3. Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression

Author(s):  
William Abel ◽  
Elizabeth Kahn ◽  
Tom Parr ◽  
Andrew Walton

This chapter assesses when, if ever, a state should restrict hate speech. Political disputes about this topic are part of broader disagreements about the limits of freedom of expression. The chapter makes a case for restricting hate speech when, and on the grounds that, it incites or makes more likely harm to particular members of society. It considers whether some familiar justifications for freedom of expression provide a persuasive case against this view, exploring arguments that appeal to autonomy, individual interests in expression, and the dangers of granting the state regulatory power. None of these justifications supports the protection of hate speech. The chapter then sketches the kinds of hate speech legislation that these arguments justify.

Author(s):  
Marelize Marais

In this contribution, I argue that every person's duty to respect others is central to section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 ("the Equality Act"), otherwise known as the "hate speech" prohibition. This duty should therefore also be a central consideration in its interpretation. Related duties are those of the state to enact legislation, and of courts to interpret and apply the law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Our courts have in many instances considered the duty to respect others, as well as the state's and the courts' related duties, in the interpretation of socioeconomic rights and the development of the common law. In doing so, they have consistently employed the reasonableness standard. Therefore, references to relevant case law in various legal contexts provide the framework within which I examine legal duties in the context of unfair discrimination and, in particular, hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. I examine the constitutional obligations of the state, the courts and private persons to promote respect for the dignity of others. I reiterate the state's specific obligation in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds listed in section 9(3). Finally, I relate these duties to the section 10(1) prohibition in the Equality Act. I apply the reasonableness standard to conclude that the prohibition gives due effect to the duties of the state and every person, and that the courts are duty-bound to interpret it accordingly. This conclusion refutes the Supreme Court of Appeal's ruling in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission ("Qwelane")[1] that the section 10(1) prohibition was vague, overbroad and, therefore, unjustifiably infringing the right to freedom of expression.   [1]        2020 3 BCLR 334 (SCA). 


Iuris Dictio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lóránt Csink

The protection of human rights is one of the main obligations a state has in order to fulfill its duties. Therefore, the right of freedom of expression shall be protected, especially because it relates directly to the defense of the democratic of a society. Although there are different points of view regarding an issue, especially same-sex marriage, the state is obligated to stay neutral towards public opinions. Consequently, public opinions might end up transforming into hate speech which creates an even larger confrontation within people and the state. This is why, the state must establish fair limits for human rights. Finally, it is essential to understand that promoting tolerance is the most important aspect to safeguard the rights of people to freely speak their minds in order to exercise their right of freedom of speech.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Heru Susetyo ◽  
Farida Prihatini ◽  
Abdurakhman Abdurakhman ◽  
Nurindah Hilimi ◽  
Intan Mahabah ◽  
...  

<p><em>Indonesia with its five pillars of Pancasila binds the State and its citizens to "Believe in Almighty" where the religious identity is the spirit of the State that must be respected. This is proven by the existence of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning the Prevention of Blasphemy that prohibits blasphemy, atheism, or any belief other than the religious identity recognized by the government and law. Article 156 (a) of the criminal code, known as the Criminal Code, also punishes "the dissemination of information aimed at inciting religious hatred or hostility" for five years in prison. In addition, the Information and Electronic Transaction Law (ITE) Law No. 11 of 2008, regulating criminal sanctions for libel, hate speech, and insulting certain religions/beliefs through electronic devices. On the other hand, the 1945 Constitution, as well as the Human Rights Act of 1999 and Law No. 12/2005 concerning Ratification of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of expression, religion, and belief. Criticism of religion is quite limited and support for atheism is definitely still banned in Indonesia. Therefore, this article yearns to explore the dynamics of law enforcement and defamation in Indonesia in national and international human rights regimes. Then, does the law on blasphemy have a legal basis in the Indonesian legal system, national and international human rights regimes, and the surrounding social values? This study compares the application of religious blasphemy laws in several regions in Indonesia and in several Southeast Asian countries.</em></p>


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-640
Author(s):  
Thiago Dias Oliva

Abstract With the increase in online content circulation new challenges have arisen: the dissemination of defamatory content, non-consensual intimate images, hate speech, fake news, the increase of copyright violations, among others. Due to the huge amount of work required in moderating content, internet platforms are developing artificial intelligence to automate decision-making content removal. This article discusses the reported performance of current content moderation technologies from a legal perspective, addressing the following question: what risks do these technologies pose to freedom of expression, access to information and diversity in the digital environment? The legal analysis developed by the article focuses on international human rights law standards. Despite recent improvements, content moderation technologies still fail to understand context, thereby posing risks to users’ free speech, access to information and equality. Consequently, it is concluded, these technologies should not be the sole basis for reaching decisions that directly affect user expression.


