11. Use of force

Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.

Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Art 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the United Nations Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto

The Article will examine the parameters of state-sponsored terrorism through an evaluation of the tenets of state responsibility. Under customary international law, States are not perpetrators of terrorism because terrorism is a penal offence and states are not subjects of international criminal law. Nonetheless, General Assembly resolutions repeatedly condemn States that undertake and/or support acts of terrorism. It reflects the absolute prohibition on the use of force except in reaction to a conventional armed attack and the seeming metamorphosis and fluidity of the traditional understanding.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Pshtiwan Mohammed Qader

The present paper examines the problem of cyber-attacks under existing international law. It takes the view that the (United Nations) UN Charter provisions on the use of force can be extended to cyber-attacks by means of interpretation although the relevant provisions do not explicitly address such issue. This Article argues that cyber-attacks resulting in material damage or destruction to property, death or injury to persons, or severe disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructures can be characterized as use of armed force and therefore violate the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. However, cyber-attacks not resulting in the above consequences may be illegal intervention in the internal affairs of other states if such attacks are coercive in nature. In addition, the current study discusses that a cyber-attack which amounts to a use of armed force per se is not sufficient to give the victim state the right to self-defense, unless its scale and effects are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack. Finally, the study concludes that an international cyber treaty is truly necessary to more effectively address cyber-attacks.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-599
Author(s):  
Said Mahmoudi

Abstract Sweden’s territorial sea and internal waters have experienced regular intrusions by submerged foreign submarines since the early 1950s. The response of the country to such intrusions is generally well-documented and mainly public. The present article offers an overview of the development of the relevant national legislation, the actual response of the naval forces, and the legal arguments invoked at national level to justify or dismiss use of force in self-defence or under another title. The article discusses the relevance of the immunity that submarines normally enjoy under international law and Sweden’s human-rights obligations, two issues that have been at the centre of the legal discourse. Particular attention is paid to developments since 2014 when a new round of “submarine hunts” started and led to the adoption of new measures both revising the existing laws and strengthening the defence forces.


2019 ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter looks at the use of force and collective security. Today, the United Nations Charter embodies the indispensable principles of international law on the use of force. These include the prohibition on the unilateral use of force found in Article 2(4), and the recognition of the inherent right of all States to use force in self-defence found in Article 51. Finally, under Chapter VII, a collective security system centred upon the Security Council was established for the maintenance of international peace and security. A key debate over the scope of Article 2(4) is whether a new exception has been recognized which would allow the use of force motivated by humanitarian considerations. It is argued that these ‘humanitarian interventions’ would allow a State to use force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.


Author(s):  
Byers Michael

This chapter addresses the US and NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to the present day. It examines the different legal justifications advanced or available for the intervention, namely self-defence, UN Security Council authorization, and intervention by invitation. It explores the complex relationships between these justifications and, particularly, the strategies adopted by states in choosing between them. The chapter concludes by considering the effects of the intervention on the customary international law of self-defence as it concerns non-state actors located in “unaware or unable” states, and anticipatory or pre-emptive responses.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Suy

At the outset of the conflict over Kosovo, the use of armed force by NATO member states has been justified to force the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to accept and sign the Rambouillet agreement. Later on, the use of force was justified in order to prevent a major humanitarian catastrophe. But examination of the relevant Security Council resolutions and of the circumstances surrounding the Rambouillet negotiations shed a totally different light on the legal arguments advanced by proponents of NATO's intervention. Modern international law on the use of force by states, as enshrined in the UN Charter, is still at the core of inter-state relations.


Author(s):  
W Scholtz

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force. 


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