scholarly journals Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
György Szabó ◽  
Csaba Tőke
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

scholarly journals Effects of Empty Sites on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Based on Social Diversity

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Social Diversity ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Rank Distributions

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.

EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL'S SELF-EXAMINATION ON COOPERATION IN PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1229-1236
Author(s):  
JIAN-YUE GUAN ◽  
JIN-TU SUN ◽  
YING-HAI WANG
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Average Density ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Pair Approximation ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Self Examination

We study a spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular network's one-dimensional regular ring and two-dimensional square lattice. The individuals located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbors or defect. The effects of individual's self-examination are introduced. Using Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation method, we investigate the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of payoff parameters b and the time interval Δt. The effects of the fraction p of players in the system who are using the self-examination on cooperation are also discussed. It is shown that compared with the case of no individual's self-examination, the persistence of cooperation is inhibited when the payoff parameter b is small and at certain Δt (Δt > 0) or p (p > 0), cooperation is mostly inhibited, while when b is large, the emergence of cooperation can be remarkably enhanced and mostly enhanced at Δt = 0 or p = 1.

scholarly journals Effect of memory on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice

2008 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shao-Meng Qin ◽  
Yong Chen ◽  
Xiao-Ying Zhao ◽  
Jian Shi
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

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