A Study of Infringement on Privacy Rights Caused by Making Public a Private Fact on the Press and the Internet - Focusing on the Judgments in the Supreme Court of the United States and the State Court -

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-194
Author(s):  
Hyeong-Seok Lee ◽  
Jung-Ki Kim
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
State Court ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Privacy Rights ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Supreme Court

Law, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Religion

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek H. Davis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Church And State ◽  
Religion And Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
State Court ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is typically analyzed based on whether a court’s decision emerges from an Establishment Clause analysis or a Free Exercise Clause analysis. While this method is useful, a more in-depth analysis can be undertaken by identifying various philosophical themes that describe the court’s varied approaches to deciding religion cases. The cases can be analyzed under at least four separate but interrelated themes: separation of church and state, cooperation between sacred and secular activities in religion-based contexts, equal treatment among religions, and the integration of religion and politics. This article examines the High Court’s often controversial decisions affecting religion through the lenses of these four themes. The term “separation of church and state” is frequently used to describe the American relationship between law and religion, but this term is far too simplistic a description of how church and state interact in the American system; the ways in which the system sometimes embraces separation but sometimes does not, are analyzed and explained. Consistent with the misconception that the Supreme Court always seeks to “separate” church and state, court analysts will sometimes describe the court’s strategy as giving “no aid” to religion. This also is a simplistic analysis, since it can clearly be shown that the court does not seek to “wall” off religion from government aid in all cases. Rather, the court tends to sanction state support of “secular” activities that arise in religion contexts while denying state aid to the “sacred” components of religious activity. “Equality” is a hallmark of American democracy. While the Founders did not earmark equality as a goal of the religion clauses, the concept has nevertheless emerged as a byproduct of deeper goals, namely sanctioning religious pluralism and providing equal access to government office. If separation of church and state were really the centerpiece of how religion and state activity interact in the United States, the Supreme Court would not sanction the involvement of religion in public debate and discourse, nor would it permit political candidates and officeholders to freely talk about religion in their personal lives and its role in American political life. But the court carefully crafts a jurisprudence that rarely intrudes on this kind of activity. In sum, looking at Supreme Court religion cases through a number of philosophical lenses is a fruitful guide to understanding court decisions that are otherwise often highly complex and confusing.

The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion

1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Carroll
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Local School ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Bible Reading

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, “the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. … Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer and state-prescribed Bible reading in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry, but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.

Exile within the United States

1965 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-29
Author(s):  
Brent T. Lynch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Prison Inmates ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Agency

The Utah Board of Pardons, an executive agency, releases some Utah prison inmates by an order of "conditional termina tion," which directs the recipient to leave the state immediately and remain away permanently. The Supreme Court of Utah has recently held this order to be valid and constitutional, a ruling attacked by this article, which cites cases wherein rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution are violated. Public policy, sound penology, and constitutional law all militate against use of conditional termination.

Freedom of Communication in the US and Europe

ICL Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Tenorio
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us

AbstractThis paper compares the freedom of communication in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, departing from the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is noted that there are differences, as specified herein. Regulatory texts invite to speak of two distinct models, though this may be a far-fetched statement. This paper makes the following concluding remarks: 1) There are many concepts of freedom of expression that are compatible with democracy; the one derived from the Sullivan Judgment in the US (and in Europe from the Lingens Judgment) is not the only one, although it is currently considered the most consist­ent with democracy. This point is not discussed here. 2) Major changes sometimes occur through seemingly small details. In this sense, the shift of the burden of proof in defama­tion cases (Sullivan) has created an earthquake in the legal regime governing the press. The Sullivan doctrine can be summarized as follows: first, errors are inevitable, as freedom of speech requires ‘breathing room’; second, the malice of those accused of defamation must be proven; third, it is necessary to prove the lack of veracity of the slanderer. This doctrine allows the press to play its role as the watchdog of freedom. 3) In Spain, the press also appears to play this role, thus requiring us to ask whether there is, or ever was, a Sullivan Judgment in Spanish jurisprudence. We tend to attribute the privileged position of the press in Spain to the fact that the Constitutional Court has given preferential consid­eration to freedom of speech when it is in conflict with honor, intimacy and self-image privacy. This preference is justified by its connection to democracy. Since the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC hereafter) 6/1981 of 16 March, the Spanish Consti­tutional Court has stressed the importance of freedom of information for democracy, and since the STC 159/1986 of 16 December, the Constitutional Court has suggested the pref­erential position of freedom of expression. However, the incorporation of the Sullivan doc­trine into the Spanish system occurred through STC 6/1988 of 21 January, almost ten years after the passage of the Constitution into law.

