Finding a model of judicial review for administration: implications from theChevroncase for separation of powers in South Korea

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-162
Author(s):  
Dong Won Kim
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Agsel Awanisa ◽  
Yusdianto Yusdianto ◽  
Siti Khoiriah

The purpose of this research is to determine the constitutional complaint mechanism based on comparisons in other countries, practices, and adaptation of constitutional complaints under the authority of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia. Many cases with constitutional complaint substance have been submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia even though they don’t have this authority. This research uses a normative legal research method using a statutory approach, a conceptual approach, a comparative approach, and a case approach. This research indicates that the constitutional complaint mechanism in Germany, South Korea, and South Africa has been well implemented. In practice, cases with constitutional complaint substance are filed to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia by changing the form by using the legal means of a judicial review, such as case number 16/PUU-VI/ 2008, case number 140/PUU-XIII/2015 and case number 102/PUU-VII/2009. Due to the consideration of the structure, substance, and culture of law, adaptation of constitutional complaint within the authority of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia needs to be carried out by amending Law Number 24 of 2003 jo. Law Number 7 of 2020 concerning the Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This concluding chapter identifies the four major causes of the growth and origin of judicial review in the G-20 common law countries and in Israel. First, the need for a federalism umpire, and occasionally a separation of powers umpire, played a major role in the development of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in India, and most recently in the United Kingdom. Second, there is a rights from wrongs phenomenon at work in the growth of judicial review in the United States, after the Civil War; in Canada, with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in India, after the Indira Gandhi State of Emergency led to a massive trampling on human rights; in Israel, after the Holocaust; in South Africa, after racist apartheid misrule; and in the United Kingdom, after that country accumulated an embarrassing record before the European Court of Human Rights prior to 1998. This proves that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation often occurs in response to a deprivation of human rights. Third, the seven common law countries all borrowed a lot from one another, and from civil law countries, in writing their constitutions. Fourth, and finally, the common law countries all create multiple democratic institutions or political parties, which renders any political attempt to strike back at the Supreme Court impossible to maintain.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This introductory chapter discusses how judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has usually emerged historically for a combination of four reasons. First, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is a response to a nation’s need for an umpire to resolve federalism or separation of powers boundary line disputes. The second main cause of the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is what can be called the rights from wrongs hypothesis; judicial review very often emerges as a response to an abominable deprivation of human rights. The third major cause is the out-and-out borrowing of the institution of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from either the United States’ model; the German Civil Law model; and, most recently, from the Canadian Second Look judicial review constitutional model. The fourth major cause is the existence of a system of checks and balances, which gives Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts political space to grow in. Revolutionary charismatic constitutionalism can also lead to the growth of judicial review as Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained in an important new book, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019).


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This book is about the stunning birth and growth of judicial review in the civil law world, since 1945. In Volume I of this two-volume series, I showed that judicial review was born and grew in common law G-20 constitutional democracies and in Israel primarily: (1) when there is a need for a federalism or a separation of powers umpire, (2) when there is a rights from wrongs dynamic, (3) when there is borrowing, and (4) when the political structure of a country’s institutions leaves space within which the judiciary can operate. The countries discussed in Volume I were the following: (1) the United States, (2) Canada, (3) Australia, (4) India, (5) Israel, (6) South Africa, and (7) the United Kingdom....


2021 ◽  
pp. 201-230
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at Brazilian judicial review. Judicial review in Brazil originated because it was borrowed from the U.S. Constitution. It emerged in amplified form in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution because, by 1988, the normative appeal of judicial review was widely appreciated all over the world. Moreover, the Hybrid Model of judicial review in Brazil, whereby the Supreme Federal Tribunal is both, at the apex of a diffuse system of judicial review, and is also a Constitutional Court, reflects widespread appreciation for the value of a system like the German Constitutional Court in a civil law jurisdiction. The power of such a court to issue rulings with erga omnes effect is especially important in civil law countries like Brazil, which lack systems of stare decisis. First, judicial review emerged in Brazil as the result of borrowing. Second, it emerged as a rights from wrongs reaction to abuses of power during Fascism and during the military dictatorship, which ruled Brazil for 1964 until 1984. Third, judicial review is necessary in Brazil for both federalism and separation of powers umpiring reasons. Fourth, judicial review in Brazil also emerged because the constitution-writing elite wanted to entrench its liberal and socialist values to forestall the emergence of yet another military government in the country. And, fifth, the Brazilian Constitution divides and allocates power among so many federal and state entities that the Supreme Federal Tribunal has the political space it needs to play a really big role in governing the country.


Author(s):  
Joseph Atja Sulandra ◽  
Anak Agung Ngurah Roy Sumahardika

This study aimed to compare the profile and authority of the Constitutional Court of South Korea with the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, which is granted by its Constitution and related laws. The aim is to see how far the role of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia as an institution of judicial review, so that it can also note the advantages and disadvantages in its function as the guardian of the constitution. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membandingkan profil dan kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi Korea Selatan dengan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, yang diberikan oleh Undang-Undang Dasar serta Undang-Undang terkait. Tujuannya adalah untuk melihat seberapa jauh peran Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia sebagai Lembaga Judicial Review Undang-undang terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar, sehingga dapat dilihat kelebihanan dan kekurangannya masing-masing dalam fungsinya sebagai lembaga pengawal konstitusi.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90
Author(s):  
Janina Boughey

Although the High Court has never ruled on the issue, the prevailing view has been that unless parliaments enact bills of rights, the principle of proportionality does not and cannot play a role in judicial review of administrative decisions in Australia. Yet in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, a majority of the High Court hinted that this may not be the case. This article analyses the reasons for Australia's longstanding reluctance to embrace proportionality in the administrative law context, and whether the decision in Li has altered this position. It then explores overseas developments in proportionality review which reveal that the principle may take on many forms in the administrative law context, with differing implications for the separation of powers. The article finds that it might be possible to accommodate certain methods of applying proportionality within Australia's judicial review framework, but not without significant broader changes to judicial review of administrative action in Australia.


Author(s):  
Somanathan TV

This chapter explores how India’s constitutional law has addressed the administrative and regulatory State as it has evolved outside the traditional branches of government, and how judicial review is exercised over it. It begins by providing a background on constitutional issues relating to the administrative State as it functions within the executive branch, before turning to a discussion of the major regulatory bodies that either are explicitly called ‘regulatory’ or exercise regulatory functions. It then considers the constitutional position of the administrative and regulatory State based on judicial decisions and on the Indian Constitution. It also examines the conceptual underpinnings of, and justification for, the regulatory State, along with some specific concerns arising from the regulatory State such as legal uncertainty and excessive delegation. The chapter concludes by analysing some of the issues associated with the emerging constitutional jurisprudence on the regulatory State.


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