thus, the powers granted to the Appellate Body are not far from those granted to courts of appeal in national legal systems. However, this rapprochement is soon reaching its limit, because judicial practice in national systems gives the appellant the power to review first instance judgment in relation to facts and law. However, the situation is different at the level of the Organization. Article17 (6) defines the appeal “shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.” The Appellate Body, then, is a judge of law who considers violations of the rules of law by the Special Group. Its function is as close as possible to a court of appeal as is known in some national legal systems, such as the French system. We have the right to question the new system of the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization under the Marrakesh Accords, and the new features that distinguish it from the mechanisms of contemporary international justice, both procedural and functional.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172097834
Author(s):  
Sijeong Lim ◽  
Hyo Won Lee

The World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism is based on either bilateral bargaining or third-party rulings by a panel or the Appellate Body. When do countries utilize the multilateral procedure, and under what conditions do they opt for a bilateral agreement? Departing from previous studies emphasizing the role of the complainant in shaping the course of the dispute settlement mechanism, this article offers an explanation based on the strategic choices of respondents. This study suggests that the domestic political interests of respondent governments determine the use of the dispute settlement mechanism’s multilateral track. We argue that respondent governments choose the multilateral track to seek political cover for domestically unpopular concessions to a complainant. Such cover is required when (1) the dispute at stake has high public salience and (2) the respondent faces an upcoming election. Our hypotheses are tested using World Trade Organization’s dispute cases from 1995 to 2017.


Author(s):  
Daniel Gervais

This contribution reviews the role of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body—a part of its dispute-settlement mechanism—in interpreting the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). It discusses, first, the way in which the Appellate Body functions when compared to a common law jurisdiction or a general or specialized domestic court. The contribution then turns to the three disputes concerning the TRIPS Agreement that have reached the Appellate Body since 1995, and the five cases filed against Australia challenging plain packaging measures targeting tobacco products. The primary purpose of the contribution is not to discuss those cases individually in detail but rather to offer a perspective on how the Appellate Body might play a greater role in building the interface between the rules and standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement, and those contained in international law outside the WTO.


2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Tarek Yahiaoui ◽  

The process of dispute settlement at WTO has been delegated to independent entities: private groups that consider cases as first instance structures, and the Appellate Body that hears appeals for special group summaries. For its part, the dispute settlement body (DSB), the political structure composed of all members of the Organization and its primary task is the general administration of the dispute settlement and decision-making system. The recommendations contained in the reports of the Special Groups and the Appellate Body are binding on the parties to the dispute only after the dispute settlement body has adopted them. However, this process of adoption is now almost automatic; in order not to adopt a resolution it is necessary for all members to agree unanimously, according to a technique known as the "reverse consensus" or "negative consensus", which we do not yet know a similar in the international law. The political control exercised by the dispute settlement body remains generally theoretical, because the reverse consensus technique imposed almost as a decision-making mechanism. As long as the complainant insists on his complaint, it is inconceivable that the parties to the dispute are not convinced of the outcome of the dispute and raise a consensus not to adopt a particular report. In fact, if members have not collectively endorsed the abstracts or solutions of special groups or the Appellate Body, they have not prevented the adoption of any report. The appeal procedure is without doubt the most prominent and authentic new addition to the Organization's dispute settlement mechanism established by the Marrakesh Accords. The parties to the dispute seen by the Special Group can only appeal to the Appellate Body within a specified period of the date of the distribution of its report to the members of the Organization. The designation given to this body raises the question: the appeal is aimed at amending or canceling a judgment of the first instance judge by second-tier judges and article 17 (13) of the memorandum of agreement goes in the same context, stating that: The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel". Thus, the powers granted to the Appellate Body are not far from those granted to courts of appeal in national legal systems. However, this rapprochement is soon reaching its limit, because judicial practice in national systems gives the appellant the power to review first instance judgment in relation to facts and law. However, the situation is different at the level of the Organization. Article17 (6) defines the appeal “shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.” The Appellate Body, then, is a judge of law who considers violations of the rules of law by the Special Group. Its function is as close as possible to a court of appeal as is known in some national legal systems, such as the French system. We have the right to question the new system of the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization under the Marrakesh Accords, and the new features that distinguish it from the mechanisms of contemporary international justice, both procedural and functional.


Author(s):  
Asif Khan ◽  
Ximei Wu

The World Trade Organization's (WTO’s) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body’s members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.


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