Populism, Foreign Policy, and the GOP

Age of Iron ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 134-154
Author(s):  
Colin Dueck

This chapter investigates the state of foreign policy opinion within the Republican Party today. Perhaps surprisingly, the basic distribution of voter opinion on foreign policy within the GOP has not changed that much since the early Obama era. However, Republican voters do support Trump, and not only because he is an incumbent president from the same party. The GOP has moved in a populist, culturally conservative, and white working-class direction over a period now spanning several decades. In this sense, Trump is as much an effect as a cause. He has broken open prior conservative orthodoxies. In certain ways, on a range of specific issues following his presidency, this leaves the future of Republican foreign policy wide open. But observers should understand that the conservative-leaning American nationalism he has championed is not about to disappear when he leaves the scene. In one form or another, it is here to stay.

Age of Iron ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Colin Dueck

This chapter summarizes the entire book. It argues that a kind of conservative American nationalism long predates the Trump presidency, and goes back to the American founding. Different aspects of conservative American nationalism have been incorporated into the Republican Party from its creation. Every Republican president since Theodore Roosevelt has tried to balance elements of this tradition with global US foreign policy priorities. Donald Trump was able to win his party’s nomination and rise to the presidency in part by challenging liberal internationalist assumptions. Yet in practice, he too has combined nationalist assumptions with global US foreign policy priorities. The long-term trend within the Republican party—predating Trump—is toward political populism, cultural conservatism, and white working-class voters, and this has international implications. Republican foreign policy nationalism is not about to disappear.


2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-16
Author(s):  
Brian Kovalesky

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, during the height of protests and actions by civil rights activists around de facto school segregation in the Los Angeles area, the residents of a group of small cities just southeast of the City of Los Angeles fought to break away from the Los Angeles City Schools and create a new, independent school district—one that would help preserve racially segregated schools in the area. The “Four Cities” coalition was comprised of residents of the majority white, working-class cities of Vernon, Maywood, Huntington Park, and Bell—all of which had joined the Los Angeles City Schools in the 1920s and 1930s rather than continue to operate local districts. The coalition later expanded to include residents of the cities of South Gate, Cudahy, and some unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, although Vernon was eventually excluded. The Four Cities coalition petitioned for the new district in response to a planned merger of the Los Angeles City Schools—until this time comprised of separate elementary and high school districts—into the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The coalition's strategy was to utilize a provision of the district unification process that allowed citizens to petition for reconfiguration or redrawing of boundaries. Unification was encouraged by the California State Board of Education and legislature in order to combine the administrative functions of separate primary and secondary school districts—the dominant model up to this time—to better serve the state's rapidly growing population of children and their educational needs, and was being deliberated in communities across the state and throughout Los Angeles County. The debates at the time over school district unification in the Greater Los Angeles area, like the one over the Four Cities proposal, were inextricably tied to larger issues, such as taxation, control of community institutions, the size and role of state and county government, and racial segregation. At the same time that civil rights activists in the area and the state government alike were articulating a vision of public schools that was more inclusive and demanded larger-scale, consolidated administration, the unification process reveals an often-overlooked grassroots activism among residents of the majority white, working-class cities surrounding Los Angeles that put forward a vision of exclusionary, smaller-scale school districts based on notions of local control and what they termed “community identity.”


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 323-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Ellis ◽  
Jerry Rawicki

This article extends the research of Jerry Rawicki and Carolyn Ellis who have collaborated for more than eight years on memories and consequences of the Holocaust. Focusing on Jerry’s memories of his experience during the Holocaust, they present dialogues that took place during five recorded interviews and follow-up conversations that reflect on the similarity of Hitler’s seizing of power in the 1930s to the meteoric rise of Donald Trump. Noting how issues of class and race were taking an increasingly prominent role in their conversations and collaborative writing, they also begin to examine discontent in the rural, White working class and Carolyn’s socialization within that community. These dialogues and reflections seek to shed light on the current political climate in America as Carolyn and Jerry struggle to cope with their fears and envision a hopeful path forward for their country.


Never Trump ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 240-248
Author(s):  
Robert P. Saldin ◽  
Steven M. Teles

This concluding chapter highlights how the Republican Party has been substantially transformed by the experience of having Donald Trump at its head. The president's reelection in 2020 would only deepen that transformation. Deep sociological forces—in particular, a Republican Party base that is increasingly white, working class, Christian, less formally educated, and older—will lead the party to go where its voters are. What Trump started, his Republican successors will finish. Just as parties of the right across the Western world have become more populist and nationalist, so will the Republicans. That, of course, bodes poorly for most of the Never Trumpers, who combined a deep distaste for Trump personally with a professional interest in a less populist governing style and a disinclination to see their party go ideologically where he wanted to take it. Ultimately, the future is unwritten because it will be shaped by the choices of individuals. Never Trump will have failed comprehensively in its founding mission, which was to prevent the poison of Donald Trump from entering the nation's political bloodstream. However, it is likely to be seen, in decades to come, as the first foray into a new era of American politics.


