Bodily Disorientation and Moral Change

Hypatia ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ami Harbin
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
The Self ◽  
Moral Change ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Complex Interactions

Neglect of the moral promise of disorientation is a persistent gap in even the most sophisticated philosophies of embodiment. In this article, I begin to correct this neglect by expanding our sense of the range and nature of disoriented experience and proposing new visions of disorientation as benefiting moral agency. Disorientations are experienced through complex interactions of corporeal, affective, and cognitive processes, and are characterized by feelings of shock, surprise, unease, and discomfort; felt disorientations almost always make us unsure of how to go on. I argue that experiences of disorientation can strengthen the moral agency of individuals. I begin by clarifying experiences of felt ease and orientation. I then characterize disoriented embodiment by investigating select experiences that often involve or accompany disorientation, focusing throughout on how disorientation prompts changes in motivation and action. I conclude by charting how disoriented embodiments can help individuals become better moral agents overall, in part by challenging norms that restrict embodiment and undermining dualistic conceptions of the self.

scholarly journals Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Corporate Communications ◽  
Personal Account ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Corporate Punishment

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

scholarly journals Atheists

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah R. Schiavone ◽  
Will M Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Negative Attitudes ◽  
Complex Interactions ◽  
Cultural Origins ◽  
Made In ◽  
Do So

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don’t believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far), and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.

Moral agents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinit Haksar
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Concern For Others

Moral agents are those agents expected to meet the demands of morality. Not all agents are moral agents. Young children and animals, being capable of performing actions, may be agents in the way that stones, plants and cars are not. But though they are agents they are not automatically considered moral agents. For a moral agent must also be capable of conforming to at least some of the demands of morality. This requirement can be interpreted in different ways. On the weakest interpretation it will suffice if the agent has the capacity to conform to some of the external requirements of morality. So if certain agents can obey moral laws such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong’, then they are moral agents, even if they respond only to prudential reasons such as fear of punishment and even if they are incapable of acting for the sake of moral considerations. According to the strong version, the Kantian version, it is also essential that the agents should have the capacity to rise above their feelings and passions and act for the sake of the moral law. There is also a position in between which claims that it will suffice if the agent can perform the relevant act out of altruistic impulses. Other suggested conditions of moral agency are that agents should have: an enduring self with free will and an inner life; understanding of the relevant facts as well as moral understanding; and moral sentiments, such as capacity for remorse and concern for others. Philosophers often disagree about which of these and other conditions are vital; the term moral agency is used with different degrees of stringency depending upon what one regards as its qualifying conditions. The Kantian sense is the most stringent. Since there are different senses of moral agency, answers to questions like ‘Are collectives moral agents?’ depend upon which sense is being used. From the Kantian standpoint, agents such as psychopaths, rational egoists, collectives and robots are at best only quasi-moral, for they do not fulfil some of the essential conditions of moral agency.

Rising from the ordinary: Virtue, the justice motif and moral change

2020 ◽  
pp. 146349962093205
Author(s):  
Susanne Brandtstädter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Northern China ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Anthropology ◽  
Moral Change ◽  
Social Rule ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
Practical Principle ◽  
Social Dynamic ◽  
Chinese Peasant

Justice understood as a practical principle and virtue has remained an understudied subject in the anthropology of morality. Moral anthropology has explored the moral or ethical as a space of freedom and creativity, whereas justice has often been associated with rule-following or even the law. In contrast, my paper explores justice as a virtue whose social dynamic can initiate moral change in ordinary life. This virtue, as I understand it, comprises not only a disposition to conform to established norms but also a capacity to reformulate these in the pursuit of social justice. My ethnography of Chinese peasant lawyers’ moral agency suggests that their understanding of justice as an essentially social, rule-governed and outcome-oriented virtue can grant new insights into the dynamics of moral innovation that arise in ordinary life. The peasant lawyers of rural northern China pursue moral change through combining moral reasoning about justice with principled action for justice and the provision of benefits for victims of injustice. It is the concern with the consequences of principled action that distinguishes justice as a social virtue from the other virtues, and the justice motif from alternative drivers of social change.

