Essential Elements of an Asset Integrity Management Program for Ammonia and Methanol Plants

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Steven J. Weichel ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Near Misses ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
World Class

World-class ammonia and methanol plants typically produce more than 500,000 metric tons of ammonia or methanol per year. These plants utilize pressure vessels, piping, and tanks that operate over a wide range of temperatures and pressures. The materials of construction range from carbon steel to corrosion-resistant and heat-resistant alloys. Ensuring the safe and reliable operation of these facilities requires an effective asset integrity management program. This paper reviews the essential elements of an asset integrity management program and provides recommendations for judging the effectiveness of the program. The essential elements of an asset integrity management program include leadership, risk management, personnel and contractor competence, management of change, learning from events, emergency response, and implementation of quality assurance, maintenance, inspection, fitness-for-service assessment, repair, and replacement. Management commitment to the program is a key factor in leadership. Risk is managed by mitigating the consequences of an incident as well as minimizing its likelihood; a robust risk-based inspection (RBI) program is typically part of the risk management. In-service degradation mechanisms of the materials that are used in pressure vessels, piping, and tanks include corrosion, fatigue, creep, and metallurgical embrittlement. If defects are identified by inspection, fitness for service assessment is performed to determine what action is to be taken. Training and certification of personnel and contractors is required to make sure that this work is properly performed. Incidents and near misses that occur in the plant and in the industry need to be reviewed to identify areas for potential program improvements. Timely and appropriate emergency response can minimize the consequences of an incident.

Developing Risk Management as New Concept to Manage Risks in Higher Educational Institutions

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 42-52
Author(s):  
Ming-Chang Wu ◽  
Didik Nurhadi ◽  
Siti Zahro
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Higher Education Institutions ◽  
Education Institution ◽  
Management Program ◽  
High Expectations ◽  
Good Communication ◽  
Commercial Activities ◽  
Risk Management Program ◽  
World Class

Generally, the higher education institutions and students have been significantly increased from year to years in order to meet the needs of global labor and develop the country's economy better. On the other hand, they also carry out teaching, research, community service, and commercial activities. This diversity of activities creates more risks diverse and complex as well as a wealth of opportunities for higher education institutions. A solution considered is by implementing the risk management as a new concept to understand and manage the risks associated with those activities and making new opportunities, is challenging and critical to preserving and protecting reputation, and resources of institutions. This article discussed the importance of the role of risk management and to implement a risk-management program in higher education institutions that have high expectations as a world-class education institution. The risk-management program is also more optimal if it supported by a good communication between all leaders and staffs in the organizational environment.

Earthquake risk management for oil and gas infrastructure in the north west of Australia

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 588
Author(s):  
Meysam Banimahd ◽  
Steve Tyler ◽  
Matthew Kuo ◽  
Fiona Chow
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Failure Modes ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Significant Risk ◽  
Earthquake Risk ◽  
North West ◽  
The North ◽  
Management Procedures ◽  
Integrity Management

The July 2019 magnitude 6.6 earthquake 200 km offshore from Broome is a recent reminder of the significant risk that earthquakes pose to oil and gas infrastructure in Australia. Unlike tropical cyclones, there are no reliable methods for predicting the timing, location and magnitude of imminent earthquakes. Appropriate risk management is therefore required, together with the implementation of emergency response and integrity management procedures, to manage the potential impacts to health, safety, process safety, the environment and production. Given the concentration of oil and gas infrastructure in the north west of Australia, a collaborative approach is advantageous for earthquake risk management and emergency response measures. This paper shares Woodside’s earthquake risk and integrity management procedures with the aim of enabling appropriate quality and consistency throughout the industry. The paper reviews state-of-the-art international practice in earthquake risk management for critical infrastructure from design to operation. Applicable seismic design criteria, likely failure modes and performance requirements are also described. Woodside’s real-time earthquake alert and integrity management systems are presented. Recommendations are made on best practice for earthquake risk management in the region and areas for further collaboration and improvement within the industry.

Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

scholarly journals Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program (PSM/RMP) Audits: Are You Prepared?