1994 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Streeter

A recent edited study of U.S. ambassadors assigned to Latin American countries beset by economic and political crises assesses the importance of individuals as determinants of U.S. foreign policy. Although the authors differed in their conclusions, two in particular suggested that even ambassadors who enjoyed great operational independence rarely disagreed with the ideological premises of their superiors in Washington. Historian Louis A. Pérez, for example, portrayed U.S. ambassador to Cuba Sumner Welles as “an active powerbroker” who “operated out of a defined ideological framework, a world view that allowed him to recognize social forces as potential friend or likely foe to U.S. interests.” Welles's attempt in 1933 to remove Cuban President Ramón Grau San Martin, who had abrogated the Platt Amendment, coincided with the State Department's policy of keeping Cuba favorable to U.S. economic and strategic interests. Scholar Jan Knippers Black came to a similar conclusion about the role of Ambassador Lincoln Gordon in the 1964 overthrow of leftist Brazilian President João Goulart. Black found it “extremely difficult to isolate his [Gordon's] imprint on more fundamental aspects of policy … it seems unlikely that U.S. policies and actions would have differed in any significant way, had some other individual been serving at that time and place as ambassador.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 207-232
Author(s):  
Evgenii A. Koloskov

The article is devoted to the second stage of the Macedonian naming dispute. I continue my research on the actual memory war between Athens and Skopje. The article focuses on the period from the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest to the signing of the Prespan Agreement in 2018. I research the key points, the main factors of the conflict, especially the role of the international mediators and the internal political situation in two countries. I propose a new version of the periodization of the Macedonian naming dispute. I paid special attention to the process of the “antiquization” in Macedonia during the period when VMRO-DPMNE was in power and to the canceling of it after the transit of power to the SDSM. Conclusions are drawn about the future for reconciliation in view of the difficult foreign policy situation in the region and in both countries. Considering that in Greece the compromise with Skopje became one of the reasons for the transition to the opposition to SYRIZA, and in North Macedonia of the apparent weakening of the position of the ruling party, the negative potential of the Greco-Macedonian dispute over the state name has not been fully exhausted.


Author(s):  
Colin Dueck

Age of Iron attempts to describe the past, present, and possible future of conservative nationalism in American foreign policy. It argues that a kind of conservative US nationalism long predates the Trump presidency, and goes back to the American founding. Different aspects of conservative American nationalism have been incorporated into the Republican Party from its creation. Every Republican president since Theodore Roosevelt has tried to balance elements of this tradition with global US foreign policy priorities. Donald Trump was able to win his party’s nomination and rise to the presidency in part by challenging liberal internationalist assumptions. Yet in practice, he too has combined nationalist assumptions with global US foreign policy priorities. The long-term trend within the Republican party, predating Trump, is toward political populism, cultural conservatism, and white working-class voters—and this has international implications. Republican foreign policy nationalism is not about to disappear. The book concludes with recommendations for US foreign policy, based upon an understanding that the optimism of the post–Cold War quarter-century is over.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
O. Bogaevskaya ◽  
V. Zhuravleva

In 2020, the white working class made almost half of all the votes for Donald Trump – about 37 million out of 73.5 million votes that he got. 67% of white Americans with less than four years degree cast their votes for Trump. 100 days after he lost the reelection, 29% of Republicans believed that Trump will come back to the White House before the month of August 2021. Who are they, these Trumps supporters and believers? How did Trump change their role in political life, and what will be their future after him? During the last 45 years, the white working class of America has transformed from the world’s most affluent and secure working class, the linchpin of the New Deal coalition, the protagonist of the American dream into one of the most vulnerable, disintegrated and declining in its number and power element of the American electorate. Trump used their anger and despair in his way to power, bringing them back to politics. Today both the Democratic and Republican Parties are fighting again for the white working class. Historically, this group was the base of the Democratic Party. But for the last two decades, the Party has become much more liberal in its values and focused more on different groups of minorities. These trends made whites without college degree to shift to the Republican Party, regardless its “party of white riches” image. The current shift occurred in the years of Obama presidency – for highly conservative, less educated, mostly South whites this President came as a challenge to their traditional views of America. By the end of the Obama era, the Republican Party almost filled the gap with the Democratic Party in white working class support. Trump became the high pick of this shift. Meanwhile, the Democrats got the trend and came back fighting for its past electorate who suddenly became the focus of a political game and interparty transformations, which makes it highly possible to change the face of the American party system as we know today. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


2014 ◽  
pp. 889-915
Author(s):  
Anna Abakunkova

The article examines the state of the Holocaust historiography in Ukraine for the period of 2010 – beginning of 2014. The review analyzes activities of major research and educational organizations in Ukraine which have significant part of projects devoted to the Holocaust; main publications and discussions on the Holocaust in Ukraine, including publications of Ukrainian authors in academic European and American journals. The article illustrates contemporary tendencies and conditions of the Holocaust Studies in Ukraine, defines major problems and shows perspectives of the future development of the Holocaust historiography in Ukraine.


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