scholarly journals Effects of Empty Sites on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Based on Social Diversity

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1229-1236
Author(s):  
JIAN-YUE GUAN ◽  
JIN-TU SUN ◽  
YING-HAI WANG

We study a spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on regular network's one-dimensional regular ring and two-dimensional square lattice. The individuals located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbors or defect. The effects of individual's self-examination are introduced. Using Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation method, we investigate the average density of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of payoff parameters b and the time interval Δt. The effects of the fraction p of players in the system who are using the self-examination on cooperation are also discussed. It is shown that compared with the case of no individual's self-examination, the persistence of cooperation is inhibited when the payoff parameter b is small and at certain Δt (Δt > 0) or p (p > 0), cooperation is mostly inhibited, while when b is large, the emergence of cooperation can be remarkably enhanced and mostly enhanced at Δt = 0 or p = 1.


2008 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shao-Meng Qin ◽  
Yong Chen ◽  
Xiao-Ying Zhao ◽  
Jian Shi

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