The June 30th Coup

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Interview Data ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Step Process ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Terrorist Organization ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood

This chapter identifies the discrepancy between real and perceived political opportunities and the effect this gap had on political mobilization for the June 30th protests in Egypt. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted during the 2012 anti-Morsi protests, the 2013 coup, the months following the coup, and at protests in Tahrir Square and at the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in. In addition to outlining the politics surrounding President Morsi’s 2012 constitutional declaration, the subsequent protests, and how the Tamarod movement mobilized mass protests against Morsi that took place on June 30, 2013, the chapter also presents the details and step-by-step process of the 2013 military coup. The chapter explains post-coup politics, including the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, the military’s mobilization of the public against the Muslim Brotherhood, the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre, the cult of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the 2014 constitutional referendum and presidential elections.

Grievances against the Morsi Government

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Harassment ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Interview Data ◽  
Political Appointments ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Political Economic

This chapter outlines the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. It focuses on democracy in Egypt, the 2012 presidential elections, and the expectations and promises put forth by Morsi. The chapter also covers popular perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, grievances surrounding electricity and gas, security and sexual harassment, Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, and Morsi’s political appointments. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted in Egypt during the year of Morsi’s presidency.

Egypt the Triumph of State Over Citizens

2019 ◽  
pp. 133-160
Author(s):  
Marina ◽  
David Ottaway
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Social Problems ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
First Time ◽  
Gamal Abdel Nasser

This chapter recounts the stages of the 2011 uprising in Egypt, from the fall of one military dictator to the rise of another. The upheaval ended three decades of sclerotic rule under Hosni Mubarak, and ushered in a brief period of democracy that saw the Muslim Brotherhood triumph in parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time in Egyptian history.After a year of tumultuous rule, Islamic President Mohammed Morsi was ousted in a military coup d’état in 2013thanks to the connivance of self-proclaimed democratic secularists. The new military dictator, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has set about uprooting all traces of Islamist presence in the country and eliminating all civil society activism as well. His goal has been to turn Egypt back fifty years to restore the military state established by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and imitate his pursuit of costly mega-projects to solve the country’s crushing economic and social problems.

The Dynamics of Egypt’s “Semi-opposition,” 2004–11

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Mai Mogib Mosad
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Political System ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
The Relationship

This paper maps the basic opposition groups that influenced the Egyptian political system in the last years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. It approaches the nature of the relationship between the system and the opposition through use of the concept of “semi-opposition.” An examination and evaluation of the opposition groups shows the extent to which the regime—in order to appear that it was opening the public sphere to the opposition—had channels of communication with the Muslim Brotherhood. The paper also shows the system’s relations with other groups, such as “Kifaya” and “April 6”; it then explains the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood at seizing power after the ousting of President Mubarak.

scholarly journals Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State violence and authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Pratt ◽  
Dina Rezk
Keyword(s):  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
State Violence ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Critical Security Studies ◽  
Securitization Theory ◽  
Middle East Politics ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Arab Spring

Unprecedented levels of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood, and the widespread acceptance of this violence by Egyptians following the July 2013 military coup, have been under-examined by scholars of both critical security studies and Middle East politics, reflecting implicit assumptions that state violence is unexceptional beyond Europe. This article explores how the deployment of such levels of violence was enabled by a securitization process in which the Egyptian military successfully appropriated popular opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule, constructing the group as an existential threat to Egypt and justifying special measures against it. The article builds on existing critiques of the Eurocentrism of securitization theory, alongside the writings of Antonio Gramsci, to further refine its application to non-democratic contexts. In addition to revealing the exceptionalism of state violence against the Muslim Brotherhood and highlighting the important role of nominally non-state actors in constructing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to Egypt, the article also signals the role of securitization in re-establishing authoritarian rule in the wake of the 2011 uprising. Thus, we argue that securitization not only constitutes a break from ‘normal politics’ but may also be integral to the reconstitution of ‘normal politics’ following a period of transition.

