Common Law Principles and the Expression and Use of Forensic Evidence in Criminal Cases

2020 ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Andrew Ligertwood
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Forensic Evidence ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Reasonable Possibility ◽  
The Common ◽  
Forensic Scientists ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Science Evidence

The presentation of expert forensic science evidence in rigorous statistical terms raises the question of how lay fact-finders (judges and jurors) might employ such evidence to prove events in issue. Can this simply be left to the common sense of fact-finders or should the law provide further guidance about how they should reason in applying the criminal standard of proof? Should courts demand that witnesses who give statistical evidence express that evidence in a particular form? This article examines the non-mathematical nature of common law fact-finding and its embodiment in the presumption of innocence principle underlying the criminal standard of proof. It argues that forensic scientists present evidence in a form that makes transparent the risks of error so that, in determining satisfaction of the accused’s guilt having regard to all the evidence before it, the fact-finder considers the reasonable possibility of doubts necessarily left open by statistical evidence.

14. Character evidence I

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evidential Value ◽  
Character Evidence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Civil Cases

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the uses and development of character evidence from the common law through to the codification provided by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The second section deals with evidence of character in civil cases, covering defamation cases; evidence of good character; and evidence of bad character. The third section focuses on evidence of good character in criminal cases, including the important case of Hunter [2015] 1 WLR 5367, and covers admissibility and methods of proof; kinds of evidence permitted; rebuttal of evidence of good character; and evidential value of evidence of good character.

Intention vs. Negligence

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.

Proof of Causation in Tort Cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 149-160
Author(s):  
Bohdan Karnaukh
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Ways Of Coping ◽  
Law System ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Civil Cases ◽  
Civil Law System

The article addresses the problem of uncertainty over causation in tort cases. It reveals the interconnection between burden of proof and standard of proof. The author provides a comparative overview of approaches to standard of proof in common law and civil law systems. It is argued that while in common law there are two different standards viz: beyond-reasonable-doubt-standard for criminal cases and balanceof-probabilities standard for civil cases in civil law system there is only one standard applicable both to criminal and civil cases. With comparative analysis in the background the article also reveals the peculiarities of Ukrainian law in the respect of the issue raised. The problem is approached in a pragmatic manner: using a hypothetical case the author models practical outcomes entailed by each of the approaches being applied to the case. Eventually the conclusion is made that there are four ways of coping with uncertainty over causation: (1) to reverse the burden of proof; (2) to calibrate the standard of proof for certain cases; (3) to recognize the very creation of the abnormal risk as a compensable damage; and (4) to multiply damage plaintiff sustained by the probability factor indicating the likelihood of the damage being actually caused by the defendant.

FIXING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CONCEPT OF CRIME: THE CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Guinchard
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Basic Feature ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Criminal Sanction ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Criminal Sanctions ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
The Common ◽  
Substantive Law

In England and Wales, as elsewhere, criminal law stands in sharp contrast to other systems of social control. Criminal offences and their related penalties are clearly distinguishable from civil wrongs and their associated (civil) sanctions. And because the term ‘civil law’ refers not only to the domain of torts, but also encompasses administrative law, criminal penalties are, in addition, distinguished from the administrative or regulatory sanctions. This ‘distinction between criminal and civil justice has been such a basic feature of the common law’1that it shapes not only substantive law but also the organization of the courts into civil, criminal and sometimes administrative chambers or divisions. More importantly, the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions will lead to the application of different procedural rules: civil proceedings, used for the imposition of civil sanctions, are less stringent that their criminal counterpart applied when the offender faces a criminal sanction. This more gentle approach can be detected in both the burden and standard of proof.

scholarly journals The common law defence of automatism: a quagmire for the psychiatrist

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith J. B. Rix
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Psychotropic Drugs ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.

scholarly journals Standards of Proof: A Comparative Overview from the Ukrainian Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-43
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Inflexion Point ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Open Discussion

