Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive Science

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Samuels ◽  
Eric Margolis ◽  
Stephen P. Stich
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
First Order ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Broad Field ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

This chapter offers a high-level overview of the philosophy of cognitive science and an introduction toThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The philosophy of cognitive science emerged out of a set of common and overlapping interests among philosophers and scientists who study the mind. We identify five categories of issues that illustrate the best work in this broad field: (1) traditional philosophical issues about the mind that have been invigorated by research in cognitive science, (2) issues regarding the practice of cognitive science and its foundational assumptions, (3) issues regarding the explication and clarification of core concepts in cognitive science, (4) first-order empirical issues where philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary investigation of particular psychological phenomena, (5) traditional philosophical issues that aren’t about the mind but that can be informed by a better understanding of how the mind works.

On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

1998 ◽  
pp. 32-36
Author(s):  
Henrique de Morais Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Irreducible Elements ◽  
Framework Model ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science

2012 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Anthropology ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Profound Influence ◽  
The Mind

Recent research across the disciplines of cognitive science has exerted a profound influence on how many philosophers approach problems about the nature of mind. These philosophers, while attentive to traditional philosophical concerns, are increasingly drawing both theory and evidence from empirical disciplines — both the framing of the questions and how to resolve them. However, this familiarity with the results of cognitive science has led to the raising of an entirely new set of questions about the mind and how we study it, questions which not so long ago philosophers did not even pose, let alone address. This book offers an overview of this burgeoning field that balances breadth and depth, with articles covering every aspect of the psychology and cognitive anthropology. Each article provides a critical and balanced discussion of a core topic while also conveying distinctive viewpoints and arguments. Several of the articles are co-authored collaborations between philosophers and scientists.

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Andler
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Modular Architecture ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Research Programs ◽  
The Mind

Cognitive science, which appears as an articulated group of research programs whose aim is to constitute a science of the mind, raises a number of issues from the point of view of philosophy of science. This chapter will sample the field by dealing with two main topics. The first one is the hypothesis of a modular architecture of the mind, which has occupied cognitive science since more than 30 years. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the foundations and limits of cognitive science, dealing notably with the functionalist framework (in particular, the computational theory of the mind) and the so-called language of thought hypothesis. We conclude by saying a few words about the division of labor among philosophers who are interested in cognition.

Beérkezett könyvek

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-427
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Well Being ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Number Of Genes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Origin Of Mind ◽  
The Mind

Ádám György: A rejtozködo elme. Egy fiziológus széljegyzetei Carpendale, J. I. M. és Müller, U. (eds): Social interaction and the development of knowledge Cloninger, R. C.: Feeling good. The science of well being Dunbar, Robin, Barrett, Louise, Lycett, John: Evolutionary psychology Dunbar, Robin: The human story. A new history of makind's evolution Geary, D. C.: The origin of mind. Evolution of brain, cognition and general intelligence Gedeon Péter, Pál Eszter, Sárkány Mihály, Somlai Péter: Az evolúció elméletei és metaforái a társadalomtudományokban Harré, Rom: Cognitive science: A philosophical introduction Horváth György: Pedagógiai pszichológia Marcus, G.: The birth of the mind. How a tiny number of genes creates the complexities of human thought Solso, R. D.: The psychology of art and the evolution of the conscious brain Wray, A. (ed.): The transition to language

Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antti Revonsuo
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Actual Problem ◽  
Philosophy Of Neuroscience ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Biological Explanations ◽  
Different Levels

Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.

Information and mechanical models of intelligence

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Advanced Technology ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Meaningful Information ◽  
Intelligent Behavior ◽  
Mechanical Models ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact

The impact of new advanced technology on issues that concern meaningful information and its relation to studies of intelligence constitutes the main topic of the present paper. The advantages, disadvantages and implications of the synthetic methodology developed by cognitive scientists, according to which mechanical models of the mind, such as computer simulations or self-organizing robots, may provide good explanatory tools to investigate cognition, are discussed. A difficulty with this methodology is pointed out, namely the use of meaningless information to explain intelligent behavior that incorporates meaningful information. In this context, it is inquired what are the contributions of cognitive science to contemporary studies of intelligent behavior and how technology may play a role in the analysis of the relationships established by organisms in their natural and social environments.

