Justice under Anarchy: Rawlsian Global Justice with New Zealand as a Case Study

<p>This thesis makes an innovative argument for global justice by exploring neglected areas of Rawlsian theory, and using New Zealand as a case study. An enquiry into the Rawlsian view of domestic justice is included because it acts as a basis for Rawlsian global justice. In giving its view of global justice, the thesis argues for a global difference principle focused on persons. This argument includes an exploration of a neglected aspect of the principle; how it is constrained by the duty of assistance and the just savings principle. The thesis will also show that the global difference principle makes demands on developed nations because they can help realize the principle by improving conditions in developing nations by using Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also likely that developed nations can improve conditions in the developing world by using the international factor of trade. However, rather than just focusing on this factor, the thesis reasons it is best to use this factor in tandem with ODA. The thesis also shows that developed nations should provide ODA by demonstrating how the numerous pledges made by developed nations over the years regarding ODA amount to promises, and that promises have moral significance. Before moving on to discuss New Zealand’s ODA programme, the thesis examines one of Rawls’s international principles of justice, the freedom and independence of peoples principle, and how it applies to New Zealand. In making an argument for the principle, the thesis shows how the principle can fit into a global justice framework, and adds to the literature by showing how the principle should treat small polities. The thesis also assesses how New Zealand’s history of colonialism has and has not respected the principle. This history also affects New Zealand’s ODA programme, so much so that one can be justified in describing this programme as being a relic of this history. This programme will be the subject of the final topic-based chapter. Previous assessments of the programme have been done with no, or a limited, normative framework. By this point a detailed Rawlsian normative framework, along with a picture of ODA’s efficacy, is in place, and is used to analyse the programme. This analysis includes the policy recommendations of monetarily enlarging the programme, focusing the programme on the globally least advantaged, and giving more of the programme’s funds to multilateral agencies.</p>

Justice under Anarchy: Rawlsian Global Justice with New Zealand as a Case Study

<p>This thesis makes an innovative argument for global justice by exploring neglected areas of Rawlsian theory, and using New Zealand as a case study. An enquiry into the Rawlsian view of domestic justice is included because it acts as a basis for Rawlsian global justice. In giving its view of global justice, the thesis argues for a global difference principle focused on persons. This argument includes an exploration of a neglected aspect of the principle; how it is constrained by the duty of assistance and the just savings principle. The thesis will also show that the global difference principle makes demands on developed nations because they can help realize the principle by improving conditions in developing nations by using Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also likely that developed nations can improve conditions in the developing world by using the international factor of trade. However, rather than just focusing on this factor, the thesis reasons it is best to use this factor in tandem with ODA. The thesis also shows that developed nations should provide ODA by demonstrating how the numerous pledges made by developed nations over the years regarding ODA amount to promises, and that promises have moral significance. Before moving on to discuss New Zealand’s ODA programme, the thesis examines one of Rawls’s international principles of justice, the freedom and independence of peoples principle, and how it applies to New Zealand. In making an argument for the principle, the thesis shows how the principle can fit into a global justice framework, and adds to the literature by showing how the principle should treat small polities. The thesis also assesses how New Zealand’s history of colonialism has and has not respected the principle. This history also affects New Zealand’s ODA programme, so much so that one can be justified in describing this programme as being a relic of this history. This programme will be the subject of the final topic-based chapter. Previous assessments of the programme have been done with no, or a limited, normative framework. By this point a detailed Rawlsian normative framework, along with a picture of ODA’s efficacy, is in place, and is used to analyse the programme. This analysis includes the policy recommendations of monetarily enlarging the programme, focusing the programme on the globally least advantaged, and giving more of the programme’s funds to multilateral agencies.</p>

Rawls’s Original Position and Algorithmic Fairness

Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. This article aims to identify some complications with this approach: Under which circumstances can Rawls’s original position reasonably be applied to algorithmic fairness decisions? First, it is argued that there are important differences between Rawls’s original position and a parallel algorithmic fairness original position with respect to risk attitudes. Second, it is argued that the application of Rawls’s original position to algorithmic fairness faces a boundary problem in defining relevant stakeholders. Third, it is observed that the definition of the least advantaged, necessary for applying the difference principle, requires some attention in the context of algorithmic fairness. Finally, it is argued that appropriate deliberation in algorithmic fairness contexts often require more knowledge about probabilities than the Rawlsian original position allows. Provided that these complications are duly considered, the thought-experiment of the Rawlsian original position can be useful in algorithmic fairness decisions.

Two limits to the application of Rawls’s concepts of autonomy and the difference principle in contemporary philosophy of education

The concept of justice that Rawls discussed in his famous book “A Theory of Justice” has had a profound influence on contemporary political and moral philosophy, as well as, to some extent, philosophy of education. Many philosophers of education have applied or criticized Rawls’s concepts – above all the concepts of autonomy, the person, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – which he developed as an essential part of his theory of justice. In this paper I will discuss very briefly only one of the problems that philosophers of education face when applying his concepts of the autonomous person and the difference principle. The essence of this problem is expressed in the question of whether or not to respect the limits of the applicability of these concepts set by Rawls himself.

Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

The Just Savings Principle

This chapter situates John Rawls’ just savings principle in a discussion about how much a nation-state should save. The main question addressed is whether this principle is a viable alternative to the dominant utilitarian theory of optimal growth. Rawls certainly gives savings a different aim (i.e., to create and maintain just institutions) and introduces additional permissibility conditions on reaching this goal (i.e., the necessary burdens should be fairly shared between generations). He thereby gives rise to the field of research now known as intergenerational justice. To assess the relative merits of the just savings principle, however, more details are needed; and this chapter aims to supply some of them. First, the principle of just savings is given a more determinate form whereby it is understood as a two-stage combination of a priority principle at the stage of institutional development and a difference principle at the maintenance stage. Second, some of its practical bearings are explored (i.e., its implications for real-life savings decisions). Among other things, the idea that the principle leads to a steady-state economy is problematized, and its relevance to concrete problems, such as climate change and the design of pension schemes, is assessed.