Impure Public Goods, Relative Gains, and International Cooperation

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 578-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Costello
1980 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Raymond ◽  
Michael Sesnowitz

Aspects of the method developed by Aaron and McGuire and Maital (AMM) for estimating the benefit distributions associated with the provision of pure public goods are clarified and the method is extended to cover the case of public projects designed to improve the quality of impure public goods. The extended method is used to estimate the distributional impact of a proposed public project in the Cleveland-Akron metropolitan region, and the results are compared with estimates obtained from three naive models and from the AMM model for pure public goods. It is found that the native models overestimate substantially the net benefits received by low-income families and underestimate the net benefits received by high-income families. Using the AMM method for a pure public good similarly distorts the results, though by a much smaller magnitude.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S64-S76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Brown ◽  
Daniel Susskind

Abstract This paper explores the concept of ‘global public goods’ (GPGs) in the context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that many of the tasks involved in public health, and in particular those involved in the control of an infectious disease like COVID-19, ought to be treated as GPGs that can only be effectively delivered through international cooperation. It sets out what a cooperative response to the COVID-19 pandemic should look like and introduces ideas for further discussion about how it might be financed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 134-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Engelmann ◽  
Alistair Munro ◽  
Marieta Valente

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 701-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Snidal

Many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well. In international politics, this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy. After discussing why states might seek relative gains, I demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed. Relative gains do impede cooperation in the two-actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner's dilemma problem; but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner's dilemma, relative gains seeking is much less consequential. Its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors. Relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory, but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors.


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