Two Dogmas of Research Ethics

This chapter reviews a series of arguments that purport to show that there is an inherent moral dilemma in research with humans and that this conflict produces a corresponding social dilemma, known as the prisoner’s dilemma. If these arguments are sound, it would show that dual requirements of the egalitarian research imperative outlined in chapter 4 cannot be satisfied in practice. This chapter argues that these arguments fail and that their intuitive force in this area is bolstered by two dogmas of research ethics: the claim that the ethical norms in this area derive from the role-related obligations of medical professionals and the claim that research is an inherently utilitarian undertaking. This chapter demonstrates that rejecting those dogmas creates a space for reconciling the production of socially valuable information with respect for research participants as free and equal.

A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene–culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

The social dilemma in artificial intelligence development and why we have to solve it

While the demand for ethical artificial intelligence (AI) systems increases, the number of unethical uses of AI accelerates, even though there is no shortage of ethical guidelines. We argue that a possible underlying cause for this is that AI developers face a social dilemma in AI development ethics, preventing the widespread adaptation of ethical best practices. We define the social dilemma for AI development and describe why the current crisis in AI development ethics cannot be solved without relieving AI developers of their social dilemma. We argue that AI development must be professionalised to overcome the social dilemma, and discuss how medicine can be used as a template in this process.

Religiosity and Cooperation: The COVID-19 Pandemic in Slovenia

We researched the COVID-19 pandemic as a give-some social dilemma. The success of solving the dilemma depends on an adequate proportion of cooperative actors. We were interested in the difference between how religious and non-religious Slovenian citizens reported their level of cooperation with government measures aimed at limiting the spread of the virus during the pandemic. Our research shows that during the first wave of the epidemic in Slovenia, religious citizens were slightly more cooperative than non-religious citizens. However, this statistically significant difference was not the consequence of religiosity per se. Regression analysis suggests that the observable difference was due to factors such as age, gender, concern about health, and trust in the ruling government. We explain the effect of these factors in light of the existing corpus of knowledge about social dilemmas.

I Am Better Than Others: Waste Management Policies and Self-Enhancement Bias

Waste source separation has been a social dilemma globally with a low participation rate. This research attempted to solve this dilemma by exploring the effect of mandatory (versus voluntary) policies on waste separation from the perspective of the self-versus based on deterrence theory and self-enhancement motivation. Hypothetical scenarios were used to demonstrate the effectiveness of mandatory policies and self-enhancement bias for residents (n = 589) and adolescents (n = 121). Study 2 was performed to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a no-implementation policy condition, and Study 3 extended the findings to adolescents. We found robust self-enhancement bias, where participants perceived themselves to be better than others in both willingness to perform and attitudes toward waste separation behavior. Specifically, participants tended to perceive themselves to perform waste separation well when policy compliance was voluntary, but they tended to perceive others to perform well when policy compliance was mandatory with supervision. These findings highlight the impact of mandatory policy with supervision and self-enhancement bias in waste management. The present studies provide substantial evidence and implications for the necessity of supervision in mandatory policy implementation.

A role of anterior cingulate cortex in the emergence of worker–parasite relationship

We studied the brain mechanisms underlying action selection in a social dilemma setting in which individuals’ effortful gains are unfairly distributed among group members. A stable “worker–parasite” relationship developed when three individually operant-conditioned rats were placed together in a Skinner box equipped with response lever and food dispenser on opposite sides. Specifically, one rat, the “worker,” engaged in lever-pressing while the other two “parasitic” rats profited from the worker’s effort by crowding the feeder in anticipation of food. Anatomically, c-Fos expression in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was significantly higher in worker rats than in parasite rats. Functionally, ACC inactivation suppressed the worker’s lever-press behavior drastically under social, but only mildly under individual, settings. Transcriptionally, GABAA receptor– and potassium channel–related messenger RNA expressions were reliably lower in the worker’s, relative to parasite’s, ACC. These findings indicate the requirement of ACC activation for the expression of exploitable, effortful behavior, which could be mediated by molecular pathways involving GABAA receptor/potassium channel proteins.

Social Learning Strategies and Cooperative Behaviour: Evidence of Payoff Bias, but Not Prestige or Conformity, in a Social Dilemma Game

Human cooperation, occurring without reciprocation and between unrelated individuals in large populations, represents an evolutionary puzzle. One potential explanation is that cooperative behaviour may be transmitted between individuals via social learning. Using an online social dilemma experiment, we find evidence that participants’ contributions were more consistent with payoff-biased transmission than prestige-biased transmission or conformity. We also found some evidence for lower cooperation (i) when exposed to social information about peer cooperation levels than without such information, and (ii) in the prisoners’ dilemma game compared to the snowdrift game. A simulation model established that the observed cooperation was more likely to be caused by participants’ general propensity to cooperate than by the effect of social learning strategies employed within the experiment, but that this cooperative propensity could be reduced through selection. Overall, our results support previous experimental evidence indicating the role of payoff-biased transmission in explaining cooperative behaviour, but we find that this effect was small and was overwhelmed by participants’ general propensity for cooperation.