The Unrealized Precedent of DAVIS V. BANDEMER

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Seabrook
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
The State ◽  
Congressional Districts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legislative Districts ◽  
State Legislative

This chapter examines the involvement of the Supreme Court of the United States in litigation relating to partisan gerrymandering, paying particular attention to a case that attempted to apply the previously established Davis v. Bandemer precedent to congressional elections: Vieth v. Jubelirer. It begins with an overview of Badham v. Eu, which arose from the redrawing of California's congressional districts in the aftermath of the 1980 census and its most significant holding: that the Bandemer precedent, which had initially been applied to the drawing of state legislative districts only, also extends to the drawing of congressional districts. The chapter then considers the circumstances surrounding the Vieth case, in which the alleged political gerrymander concerned the reapportionment plan for the congressional districts in the state of Pennsylvania rather than those for the state assembly. It also analyzes the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Vieth, focusing on Justice Antonin Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurring opinion.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Yaffe
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Duct Tape

The case of Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551) presents a set of facts that test almost anyone’s intuitions favoring the idea that kids should be shielded from the worst punishments, punishments that are justifiably heaped on adults. More for the thrill of it than anything else, Christopher Simmons, together with two friends, broke into a randomly chosen home in the middle of the night, abducted Shirley Crook from her bedroom, bound her hands, legs, and head tightly with duct tape, and threw her off a bridge. She drowned in the waters below. Simmons later bragged about the murder, saying that he did it “because the bitch seen my face.” This repulsive remark was an evident lie, not that it matters, since there was ample evidence that Simmons had planned to kill Crook well before he and his friends even entered her home. Shirley Crook left behind a grief-stricken husband and daughter, both of whom testified at the sentencing phase of the trial to the havoc that the murder had wreaked on their lives. One and only one thing can be said on Simmons’ behalf, and it was duly noted by the attorneys in the case when addressing the jury that sentenced him to die: Christopher Simmons was 17 years old at the time of the crime. Eventually the Supreme Court of the United States reached the conclusion that this one fact was significant enough to warrant withholding from Simmons the worst that the state can do to a person: the court saved Simmons’ life, ruling that no one under 18 at the time of a crime could be executed for it, no matter how heinous the conduct....

How Ontology Saved Free Speech in Cyberspace

1998 ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Physical World ◽  
The Internet ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
The Supreme Court

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.

Introduction to the Special Section on Commercial Speech

2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
Timothy L. Fort ◽  
Steven R. Salbu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Special Section ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unfair Competition ◽  
Commercial Speech ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Broad Interpretation

ABSTRACT:In 1998, activist Marc Kasky sued Nike for alleged false advertising and unfair competition under California law. Kasky alleged that Nike made false statements in a variety of what we would usually consider non-advertising forums, including interviews and letters to the press. The Supreme Court of California permitted Kasky's suit to go forward, even though the statements were not a part of traditional paid commercial advertisements. The Supreme Court of the United States, which initially granted certiorari to review the case, dismissed the writ on June 26, 2003, leaving intact California's broad interpretation of its statute and narrow construction of the Constitutional speech protections that constrain that statute. What is typically referred to as “the Nike case” or “the Kasky case” can mean either Kasky v. Nike (as the case was originally filed) or Nike v. Kasky (when Nike appealed the lower court's judgment).

Police recording of custodial interrogations

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon L Bang ◽  
Duane Stanton ◽  
Craig Hemmens ◽  
Mary K Stohr
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
State Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
False Confessions ◽  
Innocent People ◽  
Policies And Procedures ◽  
The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of the United States recognized in its seminal case Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) that police used overly coercive techniques during custodial interrogations to obtain confessions. Yet, post Miranda, police officers still utilize legal coercive and deceptive techniques during custodial interrogations. Unfortunately, some of these techniques have proven to be so coercive that they lead to false confessions and innocent people being convicted for crimes they did not commit. Some states have taken measures to protect the accused during custodial interrogations and require the police to record custodial interrogations under certain conditions. The policies and procedures that mandate interrogation recording vary in scope and by state. This article sheds light on the different statutes and policies implemented at the state level that regulate custodial interrogation recording.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document