Sticky Norms, Endogenous Preferences, and Shareable Goods

2016 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Fremstad
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Preferences

Endogenous Preferences And Delegation In The European Union

2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hug
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Endogenous Preferences ◽  
The Eu

The interplay among intergovernmental and supranational actors is a defining feature of the institutional life of the European Union (EU). Too often, however, these actors are considered independent of each other, and their autonomy is assessed in a vacuum. This is problematic because if there is such a thing as "endogenous preferences" in the EU, it appears exactly through this interdependence of intergovernmental and supranational actors. None of the institutionalist approaches to the EU has come to grips with this fact yet. Based on some very simple gametheoretic ideas, I offer in this article a rationale for "endogenous preferences" and discuss their impact on issues of delegations. Some cursory empirical evidence supports the claims that the preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint them. Similarly, the analyses presented here suggest that preferences over delegation to supranational actors are influenced by differences in policy views between principals and agents.

scholarly journals Market Design with Endogenous Preferences

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviad Heifetz ◽  
Ella Segev ◽  
Eric L. Talley
Keyword(s):  
Market Design ◽  
Endogenous Preferences

Legislation with Endogenous Preferences

2013 ◽  
pp. 456-486
Author(s):  
Aviad Heifetz ◽  
Ella Segev ◽  
Eric Talley
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Preferences

Virtue and vice with endogenous preferences

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-211
Author(s):  
Nicholas Chesterley
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Preferences

scholarly journals Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yair Antler
Keyword(s):  
Stable Matching ◽  
The Other ◽  
Matching Theory ◽  
Endogenous Preferences ◽  
Matching Problem ◽  
Matching Mechanism

We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g., the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings that are not stable with respect to the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly modified, every equilibrium of its induced game results in a pairwise stable matching with respect to the endogenous preferences as long as they satisfy a natural reciprocity property. (JEL C78, D82)

Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 639-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth R. Gerber ◽  
John E. Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Bayesian Model ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Process ◽  
Endogenous Preferences ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Adaptive Preferences ◽  
Rights Issues

The assumption that individual preferences, or attitudes, are fixed and exogenously determined is central to many studies of political and economic institutions, such as markets and elections. We present a Bayesian model of adaptive preferences and empirical evidence consistent with that model to argue that preferences are not always exogenous and fixed. The changing relationships between partisanship and preferences on civil rights issues between 1956 and 1964 and on the Vietnam War issue between 1968 and 1972 coincide with significant changes in the major parties' positions on these issues, suggesting that preferences are endogenous to the electoral process. We conclude with a discussion of the positive and normative implications of endogenous preferences.

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