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha Mead Ira
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Prevention Program ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Prevention Programs ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Process Safety ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Risk Management Program ◽  
Manufacturing Facilities

In June 1996, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated 40 CFR Part 68, Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs (RMP) Under Clean Air Act, Section 112 r (7), commonly called the RMP rule. Much of the RMP rule was already required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (the PSM Standard), which had been issued four years earlier. Because both of these regulations include anhydrous ammonia at a threshold level of 10,000 lbs., many refrigerated warehousing and manufacturing facilities are subject to them. Since the two regulations have the same threshold quantity for ammonia, facilities that are subject to RMP are also subject to PSM. While the focus of the two regulations differs, there are many common requirements, as shown in Table 1, Comparison of Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program Requirements. Both rules require the development of extensive accident prevention programs, which include Process Hazard Analyses, operation and maintenance procedures, training, and emergency response plans. The RMP rule also requires Offsite Consequence Analyses and a Plan summary submittal to the EPA before a process starts up and at five-year intervals thereafter. The Program 3 Prevention Program required to satisfy RMP, is almost identical to a PSM program. Most subject facilities, therefore, use their PSM Program to serve as their RMP Prevention Program. In Florida, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) took delegation of the RMP rule from the EPA and is the enforcing agency in this state. Since the summer of 2000, the DCA has been auditing RMP facilities for compliance with the rule, and their list of audit subjects has included several citrus manufacturing facilities. The DCA staff has been performing very thorough audits, looking closely at all of the RMP Prevention Program, or PSM Program, elements and evaluating their implementation status at each site. The DCA typically cites RMP Prevention Program deficiencies in the following areas: Mechanical Integrity, Standard Operating Procedures, Process Hazard Analysis, training records, incident investigation reporting, compliance audits, and emergency response planning. Although Florida does not have a State-OSHA program, the DCA is, effectively, serving in this function as they audit the PSM programs of refrigerated facilities throughout the state. Facility owners should therefore ensure that their PSM/RMP Prevention Programs are well developed and well implemented prior to a DCA audit. Paper published with permission.

Implementation of Quantitative Risk Assessment: Case Study

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Mangold ◽  
W. Kent Muhlbauer ◽  
Jim Ponder ◽  
Tony Alfano
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
The United States ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Quantitative Risk Assessment ◽  
Management Decision ◽  
Classical Statistics ◽  
Wide Range

Risk management of pipelines is a complex challenge due to the dynamic environment of the real world coupled with a wide range of system types installed over many decades. Various methods of risk assessment are currently being used in industry, many of which utilize relative scoring. These assessments are often not designed for the new integrity management program (IMP) requirements and are under direct challenge by regulators. SemGroup had historically used relative risk assessment methodologies to help support risk management decision-making. While the formality offered by these early methods provided benefits, it was recognized that, in order to more effectively manage risk and better meet the United States IMP objectives, a more effective risk assessment would be needed. A rapid and inexpensive migration into a better risk assessment platform was sought. The platform needed to be applicable not only to pipeline miles, but also to station facilities and all related components. The risk results had to be readily understandable and scalable, capturing risks from ‘trap to trap’ in addition to risks accompanying each segment. The solution appeared in the form a quantitative risk assessment that was ‘physics based’ rather than the classical statistics based QRA. This paper will outline the steps involved in this transition process and show how quantitative risk assessment may be efficiently implemented to better guide integrity decision-making, illustrated with a case study from SemGroup.

101 Essential Elements in a Pressure Equipment Integrity Management Program for the Hydrocarbon Process Industry: Part 2

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Reynolds
Keyword(s):  
Petrochemical Industry ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Process Industry ◽  
Work Processes ◽  
Minimum Compliance ◽  
Preventative Measures ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Physical Assets ◽  
Operational Excellence

