Decisions Behind the Veil

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin P. Bruner
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Design ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

This chapter explores the behavior of individuals placed in circumstances approximating the ‘veil of ignorance.’ Unlike previous experiments of Rawls’ veil, it considers Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity principle in addition to the so-called difference principle. The chapter author’s experimental design can register whether behavior is consistent with a lexicographic ranking of principles of justice. The chapter observes wide support for utilitarianism as well as fair equality of opportunity and, moreover, finds the former is lexically prior to the latter.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

scholarly journals RELENDO RAWLS APÓS PIKETTY: justiça, desigualdade e democracia de cidadãos proprietários

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 509
Author(s):  
Leandro Martins Zanitelli
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Recent Analysis ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Wealth Concentration ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Resumo: Ao tratar do tipo de regime institucional mais propenso à realização dos princípios da justiça como equidade, Rawls (2001) apresenta três argumentos sobre a superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários em relação ao capitalismo de bem-estar, um argumento sobre o valor equitativo das liberdades políticas, outro sobre a equitativa igualdade de oportunidades e um terceiro acerca do princípio da diferença. Em uma crítica a esses argumentos, O’Neill (2012) conclui que apenas o último deles é convincente. Este trabalho procura demonstrar como a análise recente de Piketty (2014) sobre a tendência ao acirramento da desigualdade em sociedades com baixo crescimento dá fôlego aos argumentos de Rawls quanto à superioridade de uma democracia de cidadãos proprietários no que se refere ao valor equitativo das liberdades políticas e à igualdade de oportunidades. O trabalho de Piketty também joga luz sobre a importância, no que concerne ao princípio da diferença, da distinção entre um regime que inclui políticas para prevenir a concentração da riqueza (a democracia de cidadãos proprietários) e outro preocupado exclusivamente com a desigualdade de renda (o capitalismo de bem-estar).Palavras-chave: Democracia de cidadãos proprietários, capitalismo de bem-estar, desigualdade, rawls, piketty.READING RAWLS AFTER PIKETTY: justice, inequality and property-owning democracyAbstract: When discussing the type of institutional regime most prone to realizing the principles of justice as fairness, Rawls (2001) presents three arguments about the superiority of a property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism, concerning, respectively, the fair value of political liberties, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. In a critique of those arguments, O’Neill (2012) states that only the last one, the argument of the difference principle, is convincing. This paper, tries to demonstrate how Piketty’s (2014) recent analysis of the tendency of increasing inequality in low-growth societies offers support to Rawls’s arguments favoring property-owning democracy in matters regarding the fair value of political liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Piketty’s work also stresses the importance, in what refers to the difference principle, of distinguishing between a regime encompassing policies to prevent the wealth concentration (property-owning democracy) and another one whose exclusive concern is to reduce income inequality (welfare-state capitalism).Key words: Property-owning democracy, welfare-state capitalism, inequality, Rawls, Piketty.

Fair Difference of Opportunity

2020 ◽  
pp. 260-278
Author(s):  
Adam Cureton ◽  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Family Background ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Disabled People ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Default Position ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Alternative Principle

According to Rawls, Fair Equality of Opportunity requires that those who have the same native abilities and motivations have the same chance of securing offices and positions, regardless of their social class of origin, family background or other social circumstances. Despite its name, this principle does not guarantee equal opportunity for everyone because it allows people with various kinds of physical and psychological impairments and diseases to have lower chances at securing those positions once the adverse influences of their social circumstances have been corrected for. Our alternative principle is partially inspired by Rawls’ Difference Principle. What we call Fair Difference of Opportunity says that the default position should be true equality of opportunity, but if there are ways to improve the opportunities of all by allowing more and better opportunities to some, without violating the other principles of justice, then such arrangements would be just. Fair Difference of Opportunity, we argue, is more faithful to Rawls’s basic framework and more friendly to disabled people than Fair Equality of Opportunity.

The Irreconcilable Conflict between Islam and Liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.

scholarly journals Freerolls and binds: making policy when information is missing

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
ANNIE DUKE ◽  
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Mirror Image ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Difficult Cases

Abstract When policymakers focus on costs and benefits, they often find that hard questions become easy – as, for example, when the benefits clearly exceed the costs, or when the costs clearly exceed the benefits. In some cases, however, benefits or costs are difficult to quantify, perhaps because of limitations in scientific knowledge. In extreme cases, policymakers are proceeding in circumstances of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they cannot assign probabilities to various outcomes. We suggest that in difficult cases in which important information is absent, it is useful for policymakers to consider a concept from poker: ‘freerolls.’ A freeroll exists when choosers can lose nothing from selecting an option but stand to gain something (whose magnitude may itself be unknown). In some cases, people display ‘freeroll neglect.’ In terms of social justice, John Rawls’ defense of the difference principle is grounded in the idea that, behind the veil of ignorance, choosers have a freeroll. In terms of regulatory policy, one of the most promising defenses of the Precautionary Principle sees it as a kind of freeroll. Some responses to climate change, pandemics and financial crises can be seen as near-freerolls. Freerolls and near-freerolls must be distinguished from cases involving cumulatively high costs and also from faux freerolls, which can be found when the costs of an option are real and significant, but not visible. ‘Binds’ are the mirror-image of freerolls; they involve options from which people are guaranteed to lose something (of uncertain magnitude). Some regulatory options are binds, and there are faux binds as well.

Sprawiedliwość jako racjonalność

Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?

The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and Cosmopolitan Justice

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock
Keyword(s):  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractWhat kinds of principles of justice should a cosmopolitan support? In recent years some have argued that a cosmopolitan should endorse a Global Difference Principle. It has also been suggested that a cosmopolitan should support a Principle of Global Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I examine how compelling these two suggestions are. I argue against a Global Difference Principle, but for an alternative Needs-Based Minimum Floor Principle (where these are not co-extensive, as I explain). Though I support a negative version of the Global Equality of Opportunity Principle, I argue that a more positive version of the ideal remains elusive.

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