Political Values under Competitive Pressure

Law for Sale ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 91-124
Author(s):  
Johanna Stark

The arguments presented in this chapter spell out the idea that regulatory competition, or the existence of law markets, is at odds with how the state, as the primary political entity of our time, works—or should work. The chapter argues that regulatory competition runs counter to the normative implications of concepts such as state autonomy, democracy, as well as political and legal authority. These are arguments that sit within the conceptual framework of moral and political philosophy. Their starting point is the way in which we understand these normative concepts and to what extent a political and legal reality that is shaped by regulatory competition is consistent with this understanding.

2020 ◽  
pp. e02806
Author(s):  
María Florencia Zayas

The concept of autarkeia present in the Aristotelian Politics is conceived as inseparable from the end of the city-State, insofar as it is not only constituted for mere living (zen) but for living well (eu zen). This implies a moralization of the state order that allows us to think about the conformation of an economic dimension based on the concept of autarkeia. Taking as a methodological starting point the “dialogical tension zones” device (Mársico, 2010), we will affirm that exists an Aristotelian economic thinking based on three significant concepts of his political philosophy: “self-sufficiency”, “city-State”, “justice” (Polanyi, 1994). Finally, we will affirm that the concept of “natural slavery” aims to guarantee the constitution of an autonomous productive economic order that delegitimizes the federated states’ model of organization (summachia).


Author(s):  
Johanna Stark

The book focuses on the philosophical underpinnings, problems, and consequences of regulatory competition. The term ‘regulatory competition’ describes a dynamic in which states as producers of legal rules compete for the favour of mobile consumers of their legal products. Besides discussing regulatory competition, a factual phenomenon, identifying the structural conditions for law markets to occur and referring to particular fields of law where competitive dynamics among legislators can be observed, arguments critical of regulatory competition as a policy approach are presented from the perspective of political theory and philosophy. These arguments provide a clearer picture of the incompatibilities between the theoretical pedigree of regulatory competition—the assumptions we must accept in order to see its promises and its appeal—and other sets of beliefs and commitments that shape our thinking about law and the state. They come to the conclusion that the existence of so-called ‘law markets’ that come with a commodification of law itself is at odds with both our conception of the functions of legal rules and of key political ideals and principles such as democracy, state autonomy, and political authority.


1988 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Epstein

John Donne's song was hardly written in the tradition of political philosophy, but it has a good deal to say about the theme of luck, both good and bad, which I want to address. There is no doubt but that bad luck has bad consequences for the persons who suffer from it. If there were a costless way in which the consequences of bad luck could be spread across everyone in society at large, without increasing the risk of its occurrence, then most of us would pronounce ourselves better off for the change. In this sense it can be said, for example, that there is a utilitarian grounding for a moral obligation to care and provide for those persons who suffer the fortunes of bad luck. For the sake of argument I do not wish to contest this particular starting point, although there are many who would. Instead, I want to ask the question of whether this moral obligation should be converted into a legal obligation, backed by public force. The dominant answer to that question today is yes. Even those who think that markets should determine decisions on production find that the state has a proper role to reduce the adverse consequences of bad luck. My cast of mind is more skeptical. In life, or, in this instance, politics, “come bad chance, and we do join to it our strength.” In general the effort to use coercion to counter the adverse effects of luck tends only to make matters worse.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Baugh

In Bergsonism, Deleuze refers to Bergson's concept of an ‘open society’, which would be a ‘society of creators’ who gain access to the ‘open creative totality’ through acting and creating. Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy is oriented toward the goal of such an open society. This would be a democracy, but not in the sense of the rule of the actually existing people, but the rule of ‘the people to come,’ for in the actually existing situation, such a people is ‘lacking’. When the people becomes a society of creators, the result is a society open to the future, creativity and the new. Their openness and creative freedom is the polar opposite of the conformism and ‘herd mentality’ condemned by Deleuze and Nietzsche, a mentality which is the basis of all narrow nationalisms (of ethnicity, race, religion and creed). It is the freedom of creating and commanding, not the Kantian freedom to obey Reason and the State. This paper uses Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and Deleuze and Guattari's Kafka: For a Minor Literature, A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? to sketch Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the open society and of a democracy that remains ‘to come’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1993-2005
Author(s):  
Shemsije Demiri ◽  
Rudina Kaja

This paper deals with the right to property in general terms from its source in Roman law, which is the starting point for all subsequent legal systems. As a result of this, the acquisition of property rights is handled from the historical point of view, with the inclusion of various local and international literature and studies, as well as the legal aspect devoted to the respective civil codes of the states cited in the paper.Due to such socio-economic developments, state ownership and its ownership function have changed. The state function as owner of property also changed in Macedonia's property law.The new constitutional sequence of the Republic of Macedonia since 1991 became privately owned as a dominant form of ownership, however, state ownership also exists.This process of transforming social property into state or private (dissolves), in Macedonia starts from Yugoslavia through privatization, return and denationalization measures, on which basis laws on privatization have been adopted. Because of this, there will be particularly intensive negotiations regaring the remaining state assets.


Author(s):  
Don Garrett

Like Hobbes, Spinoza prominently invokes promising and contracts (covenants) in his discussion of the foundations of the state—primarily, but not exclusively, in his Theological-Political Treatise. His understanding of their nature and significance, however, differs in important ways from that of Hobbes. This chapter poses four related puzzles concerning Spinoza’s claims about promises and contracts as they invoke or relate specifically to Hobbes: “whether the right of nature is preserved intact”; whether “reason urges peace in all circumstances”; whether breaking a promise is ever “in accordance with reason”; and whether one is obligated to keep a pledge extorted by a robber. Next, it analyzes and compares the doctrines of Hobbes and Spinoza on several key topics: rights and powers, good and evil, reason and passion, and faith and deception (both “evil deception” [“dolus malus”] and “good deception” [“dolus bonus”]). Finally, it employs these doctrines to resolve the four puzzles.


This volume features ten papers in political philosophy, addressing a range of central topics and represent cutting-edge work in the field. Papers in the first part look at equality and justice: Keith Hyams examines the contribution of ex ante equality to ex post fairness; Elizabeth Anderson looks at equality from a political economy perspective; Serena Olsaretti’s paper studies liberal equality and the moral status of parent–child relationships; and George Sher investigates doing justice to desert. In the second part, papers address questions of state legitimacy: Ralf Bader explores counterfactual justifications of the state; David Enoch examines political philosophy and epistemology; and Seth Lazar and Laura Valentini look at proxy battles in just war theory. The final three papers cover social issues that are not easily understood in terms of personal morality, yet which need not centrally involve the state: the moral neglect of negligence (Seana Valentine Shiffrin), the case for collective pensions (Michael Otsuka); and authority and harm (Jonathan Parry).


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.


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