The European Union in the G8: Promoting Consensus and Concerted Actions for Global Public Goods

Many environmental services are not traded in markets but are rather public goods and their supply cannot easily be motivated by the market forces. This leads to underinvestment in the public goods relative to what would be socially desirable. Financial instruments are designed to modify behaviour by encouraging private individuals, organisations and businesses to participate actively in conservation. Nation states are ultimately responsible for providing public goods but the competition rules of the European Union restrict the use of economic instruments that constitute ‘state aid’ as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article will analyse the regulatory frames under which economic incentives may constitute state aid in the meaning of 107 TFEU and the terms and conditions on which these aids may still be granted for land-owners.

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International Unions

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/0002828054201279 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 95 (3) ◽

pp. 602-615 ◽

Cited By ~ 96

Author(s):

Alberto Alesina ◽

Ignazio Angeloni ◽

Federico Etro

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Public Goods ◽

Size Composition ◽

Institutional Structure ◽

The European Union ◽

Ongoing Debate ◽

International Union ◽

New Members ◽

Trade Off ◽

Union Policy

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on arrangements that are relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure of the European Union.

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Political justice, political obligation and the European Union: Lessons from Habermas

European Journal of Social Theory ◽

10.1177/1368431020986755 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 136843102098675

Author(s):

Gabriele De Angelis

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Public Goods ◽

Political Obligation ◽

The European Union ◽

Political Justice ◽

The Past ◽

European Public ◽

Common Purpose ◽

European Policies ◽

Transnational Democracy

What principles of political justice ought to apply to the European Union? This question is particularly relevant considering the deepening integration process that resulted from the crises of the past decade. Habermas’s conception of a transnational democracy allows identification of the methodological components of transnational political justice: to unite in a transnational polity, people belonging to different national communities need a common purpose ( finalité), principles governing the distribution of constitutional and legislative power and a common political infrastructure that allows them to form democratic will as free and equal citizens. This article attempts to further expand these points through a public goods approach. European policies generate European public goods. These must be produced and accessed based on a fair cooperation scheme. Identifying these specific fairness conditions allows further clarification on how legislative and constitutional power ought to be distributed within the European polity.

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