10. International law and the use of force

Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.

Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
W Scholtz

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force. 


2010 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-188
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

AbstractThis article explores the development of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect among Swedish policy-makers. The doctrine may or may not include an authorization by the United Nations (UN) Security Council as a necessary component. The article investigates how the new doctrine fits with the Swedish constitutional regulation of the use of force and how the evolution of the new Swedish view of the jus ad bellum interacts with the regulation of the use of force in the European Union (EU). The responsibility to protect answers to many of the concerns voiced in Parliament; the doctrine caters both to those who wish a basis for action independent of the Security Council and to those who are faithful to the UN. The parliamentary debates as well as government documents point to a developing political consensus that unilateral humanitarian intervention may be justified under certain exceptional circumstances. The argument that decisions should be made by the Security Council is difficult to maintain in the face of grave human suffering which would otherwise warrant action by the international community. The increasing ability and willingness to intervene internationally in Sweden and the EU leads to a further question, namely: For what will the force be used?


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Art 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 462-506
Author(s):  
Mindia Vashakmadze

Foreign military intervention in internal conflicts remains an important feature of today’s international relations. At the same time, the paradigms of interventions in international law are changing. In today’s world, questions related to legality and legitimacy of foreign military interventions are more often raised than ever. However, in many cases, there is a gap between legality and legitimacy of such interventions. Concepts such as humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect attempted to bridge this gap; however, both concepts remain contested. Complex questions of substantive law and the institutional framework of collective security are discussed in this context. Meanwhile, classic exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, such as self-defence, are broadly interpreted. Certain States aspire to revive their ambitions by using military means to protect nationals abroad. The paper examines four cases (Georgia, Libya, Syria and Ukraine) in which different arguments have been held to justify military interventions. It attempts to answer the question as to whether there are new paradigms of military intervention in international law and to what extent the arguments made by the States to justify military interventions have influenced relevant norms and the structure of international law.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 910-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Chinkin

The use of force has been prohibited in international relations since at least the United Nations Charter, 1945. Article 2 (4) of the Charter states:All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 113-117
Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

Monica Hakimi's article probes the legal significance of an interesting phenomenon: the UN Security Council condoning the use of force, as opposed to authorizing it. She offers an innovative perspective on this little-studied dimension of how the Council contributes to the development of jus ad bellum. While I applaud much in the article, I question her characterization of what the Council is condoning in the cases she reviews. She claims these are “fact-specific decisions,” whereas I argue that the Council is endorsing controversial interpretations of the law on the use of force. This disagreement does not detract from Hakimi's observations about the policy implications of the practice, or about the Council's role as a site for deliberation and argumentation about the content of international law. But it does cast doubt on her conceptual claim that there are two distinct “regulatory forms,” which together provide the content of jus ad bellum, one particularistic and procedural, the other general and substantive. All legal claims and justifications entail the application of general standards to particular facts, either explicitly or implicitly. Most of her case studies can be explained in those terms. Thus, while the Council's practice of condoning the use of force is important to understand, the “conventional account” she derides provides a more persuasive and parsimonious explanation of that phenomenon.


Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter examines the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which provides that ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. States and commentators generally agree that the prohibition is not only a treaty obligation but also customary law. However, there are disagreements between states on the interpretation and application of Article 2(4): does ‘the use of force’ include not only armed force but also economic coercion and, more recently, cyber attacks. Can humanitarian intervention ever be lawful? Is Responsibilty to Protect now a substitute for humanitarian intervention?


Author(s):  
Dire Tladi

In July 2021, the author presented a Special Course for the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Courses on the Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors. The course focused on two bases for the extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors, namely self-defence and intervention by invitation. The lectures came to a conclusion that may, at first glance, appear contradictory. With respect to the use of force in self-defence, the lectures adopted a restrictive (non-permissive) approach in which the use of force is not permitted save in narrowly construed exceptions. With respect to intervention by invitation, the lectures adopted a more permissive approach in which the use of force is generally permitted and prohibited only in narrowly construed exceptions. This article serves as post-script (PS), to explain the apparent contradiction. It concludes that the main reason for this apparent contradiction is the application of the fundamental principles of international law—sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence—which are consistent with intervention by invitation but are undermined by self-defence against non-state actors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Summary The ban on the use of force in current international law is of mandatory character. The only exceptions are actions under the auspices of the UN Security Council and self-defence. The article addresses the issue of the use of force, with particular emphasis on cyberspace. As the nature of the conflicts has changed in recent years as well as the space where the individual operations have been moving, a number of fundamental questions arise in this context, which the authors will try to answer.


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