Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-284
Author(s):  
Yuta Nakamura
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Likelihood ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Social Choice Rule

Three Social Choice Rules

2017 ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Andrei Marius Vlăducu
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Borda Count ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Status Quo Bias ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
The People ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Social Choice Rules

The authors analyze three social choice rules (plurality voting, approval voting and Borda count) from a behavioral economics perspective aiming three objectives: 1) if it is a viable solution to use these procedures during mass elections; 2) why individuals prefer a specific social choice rule and not another; 3) how status quo bias and framing effect influence the preference of individuals for a certain social choice rule. The research is conducted with 87 participants to a lab experiment and data suggest that for using approval voting and Borda count during mass elections is necessary to increase the people level of information about their benefits. When making a decision in a political or economic context seem that people tend to prefer simple plurality rule do to its availability and maybe because of its strong reliance with status quo bias.

Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules L. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Market Theory ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Collective Choice Rule ◽  
Political Association ◽  
The Relationship

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule?

The effects of the social choice rule on local fiscal variables

1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.M. Pogodzinski ◽  
David L. Sjoquist
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
The Social
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