The European Union as a Global Player: Creating Global Public Goods through Partnerships and Multilateral Institutions

2016 ◽  
pp. 21-28
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl-Gustav Lindén

Kingdom of Nokia tells a fascinating story of corporatism in Finland. How did the mobile phone giant Nokia make the Finnish elite willing to serve the interests of the company? Nokia became a global player in mobile communications in the 1990s, and helped establish Anglo-Saxon capitalism in Finland. Through its success and strong lobbying, the company managed to capture the attention of Finnish politicians, civil servants, and journalists nationwide. With concrete detailed examples, Kingdom of Nokia illustrates how Nokia organised lavishing trips to journalists and paid direct campaign funding to politicians to establish its role at the core of Finnish decision-making. As a result, the company influenced important political decisions such as joining the European Union and adopting the euro, and further, Nokia even drafted its own law to serve its special interests. All this in a country considered one of the least corrupt in the world.


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Padgett

AbstractConditionality is widely used by international organisations to induce “client states” to engage in structural reform. In the European Union (EU) it plays an important role in ensuring that accession countries adopt EU rules as a condition of membership. Reliance on external incentives, however, limits the effectiveness of bilateral accession conditionality, especially for pre-accession countries with uncertain membership prospects. This article argues that multilateral institutions can boost the rule transfer effects of bilateral accession conditionality by reinforcing its incentive structure. The contention is tested by empirical research into the Energy Community in South East Europe. The research uses cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison to evaluate the rule transfer effects of Community institutions relative to accession conditionality and the terms of energy interdependence. It finds that whilst accession status is the main predictor of alignment with the energy acquis, there is evidence that multilateral institutions of the Energy Community exert a significant reinforcement effect.


World Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 184 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-175
Author(s):  
Dominik Kopiński ◽  
Marek Wróblewski

For some time now, there has been a push for the World Bank to shift its focus toward global public goods (GPGs). These are goods that, once delivered, can be unrestrictedly consumed by most—if not all—countries on the planet. Nor are their benefits rivalrous. Moreover, the production of GPGs cannot be left to markets or individual countries, as these have suboptimal incentives to act. In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the concept of GPGs has seen a revival of sorts, with the pandemic not only striking just as multilateralism was at its lowest ebb, but also serving as irrefutable proof that the world needs international collaboration now more than ever. Multilateral institutions, and in particular the World Bank—a leading global institution with global membership—can rightfully be regarded as a possible solution to many global challenges. Based on interviews conducted with World Bank senior staff, as well as numerous experts, this article discusses arguments in favor of such a strategic shift. While there are legitimate claims for the Bank becoming a full-fledged provider of GPGs, the institution’s historical roots and operational constraints make this an unlikely prospect.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elina Raitanen ◽  
Elina Raitanen ◽  
Jukka Similä ◽  
Elina Raitanen ◽  
Jukka Similä ◽  
...  

Many environmental services are not traded in markets but are rather public goods and their supply cannot easily be motivated by the market forces. This leads to underinvestment in the public goods relative to what would be socially desirable. Financial instruments are designed to modify behaviour by encouraging private individuals, organisations and businesses to participate actively in conservation. Nation states are ultimately responsible for providing public goods but the competition rules of the European Union restrict the use of economic instruments that constitute ‘state aid’ as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This article will analyse the regulatory frames under which economic incentives may constitute state aid in the meaning of 107 TFEU and the terms and conditions on which these aids may still be granted for land-owners.


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