Developing and Validating a High School Version of the Robotics Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Ten Huang ◽  
Eric Zhi-Feng Liu ◽  
Chun Hung Lin ◽  
Pey-Yan Liou
Keyword(s):  
High School ◽  
Factor Analysis ◽  
High School Students ◽  
Exploratory Factor Analysis ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
The Self ◽  
Learning Performance ◽  
School Students ◽  
Considerable Research ◽  
The World

Robotics has become a crucial domain in technology education, helping students to improve their abilities in assembly and programming. Despite the considerable research that has gone into the learning performance associated with robotics, little work has been done on the cognitive processes involved in learning this subject. The purpose of this study was to develop an instrument (based on the theoretical framework of MSLQ), with which to evaluate the motivation of high school students to learn robotics and the strategies they employ. Fifty participants in the open category competition of the World Robot Olympiad 2010 completed the self-reported questionnaire (RMSLQ-HS). Thirteen factors and fifty one items were extracted using exploratory factor analysis. Implications for the educational application of robotics and research suggestions related to RMSLQ are also discussed.

Reflection

2021 ◽  
pp. 172-178
Author(s):  
Janet Metcalfe
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Second Order ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self In Relation ◽  
Object Level

Contemporary psychology has explored the concept of the self in relation to the second order characteristics of metacognition. On the dominant theoretical framework, cognitive processes are taken to be split into two specifically interrelated levels called the object level and the metalevel, with the latter monitoring and controlling the former. The metalevel is thought to be self referential. For example, retrieving an answer to a question, or making a response to a cue, at the object level, does not involve reflection and is not self-referential. By contrast, judgments about whether the response was or was not true, or about whether one would be able to remember the response later entails second-order or metalevel processing, and it thought to be self-referential and to involve consciousness. This Reflection presents some of recent work on self-referential thought in humans. It also reviews studies of the neurological basis of these judgments, and investigations which have sought to determine whether any animals other than humans have this capacity.

Acknowledging and managing deep constraints on moral agency and the self

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Niemi ◽  
Jesse Graham
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Traumatic Events ◽  
The Self ◽  
Collaborative Dialogue

AbstractDoris proposes that the exercise of morally responsible agency unfolds as a collaborative dialogue among selves expressing their values while being subject to ever-present constraints. We assess the fit of Doris's account with recent data from psychology and neuroscience related to how people make judgments about moral agency (responsibility, blame), and how they understand the self after traumatic events.

scholarly journals Towards a Phenomenology of Technologically Mediated Moral Change: Or, What Could Mark Zuckerberg Learn from Caregivers in the Southern Netherlands?

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-428
Author(s):  
Tamar Sharon
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Art Of Living ◽  
Unit Of Analysis ◽  
Technological Mediation ◽  
Moral Change ◽  
Southern Netherlands

Abstract Kamphof offers an illuminating depiction of the technological mediation of morality. Her case serves as the basis for a plea for modesty up and against the somewhat heroic conceptualizations of techno-moral change to date—less logos, less autos, more practice, more relationality. Rather than a displacement of these conceptualizations, I question whether Kamphof’s art of living offers only a different perspective: in scale (as a micro-event of techno-moral change), and in unit of analysis (as an art of living oriented to relations with others rather than the relation to the self). As a supplement and not an alternative, this modest art has nonetheless audacious implications for the ethics of surveillance.

The Uses and Abuses of Narrative for Life

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Meretoja
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Narrative Ethics ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Blind Side ◽  
Ethical Evaluation ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Narrative Imagination ◽  
Culture Of Silence ◽  
The Continuum

Chapter 4 tests hermeneutic narrative ethics as a lens for analyzing the (ab)uses of narrative for life in Julia Franck’s Die Mittagsfrau (2007, The Blind Side of the Heart), exploring how narrative practices expand and diminish the space of possibilities in which moral agents act and suffer. It demonstrates how narrative “in-betweens” bind people together, through dialogic narrative imagination, and can promote exclusion that amounts to annihilation. It addresses the necessity of storytelling for survival, and a transgenerational culture of silence that leads to the repetition of harmful emotional-behavioral patterns. It explores the continuum from being able to tell one’s own stories to violently imposed narrative identities and suggests that moral agency requires a minimum narrative sense of oneself as a being worthy and capable of goodness. The chapter argues that the ethical evaluation of narrative practices must be contextual—sensitive to how they function in particular sociohistorical worlds.

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