Author(s):  
Svenja Schäfer ◽  
Michael Sülflow ◽  
Liane Reiners

Abstract. Previous research indicates that user comments serve as exemplars and thus have an effect on perceived public opinion. Moreover, they also shape the attitudes of their readers. However, studies almost exclusively focus on controversial issues if they explore the consequences of user comments for attitudes and perceived public opinion. The current study wants to find out if hate speech attacking social groups due to characteristics such as religion or sexual orientation also has an effect on the way people think about these groups and how they think society perceives them. Moreover, we also investigated the effects of hate speech on prejudiced attitudes. To explore the hypotheses and research questions, we preregistered and conducted a 3 × 2 experimental study varying the amount of hate speech (none/few/many hateful comments) and the group that was attacked (Muslims/homosexuals). Results show no effects of the amount of hate speech on perceived public opinion for both groups. However, if homosexuals are attacked, hate speech negatively affects perceived social cohesion. Moreover, for both groups, we find interaction effects between preexisting attitudes and hate speech for discriminating demands. This indicates that hate speech can increase polarization in society.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Miró-Llinares

Nowadays it is easy to find public statements about the situation of freedom of expression in different democracies questioning the exercise of this right, perhaps as a result of the political tensions to which democratic states have been subjected in recent years. In this sense, Spain does not escape from these diagnoses. Both international indicators that try to measure the situation and evolution of freedom of expression in different States and academic scholars highlight the excessive criminalization of certain speeches that end up in criminal proceedings that sentence people who make offensive expressions, mainly through social networks. However, in order to reach this diagnosis it is necessary to put together all the symptoms that would lead us to that conclusion. Therefore, in this paper I analyze two main indicators that could shed more light on the state of freedom of expression in Spain and the impact that social networks have had on it. Firstly, I analyze the legislative evolution of expression offences since 1995, to evaluate the limits of certain expressions in order to reach the conclusion that, effectively, over the years the punitive scope of what cannot be expressed has been extended, thus limiting, at least in abstract, freedom of expression. Secondly, I analyze the jurisprudential evolution of all these crimes since 1995 to show that, indeed, the proliferation of sentences from 2015 to the present shows the increase in the criminalization of expressions that are made eminently through social networks such as Twitter and Facebook. To conclude, I reflect on the possibility that the latest absolutory sentence by the Constitutional Court of the singer of the band Def con Dos César Strawberry will increase the feeling that, from now on, all expression is admissible and, therefore, will increase free expression in general and, in particular, in social networks, since, it does not seem that our legislator is willing to rectify in its steps the excessive criminalization of certain offenses. I also reflect on the need to approach freedom of expression in a more empirical way and the need to evaluate not only the limitations that the law and judicial processes impose on freedom of expression, but also the extent to which citizens in general and, in particular, users of social networks, without the need to have gone through any criminal proceedings, have stopped expressing their opinions because only in this way will it be possible to determine the state of health of our right to freedom of expression.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-99
Author(s):  
Munandzirul Amin

Democracy provides a place for us to learn to live with the enemy because only democracy allows tension and paradox, which comes from freedom, to occur in society. In contrast to the New Order era, we can now enjoy freedom of opinion and association. This freedom can in turn produce tension. The relationship between elements of society with one another, or the relationship between the state and elements of society, can be tense because of differences in interests in regulating social and political order. Meanwhile, Indonesian society witnessed the paradox which also originated from freedom. This, for example, is shown by the emergence of intolerant groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Even organizations such as HTI are of the view that democracy is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam in terms of sovereignty in the hands of the people, what should determine that is the preogrative right of Allah SWT. The government in the view of HTI only implements sharia and determines administrative technical issues.


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