The article addresses the issue of standards of proof from a comparative perspective. The author sketches the conventional distinction between common law and civil law countries in this regard, as well as some approaches that query the validity of the rigid division. The main purpose of the article is to characterise the Ukrainian approach to the standards of proof against the background of comparative analysis. The author concludes that recent developments in Ukrainian law have paved the way for a distinction between criminal and civil standards of proof. However, the doctrine is not yet elaborate enough to warrant a coherent application of the two different standards. There is a view that in civil law countries, not much attention is paid to the standard of proof. We would rather not take the liberty of generalising about all civil law countries, but with regard to Ukrainian doctrine, the assertion seems rather justified. However, some recent developments in procedural legislation give reasons to believe that the approach is being gradually changed. The disregard of the issue, underpinned by the sacred belief in the attainability of absolute truth, fades in comparison to the acknowledgement that standards of proof may differ in civil (commercial) and criminal cases. It is this inflexion point in Ukrainian evidence law that may entail far-reaching repercussions. Therefore, open discussion of the issue is needed to elaborate a doctrinal approach that could serve as a basis for the development of a coherent jurisprudence.

Causation in personal injury after (and before) Sienkiewicz

Legal Studies ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 396-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Miller
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Multiple Sources ◽  
Sufficient Set ◽  
The Common

Three forms of ‘material contribution’ are discussed within the context of the traditional ‘but for’ test of causation. The NESS test (Necessary Element in at least one Sufficient Set) is shown to offer a more appropriate approach when causal over-determination is present as in, for instance, Fairchild and other cases involving multiple sources of asbestos. The particular problems posed by the recent Sienkiewicz case are then examined. It is argued that removing the incoherence in the common law of causation in personal injury will require the judiciary to overcome its antipathy to statistical evidence.

scholarly journals The Relationship between the Constitutional Right to Silence and Confessions in Nigeria

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 189-211
Author(s):  
Esa O. Onoja
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The extraction of confessions from suspects under torture by security agents is a notorious fact in Nigeria. Ironically, the Constitution of the country guarantees a right to silence, but courts in Nigeria predicate the admissibility of confessions on the common law-based Judges Rules and Evidence Act 2011 without linking it to the constitutionally guaranteed right to silence. This article reviews the legal rules on the admissibility of confessions in Nigeria and contends that without attaching constitutional flavour to the admissibility of confessions, the legislature and the courts in Nigeria unwittingly water the ground for the systemic extraction of confession from suspects in custody in Nigeria. The article suggests that the courts in the country consider the implication of the guarantee of the right to silence in the country’s constitution in the determination of the admissibility of confessions to promote fair trial in criminal cases in the country.

Murphy on Evidence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Teaching Method ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Online Resource ◽  
Character Evidence ◽  
Unique Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence

Murphy on Evidence is firmly established as a leading text for use on undergraduate law courses and in preparation for professional examinations. Frequently consulted by judges and practitioners, and regularly cited in judgments, it has come to be regarded as a work of authority throughout the common law world. The book’s unique approach effectively bridges the gap between academic study of the law of evidence and its application in practice, combining detailed analysis of the law with a wealth of practical information about how it is used in the courtroom. As in previous editions, the author’s teaching method is centred around two realistic case studies—one criminal and one civil—presenting challenging evidence issues and questions for discussion at the end of each chapter. The case study material for this new edition has been further developed with new videos on the Online Resource Centre. Fully up to date with the latest developments in this fast-moving subject, the fifteenth edition of Murphy on Evidence is as indispensable as its predecessors. Topics include: the language of the law of evidence; the judicial function in the law of evidence; the burden and standard of proof; character evidence; and the rule against hearsay.

15. Character evidence II

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Sexual History ◽  
Youth Justice ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Character Evidence ◽  
S 100 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter discusses the evidence of bad character in criminal cases since the abolition of the common law rules relating to it. It covers the definition of bad character under ss. 98 and 112 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; evidence of bad character of accused and the admissible gateways under s. 101; evidence of bad character of persons other than accused under s. 100; safeguards in relation to evidence of bad character under s. 103; and other statutory provisions dealing with bad character, in particular those dealing with sexual history questioning: s. 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

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