Law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Religion

Author(s):  
Derek H. Davis

The United States Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is typically analyzed based on whether a court’s decision emerges from an Establishment Clause analysis or a Free Exercise Clause analysis. While this method is useful, a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by identifying various philosophical themes that describe the court’s varied approaches to deciding religion cases. The cases can be analyzed under at least four separate but interrelated themes: separation of church and state, cooperation between sacred and secular activities in religion-based contexts, equal treatment among religions, and the integration of religion and politics. This article examines the High Court’s often controversial decisions affecting religion through the lenses of these four themes. The term “separation of church and state” is frequently used to describe the American relationship between law and religion, but this term is far too simplistic a description of how church and state interact in the American system; the ways in which the system sometimes embraces separation but sometimes does not, are analyzed and explained. Consistent with the misconception that the Supreme Court always seeks to “separate” church and state, court analysts will sometimes describe the court’s strategy as giving “no aid” to religion. This also is a simplistic analysis, since it can clearly be shown that the court does not seek to “wall” off religion from government aid in all cases. Rather, the court tends to sanction state support of “secular” activities that arise in religion contexts while denying state aid to the “sacred” components of religious activity. “Equality” is a hallmark of American democracy. While the Founders did not earmark equality as a goal of the religion clauses, the concept has nevertheless emerged as a byproduct of deeper goals, namely sanctioning religious pluralism and providing equal access to government office. If separation of church and state were really the centerpiece of how religion and state activity interact in the United States, the Supreme Court would not sanction the involvement of religion in public debate and discourse, nor would it permit political candidates and officeholders to freely talk about religion in their personal lives and its role in American political life. But the court carefully crafts a jurisprudence that rarely intrudes on this kind of activity. In sum, looking at Supreme Court religion cases through a number of philosophical lenses is a fruitful guide to understanding court decisions that are otherwise often highly complex and confusing.

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Leslie C. Griffin

The United States is in a religion-friendly mood—or at least its three branches of government are. The Supreme Court is turning away from its Free Exercise Clause analysis that currently holds that every religious person must obey the law. At the same time, the Court is rejecting its old Establishment Clause analysis that the government cannot practice or support religion. The old model of separation of church and state is gone, replaced by an ever-growing unity between church and state. This Article examines how much union of church and state this Court might establish.


Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

Tension has long existed in the United State between the equality claims of LGBT individuals, on the one hand, and free exercise claims by those who hold that compelling equal treatment violates their convictions, on the other. This tension increased, however, after the United States Supreme Court extended marriage equality to same-sex couples nationwide. Equality advocates hold that antidiscrimination laws simply allow LGBT individuals to enjoy the same rights as others. Many religious advocates, however, believe that they are being prohibited from living out the implications of their conscientious beliefs. Neutrality between these conflicting claims cannot be achieved, as policies that appear neutral to one group appear non-neutral to the other. Private voluntary organizations are one site of conflict. Although private organizations should not typically be forced to reflect the values of the larger society, not all organizations are similarly situated within it. Groups such as the Boy Scouts should be able to exclude at will. Public authority does not itself always support the values of free and equal citizenship, and organizations may evolve over time as the Scouts itself has done. Organizations that exist within larger entities, however, fall into a different category. The Supreme Court was correct to uphold Hastings Law School in forcing the Christian Legal Society as a registered student organization to admit all comers. These groups also represent the values of a public entity and can continue to operate as independent entities if they so choose. The provision of services in connection with same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies has been another site of conflict. In Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2015), the Supreme Court found narrowly that bakery owner Phillips could refuse to create cakes for same-sex wedding celebrations, as the state of Colorado had displayed animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. Commercial establishments, however, are public accommodations and generally should not be allowed to discriminate against customers on the basis of their identities. Discrimination against the activity or conduct of formal commitment is also discrimination against the identity or status of a same-sex couple. These kinds of cases do not admit of neutral solutions. Some suggest that those with religious reservations could advertise that they do not serve same-sex couples, but this is reminiscent of Jim Crow in the post–Civil War South. Jurisdictional pluralists suggest that the government designate a sphere of noninterference as a jurisdictional boundary that it will not cross. Thus individuals and associations with religious commitments would be free to pursue these interests with minimal interference. However, a prior authoritative structure must exist to define the nature and scope of this jurisdiction, just as the Constitution defines the relationships between the national government and the states. Applications for religious exemptions should not be treated more generously when they conflict with LGBT equality concerns than with equality claims based on race or gender. Although religious individuals and groups should be able to exercise their religious convictions within their areas of competence, in a liberal society and state they cannot define the limits of these areas.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document