East European Competition in the UK Car Market: Some Empirical Evidence

1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stewart ◽  
Neil Hood
2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Downing

The release of genetically modified organisms into the environment and food chain in the UK has produced one of the most visible and enduring controversies of recent times. Amid ongoing claim and counter-claim by actors on either side of the GM ‘debate’ over the salient ‘facts’ or balance of risks and benefits associated with the technology, this controversy can be fruitfully seen as a struggle between contested networks of knowledge. Drawing on ethnographic data collected during recent PhD fieldwork, I focus on those, loosely defined as members of ‘local food networks’ in SW England, who perceive their values and cultural projects to be at risk from the deployment of this technology. In scrutinizing how distinctly ‘oppositional’ knowledge is created, exchanged and transformed particularly in relation to the construction and maintenance of cultural and historical boundaries, I suggest that in this arena a key vehicle of knowledge transfer is the narrative or story. A successfully deployed narrative can resolve uncertainties, or equally, dissolve undesirable certainties. Knowledge transfer thus becomes a matter of rhetoric, of persuasion, whereby skilfully deployed narratives can be viewed as analogical networks of associations - enrolling culturally appropriate characters, values and concepts - to move the targeted audience in the desired manner. I argue that such transfers must be seen not only as exchanges of networks of knowledge but also of networks of ignorance, for as the ethnographic data reveals, when the stakes are perceived to be so high, ideological coherence often outweighs empirical evidence and logical consistency. This raises a critical dilemma for the ethnographer. What should he/she do when confronted in the field by exaggerated claims or misinformation?


2021 ◽  
pp. 001573252110122
Author(s):  
Rupa Chanda ◽  
Neha Vinod Betai

In June 2016, the United Kingdom took the world by surprise with the results of its referendum on whether to remain in the European Union (EU). With a 52% majority, the country decided to leave the bloc in which it had been a member since 1973. With this outcome began the long process of Brexit negotiations between UK and the EU. The UK officially ceased to be an EU member on 31 January 2020, with a transition period up to the end of 2020. The decision to leave the EU came on the back of rising bitterness among people. Membership in the EU was seen as expensive and not beneficial to the country. One of the major campaigning points of the leave camp was the issue of immigration. Given that free movement of people is an important part of being in the EU, the party argued that leaving the EU would help the country take back control of its borders. Immigration in the UK has been on the rise since the early 2000s. It shot up further with the accession of the eight East European economies into the EU. Figure 1 shows how, leading up to Brexit, immigration from the EU to the UK was constantly increasing. JEL Codes: F00, F30, F22, F23


Author(s):  
David Kershaw

This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-290
Author(s):  
Alan MacLeod

This article assesses Western news media coverage of Venezuela between 1998 and 2014. It found that the major newspapers in the UK and US reproduce the ideology of Western governments, ignoring strong empirical evidence challenging those positions. The press portrayed Venezuela in an overwhelmingly negative light, presenting highly contested minority opinions as facts while barely mentioning competing arguments, as Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) propaganda model would predict. After conducting interviews, it is clear that a small cadre of pre-selected journalists is immersed into a highly antagonistic newsroom culture that sees itself as the “resistance” to the Venezuelan government and its purpose to defeat it. As a result, hegemony of thought reigns and some journalists report self-censorship.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 1015-1041 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Pletz ◽  
Joan Upson

Purpose This paper aims to analyse normative corporate governance evolution in the UK between 1995 and 2014 against the benchmark of Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) regulatory principles. Design/methodology/approach Methodologically, the authors conduct an empirical, longitudinal data set analysis of the formative years of UK normative corporate governance development between 1995 and 2014. We provide a qualitative discussion of the empirical evidence that links the type of UK regulatory corporate governance development to financial market growth thereby adopting a mixed approach based on quantitative and qualitative research methods. Findings The authors find that compared to the OECD model of corporate governance, the UK model is less rigid following a more self-regulatory approach based upon a “comply or explain” paradigm. Thus it is scored below corporate governance systems that follow a compulsory implementation model. However, even with such “low” tilt towards formal shareholder primacy norms, the UK has the best performing financial market. As a quasi-empirical study, the authors suggest that there are several historical and economic reasons for this, which together with a robust rule of law in the UK contribute to this performance – and the law especially the type or tilt is less relevant. Originality/value This is the first of its kind empirical, longitudinal data set analysis with qualitative elements that links empirical evidence to regulatory developments in the wider context of UK corporate governance evolution.


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