Why go for a computation-based approach to cognitive representation

An influential view in (philosophy of) cognitive science is that computation in cognitive systems is semantic, conceptually depending on representation: to compute is to manipulate representations. I argue that accepting the non-semantic teleomechanistic view of computation lays the ground for a promising alternative strategy, in which computation helps to explain and naturalise representation, rather than the other way around. I show that this computation-based approach to representation presents six decisive advantages over the semantic view. I claim that it can improve the two most influential current theories of representation, teleosemantics and structural representation, by providing them with precious tools to tackle some of their main shortcomings. In addition, the computation-based approach opens up interesting new theoretical paths for the project of naturalising representation, in which teleology plays a role in individuating computations, but not representations.

Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference

Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.

Semiosis is cognitive niche construction

Here we describe Peircean post-1903 semiosis as a processualist conception of meaning, and relate it to contemporary active externalism in Philosophy of Cognitive Science, especially through the notion of cognitive niche construction. In particular, we shall consider the possibility of integrating (a) the understanding of “semiosis as process” within Peirce’s mature semiotics with (b) an elaboration of the concept of cognitive niche from the point of view of niche construction theory and process biology research.

Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Cognitive science, which appears as an articulated group of research programs whose aim is to constitute a science of the mind, raises a number of issues from the point of view of philosophy of science. This chapter will sample the field by dealing with two main topics. The first one is the hypothesis of a modular architecture of the mind, which has occupied cognitive science since more than 30 years. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the foundations and limits of cognitive science, dealing notably with the functionalist framework (in particular, the computational theory of the mind) and the so-called language of thought hypothesis. We conclude by saying a few words about the division of labor among philosophers who are interested in cognition.