Similarity of Computations Across Domains Does Not Imply Shared Implementation: The Case of Language Comprehension

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 526-534
Author(s):  
Evelina Fedorenko ◽  
Cory Shain
Keyword(s):  
Language Processing ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Fluid Intelligence ◽  
Linguistic Knowledge ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
High Level ◽  
General Circuits ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Language Network

Understanding language requires applying cognitive operations (e.g., memory retrieval, prediction, structure building) that are relevant across many cognitive domains to specialized knowledge structures (e.g., a particular language’s lexicon and syntax). Are these computations carried out by domain-general circuits or by circuits that store domain-specific representations? Recent work has characterized the roles in language comprehension of the language network, which is selective for high-level language processing, and the multiple-demand (MD) network, which has been implicated in executive functions and linked to fluid intelligence and thus is a prime candidate for implementing computations that support information processing across domains. The language network responds robustly to diverse aspects of comprehension, but the MD network shows no sensitivity to linguistic variables. We therefore argue that the MD network does not play a core role in language comprehension and that past findings suggesting the contrary are likely due to methodological artifacts. Although future studies may reveal some aspects of language comprehension that require the MD network, evidence to date suggests that those will not be related to core linguistic processes such as lexical access or composition. The finding that the circuits that store linguistic knowledge carry out computations on those representations aligns with general arguments against the separation of memory and computation in the mind and brain.

Modelling spatial reasoning systems with shape algebras and formal logic

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 273-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott C. Chase
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Reasoning ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Spatial Relations ◽  
Large Set ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning Systems ◽  
Geometric Objects ◽  
Small Set ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
High Level

AbstractThe combination of the paradigms of shape algebras and predicate logic representations, used in a new method for describing designs, is presented. First-order predicate logic provides a natural, intuitive way of representing shapes and spatial relations in the development of complete computer systems for reasoning about designs. Shape algebraic formalisms have advantages over more traditional representations of geometric objects. Here we illustrate the definition of a large set of high-level design relations from a small set of simple structures and spatial relations, with examples from the domains of geographic information systems and architecture.

scholarly journals Redundancy and reducibility in the formats of spatial representations

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Ryan Yousif
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Spatial Scales ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Spatial Behavior ◽  
Polar Coordinates ◽  
Levels Of Analysis ◽  
Spatial Representations ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

Mental representations are the essence of cognition. Yet, to understand how the mind works, we must understand not just the content of mental representations (i.e., what information is stored), but also the format of those representations (i.e., how that information is stored). But what does it mean for representations to be formatted? How many formats are there? Is it possible that the mind represents some pieces of information in multiple formats at once? To address these questions, I discuss a ‘case study’ of representational format: the representation of spatial location. I review work (a) across species and across development, (b) across spatial scales, and (c) across levels of analysis (e.g., high-level cognitive format vs. low-level neural format). Along the way, I discuss the possibility that the same information may be organized in multiple formats simultaneously (e.g., that locations may be represented in both Cartesian and polar coordinates). Ultimately, I argue that seemingly ‘redundant’ formats may support the flexible spatial behavior observed in humans, and that we should approach the study of all mental representations with this possibility in mind.

scholarly journals Localização de nascentes ameaçadas em áreas urbanas: Uma estratégia preventiva de conservação ambiental com auxílio de Modelo Digital do Terreno (MDT)

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 2186-2203
Author(s):  
Bárbara Fernanda da Cunha Tasca ◽  
Fernanda Vieira Xavier ◽  
Auberto José Barros Siqueira
Keyword(s):  
Land Surface ◽  
Numerical Models ◽  
Urban Expansion ◽  
Digital Terrain Model ◽  
Human Occupation ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
First Order ◽  
Terrain Model ◽  
Drainage Channels ◽  
High Level

Identifying urban headwaters and delimitating their Permanent Preservation Areas (PPA) before its inevitable degradation by the human occupation is essential to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the cities. However, the scarcity of tools for facilitating this purpose prevents public authorities from speeding up their control actions. As headwaters frequently occur near the beginning of first-order drainage channels, it is assumed that their location can be obtained by using numerical models of the land surface. Thus, this study aimed to evaluate and demonstrate the applicability of a Digital Terrain Model (MDT) as an auxiliary tool in the prospecting process in spring fields in the urban area of Cuiabá, MT, Brazil. The methodology consisted of extracting the drainage channels from the modeled area, making it possible to indicate locations for prospecting corresponding to the head regions of the first order channels. The results show that 62,8% of the occurrence of the headwaters were in a 300m radii from the first-order start points. However, it was not possible to issue a conclusive evaluation in 28,6% of the places due to the high level of anthropization. Nevertheless, only in 8,6% of them did not present any water emergence in the surroundings, indicating the effectiveness of this method in guiding the prospection of headwaters in field. We concluded that our procedures are worthful for cities that have detailed altimetric surveys, being especially useful in urban expansion areas, where the preventive character of headwaters conservation is essential.

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