Managing Religion and Renegotiating the Secular: The Muslim Brotherhood and Defining the Religious Sphere

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel M. Scott
Keyword(s):  
Religion And Politics ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Muslim Minorities

AbstractThis article questions the assumption that — prior to July 2013 when the Egyptian military removed former President Mursi from power — the Muslim Brotherhood was in the process of implementing an Islamic state that would have involved a reversal of secularization and an upheaval to the status quo in terms of fundamental shifts in institutions and legal categories. Rather, the article argues that the Muslim Brotherhood evolved to embrace secularism of a certain sort-a statism in which it is the state that determines the boundaries of religion and politics. It illustrates this by looking at the role the Muslim Brotherhood envisaged for the Supreme Constitutional Court — and how this relates to the religious scholars of al-Azhar — in the formulation of legislation and in the assessment of whether legislation conforms to Article 2 of the constitution, both the 1971 one and the 2012 one, which was suspended in July 2013. In addition, the article will show how the Muslim Brotherhood has defined the public order with a particular focus on the idea of the Islamic “framework,” the rights of non-Muslim minorities, and personal status law.

Exclusion and Violence After the Egyptian Coup

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-85
Author(s):  
Steven Brooke ◽  
Elizabeth R. Nugent
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
District Level ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
State Repression ◽  
Sectarian Violence ◽  
Political Exclusion ◽  
Ideological Change ◽  
The Relationship

Scholars of Islamism have long grappled with the relationship between political participation and ideological change, theorizing that political exclusion and state repression increase the likelihood of Islamist groups using violence. The trajectory of post-2011 Egypt offers a chance to systematically evaluate these theories using subnational data. Pairing district-level electoral returns from pre-coup presidential elections with post-coup levels of anti-state and sectarian violence, we find that districts where Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate Mohammed Morsi performed well in 2012 witnessed more anti-state and sectarian (anti-Christian) violence following the 2013 military coup. The same relationship holds for the performance of liberal Islamist Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, which is consistent with arguments that political exclusion alone may also drive violence.

scholarly journals Egypt’s Military Coup of 2013: An Analysis of the Private Press in 112 Days

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Framing Analysis ◽  
Business Elite ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
Privately Owned ◽  
News Headlines

In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of the private press owned by Egypt’s business elite during the coup period. In the context of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt’s private press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt’s business elite engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    

Politicians or Preachers?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney Freer
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
State Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
Rentier State ◽  
Arab Nationalism ◽  
Popular Support ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood

This chapter continues tracing the development of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. It focuses on the period of expansion of the Brotherhood after the fall of Arab Nationalism from the 1970s through the 1990s, with a view to how Ikhwan movements used their ties with governments and their social appeal to earn more popular support. It presents case studies of Brotherhood activities within Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE during this period to show that the forms adopted by Brotherhood movements in the super-rentiers, similar to Ikhwan elsewhere in the region, were dictated by the political opportunities available to them. Opportunities became increasingly available to Ikhwan branches in the Gulf with the fall of Arab nationalism, which had been the Brotherhood’s primary ideological rival. Contrary to the predictions of rentier state theory, Brotherhood groups managed to establish themselves even as super-rentier governments were expanding welfare packages to citizens throughout the 1970s.

Islamists in power: the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Al-Awadi
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Legal Legitimacy ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood

The article examines the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt, 2012–2013, and how they dealt with the multifaceted challenges. The main argument is that the Brotherhood benefited from their past populist legitimacy to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Mubarak regime, but that this legitimacy waned when they did not consolidate this legitimacy with a tangible national achievement. The Brotherhood were unable to count on Egyptians’ sympathy for their endurance of rough treatment at the hands of the previous regime over many years, because the 25 January Revolution changed the Egyptian people's expectations and spread knowledge of how to punish rulers who fail to meet these expectations: with sit-ins and street demonstrations. Despite Muhammad Morsi's victory in the presidential elections, and the forceful curtailment of his four-year term by the army, this leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood failed to translate his legal legitimacy into a wider populist legitimacy based on tangible achievements.

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