QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC ON THE RATIONAL LINE

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractIn the topological semantics for propositional modal logic, S4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, for the rational line, for Cantor space, and for the real line. In the topological semantics for quantified modal logic, QS4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, and for the family of subspaces of the irrational line. The main result of the current paper is that QS4 is complete, indeed strongly complete, for the rational line.

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractIn the topological semantics for modal logic, S4 is well-known to be complete for the rational line, for the real line, and for Cantor space: these are special cases of S4’s completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. The construction used to prove completeness can be slightly amended to show that S4 is not only complete, but also strongly complete, for the rational line. But no similarly easy amendment is available for the real line or for Cantor space and the question of strong completeness for these spaces has remained open, together with the more general question of strong completeness for any dense-in-itself metric space. In this paper, we prove that S4 is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metric space.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-518
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractWe add propositional quantifiers to the propositional modal logic S4 and to the propositional intuitionistic logic H, introducing axiom schemes that are the natural analogs to axiom schemes typically used for first-order quantifiers in classical and intuitionistic logic. We show that the resulting logics are sound and complete for a topological semantics extending, in a natural way, the topological semantics for S4 and for H.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-662
Author(s):  
MATTHEW HARRISON-TRAINOR

AbstractThis article builds on Humberstone’s idea of defining models of propositional modal logic where total possible worlds are replaced by partial possibilities. We follow a suggestion of Humberstone by introducing possibility models for quantified modal logic. We show that a simple quantified modal logic is sound and complete for our semantics. Although Holliday showed that for many propositional modal logics, it is possible to give a completeness proof using a canonical model construction where every possibility consists of finitely many formulas, we show that this is impossible to do in the first-order case. However, one can still construct a canonical model where every possibility consists of a computable set of formulas and thus still of finitely much information.


Author(s):  
Kohei Kishida

Category theory provides various guiding principles for modal logic and its semantic modeling. In particular, Stone duality, or “syntax-semantics duality”, has been a prominent theme in semantics of modal logic since the early days of modern modal logic. This chapter focuses on duality and a few other categorical principles, and brings to light how they underlie a variety of concepts, constructions, and facts in philosophical applications as well as the model theory of modal logic. In the first half of the chapter, I review the syntax-semantics duality and illustrate some of its functions in Kripke semantics and topological semantics for propositional modal logic. In the second half, taking Kripke’s semantics for quantified modal logic and David Lewis’s counterpart theory as examples, I demonstrate how we can dissect and analyze assumptions behind different semantics for first-order modal logic from a structural and unifying perspective of category theory. (As an example, I give an analysis of the import of the converse Barcan formula that goes farther than just “increasing domains”.) It will be made clear that categorical principles play essential roles behind the interaction between logic, semantics, and ontology, and that category theory provides powerful methods that help us both mathematically and philosophically in the investigation of modal logic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-425
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractIn the topological semantics, quantified intuitionistic logic, QH, is known to be strongly complete not only for the class of all topological spaces but also for some particular topological spaces — for example, for the irrational line, ${\Bbb P}$, and for the rational line, ${\Bbb Q}$, in each case with a constant countable domain for the quantifiers. Each of ${\Bbb P}$ and ${\Bbb Q}$ is a separable zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space. The main result of the current article generalizes these known results: QH is strongly complete for any zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space with a constant domain of cardinality ≤ the space’s weight; consequently, QH is strongly complete for any separable zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metrizable space with a constant countable domain. We also prove a result that follows from earlier work of Moerdijk: if we allow varying domains for the quantifiers, then QH is strongly complete for any dense-in-itself metrizable space with countable domains.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
H. M. Abu-Donia ◽  
Rodyna A. Hosny

Abstract Weak structure space (briefly, wss) has master looks, when the whole space is not open, and these classes of subsets are not closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections, which classify it from typical topology. Our main target of this article is to introduce $$\psi _{{\mathcal {H}}}(.)$$ ψ H ( . ) -operator in hereditary class weak structure space (briefly, $${\mathcal {H}}wss$$ H w s s ) $$(X, w, {\mathcal {H}})$$ ( X , w , H ) and examine a number of its characteristics. Additionally, we clarify some relations that are credible in topological spaces but cannot be realized in generalized ones. As a generalization of w-open sets and w-semiopen sets, certain new kind of sets in a weak structure space via $$\psi _{{\mathcal {H}}}(.)$$ ψ H ( . ) -operator called $$\psi _{{\mathcal {H}}}$$ ψ H -semiopen sets are introduced. We prove that the family of $$\psi _{{\mathcal {H}}}$$ ψ H -semiopen sets composes a supra-topology on X. In view of hereditary class $${\mathcal {H}}_{0}$$ H 0 , $$w T_{1}$$ w T 1 -axiom is formulated and also some of their features are investigated.


1988 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanna Corsi

1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos

Let ‘ϕ’, ‘χ’, and ‘ψ’ be variables ranging over functions from the sentence letters P0, P1, … Pn, … of (propositional) modal logic to sentences of P(eano) Arithmetic), and for each sentence A of modal logic, inductively define Aϕ by[and similarly for other nonmodal propositional connectives]; andwhere Bew(x) is the standard provability predicate for PA and ⌈F⌉ is the PA numeral for the Gödel number of the formula F of PA. Then for any ϕ, (−□⊥)ϕ = −Bew(⌈⊥⌉), which is the consistency assertion for PA; a sentence S is undecidable in PA iff both and , where ϕ(p0) = S. If ψ(p0) is the undecidable sentence constructed by Gödel, then ⊬PA (−□⊥→ −□p0 & − □ − p0)ψ and ⊢PA(P0 ↔ −□⊥)ψ. However, if ψ(p0) is the undecidable sentence constructed by Rosser, then the situation is the other way around: ⊬PA(P0 ↔ −□⊥)ψ and ⊢PA (−□⊥→ −□−p0 & −□−p0)ψ. We call a sentence S of PA extremely undecidable if for all modal sentences A containing no sentence letter other than p0, if for some ψ, ⊬PAAψ, then ⊬PAAϕ, where ϕ(p0) = S. (So, roughly speaking, a sentence is extremely undecidable if it can be proved to have only those modal-logically characterizable properties that every sentence can be proved to have.) Thus extremely undecidable sentences are undecidable, but neither the Godel nor the Rosser sentence is extremely undecidable. It will follow at once from the main theorem of this paper that there are infinitely many inequivalent extremely undecidable sentences.


2002 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Yannis Stephanou

10.14311/464 ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Jelínek

In this paper we show the possibility to formalize the design process by means of one type of non-standard logic - modal logic [1]. The type chosen for this study is modal logic S4. The reason for this choice is the ability of this formalism to describe modeling of the individual discrete steps of design, respecting necessity or possibility types of design knowledge.


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