The Effect of Health Insurance on the Substitution between Public and Private Hospital Care

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (305) ◽  
pp. 135-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Doiron ◽  
Nathan Kettlewell
2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 445-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Ruiz-Sandoval ◽  
María Eugenia Briseño-Godínez ◽  
Erwin Chiquete-Anaya ◽  
Antonio Arauz-Góngora ◽  
Rogelio Troyo-Sanromán ◽  
...  

Health Policy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 120 (8) ◽  
pp. 948-959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Grigorakis ◽  
Christos Floros ◽  
Haritini Tsangari ◽  
Evangelos Tsoukatos

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnes E Walker ◽  
Richard Percival ◽  
Linc Thurecht ◽  
Jim Pearse

Objective: To study the effectiveness of recent private health insurance (PHI) reforms, in particular the 30% rebate and Lifetime Health Cover, in terms of their stated aim of reducing the load on public hospitals. Methods: Combines the use of two new projection models ? ?Health Insurance? (PHI) and ?New South Wales Hospitals? that use public and private hospital inpatient data from 1996?97 to 1999?2000, and NSW population and private health insurance coverage statistics. Results: With the PHI reforms 15% fewer individuals would use public hospitals in 2010 than without these reforms (around 18% fewer among the 40% most affluent Australians and 9% among the 40% least affluent). Lower public hospital usage would mainly be due to Lifetime Health Cover. Conclusion: If the PHI reforms remain in place, in 2010 a significant proportion of hospital use would be redirected away from the public sector and towards the private sector, with the shift being greatest among better-off Australians.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona J Clay ◽  
Joan Ozanne-Smith

Injury is a leading cause of inpatient hospital episodes. Over a 4-year period (1997?2000) the Australian Government introduced measures to support the private health insurance industry by providing incentives for people to take up private health insurance (PHI) in order to take the pressure off public hospitals. This study examined the levels of PHI for moderately and severely injured people in Victoria as a way of determining the effectiveness of government incentives. The method involved an analysis of all Victorian public and private hospital injury admissions between July 2000 and June 2003. We found that people with injuries, either unintentional or intentional, had lower levels of PHI than state norms. While numbers of injured patients occupying private hospital beds initially increased, levels then dropped below the levels before the introduction of the incentives. The burden of injury is substantial and suggests that incentives need to be targeted towards at-risk groups.


Author(s):  
Jan Abel Olsen

This chapter considers two different ways of organizing revenue collection in statutory healthcare schemes: social health insurance and taxation. The two models are commonly referred to as ‘Bismarck vs Beveridge’ after the men associated with the origin of these systems: the first German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), and the British economist Lord William Beveridge (1879–1963). The differences between these two compulsory prepayment schemes are discussed and compared with private health insurance. Based on a simple diagram introduced by the World Health Organization, three dimensions of coverage are illustrated. Some policy dilemmas are highlighted when attempting to achieve universal health coverage. Finally, various combinations of public and private prepayment schemes are discussed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document