scholarly journals fMRI evidence for procedural invariance underlying gambling preference reversals.

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neal S. Hinvest ◽  
Mark J. Brosnan ◽  
Robert D. Rogers ◽  
Timothy L. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Procedural Invariance ◽  
Gambling Preference

scholarly journals Trust me; I know what I am doing investigating the effect of choice list elicitation and domain-relevant training on preference reversals in decision making for others

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Neumann-Böhme ◽  
Stefan A. Lipman ◽  
Werner B. F. Brouwer ◽  
Arthur E. Attema
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Medical Students ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Applied Research ◽  
Significant Problem ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Health Domain ◽  
Economics Students ◽  
Financial Domain

AbstractOne core assumption of standard economic theory is that an individual’s preferences are stable, irrespective of the method used to elicit them. This assumption may be violated if preference reversals are observed when comparing different methods to elicit people’s preferences. People may then prefer A over B using one method while preferring B over A using another. Such preference reversals pose a significant problem for theoretical and applied research. We used a sample of medical and economics students to investigate preference reversals in the health and financial domain when choosing patients/clients. We explored whether preference reversals are associated with domain-relevant training and tested whether using guided ‘choice list’ elicitation reduces reversals. Our findings suggest that preference reversals were more likely to occur for medical students, within the health domain, and for open-ended valuation questions. Familiarity with a domain reduced the likelihood of preference reversals in that domain. Although preference reversals occur less frequently within specialist domains, they remain a significant theoretical and practical problem. The use of clearer valuation procedures offers a promising approach to reduce preference reversals.

Preference reversals and effects of D-amphetamine on delay discounting in rats

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Krebs ◽  
Karen G. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Delay Discounting ◽  
Preference Reversals

scholarly journals Suicidal behavior in patients with gambling disorder and their response to psychological treatment: The roles of gender and gambling preference

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Valenciano-Mendoza ◽  
Fernando Fernández-Aranda ◽  
Roser Granero ◽  
Mónica Gómez-Peña ◽  
Laura Moragas ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Suicidal Behavior ◽  
Gambling Disorder ◽  
Psychological Treatment ◽  
Gambling Preference

scholarly journals The fragile nature of contextual preference reversals: Reply to Tsetsos, Chater, and Usher (2015).

2015 ◽  
Vol 122 (4) ◽  
pp. 848-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer S. Trueblood ◽  
Scott D. Brown ◽  
Andrew Heathcote
Keyword(s):  
Preference Reversals

Rational Choosers

2020 ◽  
pp. 103-128
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Average Utility ◽  
The Veil

From some points of view, Harsanyi stands apart from other theorists discussed in this book. He was a utilitarian, and he focuses on the hypothetical choices of a single individual. Nevertheless, his construction has been influential, and he has good claim to be the founder of the device of the veil of ignorance. He uses the orthodox utility theory of rationality to show that behind a veil of ignorance in which a hypothetical individual had an equal chance of being anyone in society, rationality would lead to that person adopting the principle of maximizing average utility. Utilitarianism can be represented as the maximizing choice of a rational individual behind the veil of ignorance. A central element in Harsanyi’s construction is the idea of ethical individualism, which he holds is captured in an axiom of independence defining the rationality of choice. He also revives the idea of the interpersonal comparability of utility. His reliance on interpersonal comparisons is a potential point of criticism, as is the argument that, strictly speaking, he has not shown that utilitarianism is required, as distinct from merely being consistent with, his principles of rational choice. A more fundamental criticism is that the phenomenon of preference reversals, well established in empirical literature, call into question the independence axiom. Preference reversals are intelligible. In relation to some cases, they suggest too an important distinction between rational choice and prudent choice.

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