This is part 2 of a two part paper that outlines the 101 essential elements that need to be in place, and functioning well, to effectively and efficiently, preserve and protect the reliability and integrity of pressure equipment (vessels, exchangers, furnaces, boilers, piping, tanks, relief systems) in the refining and petrochemical industry. Part 1 of this paper was published in the proceedings of the 2000 ASME PVP Conference. Each of the two parts outline half of the 101 essential elements of pressure equipment integrity management (PEIM). This paper is not just about minimum compliance with rules, regulations or standards; rather it is about what needs to be accomplished to build and maintain a program of operational excellence in pressure equipment integrity that will permit owner-users to make maximum use of their physical assets to generate income. Compliance is not the key to success in pressure equipment integrity management (PEIM); operational excellence is. Each of the 101 work processes outlined in this two part paper, is explained concisely to the extent necessary, so that owner-users will know what needs to be done to maintain and improve their PEIM program. This paper does not prescribe how each of these 101 key elements is to be accomplished, as that description would result in a book rather than a paper. This paper simply outlines all the fundamentals that are necessary to avoid losses, avoid safety incidents, and maintain reliability of pressure equipment. It pulls together a complete overview of the entire spectrum of programs, procedures, and preventative measures needed to achieve first quartile performance in maintaining pressure equipment integrity (PEI).

Guidance for Non-Intrusive Inspection of Pressure Vessels

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske
Keyword(s):  
Essential Elements ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Confined Space ◽  
Inspection Planning ◽  
Mechanical Integrity ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
Periodic Inspections ◽  
Inspection Techniques

Pressure vessels must undergo periodic inspections to help ensure their mechanical integrity and continued safe operation. Such inspections are usually mandated by regulations or prescribed in the integrity management programs of prudent operators. Traditionally, internal visual inspections have been employed. These can be costly because of the need to shut down the vessel, isolate it, prepare it for entry, and follow requirements for confined-space entry. Furthermore, vessel entry may even have an adverse effect on its future performance. For these reasons, it is desirable to utilize non-intrusive inspection methods where a vessel can be non-invasively inspected from its exterior. However, the use of non-intrusive inspections must not compromise safe and reliable vessel operation. Compared with traditional intrusive internal inspection, non-intrusive inspection is relatively new and there are a wide variety of inspection techniques available. Each technique has its strengths and weaknesses, and many engineers are not fully acquainted with the capabilities and limitations of the various non-intrusive inspection techniques. To address this issue, Recommended Practice DNV-RP-G103 on Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) was developed [1]. This paper reviews the recommended practice and discusses example applications of the recommended practice. The recommended practice provides guidance on the following key aspects of non-intrusive pressure vessel inspection: (1) determining when its use is appropriate, (2) information that is needed for inspection planning, (3) defining requirements for inspection methods, (4) selecting inspection methods based on requirements, (5) evaluating inspection results, and (6) requirements for proper documentation of inspection results. The essential elements of the procedures covered in the recommended practice are performing a mechanical integrity review, deciding if non-intrusive inspection is possible, planning for the inspection, performing the inspection, and evaluating the results of the inspection. Finally, the inspection interval is evaluated.

Total Pipeline Integrity Management System Implemented for KOC Pipelines: A Case Study

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Significant Loss ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Initial Assessment ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Transit System ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Integrity Management

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.

Integrity Management of Flange Connections Using Reliability Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Haider ◽  
Millan Sen ◽  
Doug Lawrence ◽  
Angela Rodayan
Keyword(s):  
Data Gathering ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Reliability Model ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Design Concepts ◽  
Failure Data ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management

Abstract There is demonstrated potential for failures to occur on station piping assets in facilities, therefore it is critical to take measures to manage preventable releases. In 2018, Enbridge developed a reliability model that uses available asset information to quantify the likelihood of failure of station piping assets. Enbridge based this model on the CFER PIRIMID software, with some modifications to minimize the use of default values and to meet the company’s integrity management program requirements. With successful implementation of station piping model, Enbridge realized opportunity to develop a much-needed flange model leveraging the station piping model. Historical leak data indicates that flanged connections often experience a higher leak frequency than other assets in a facility. While there are industry guidelines that provide guidance for the assembly of process flange connections in a facility, there are few that discuss integrity management of flange connections once they are operational. Most published condition assessment flange models require inputs which are not readily available, e.g. condition of flange faces and gaskets. These inputs often require the flange to be disassembled just to obtain the data. For pipeline operators, data gathering is even more challenging as there are stations (with numerous flanges) that are spread out along the entire pipeline. Given the high number of flange connections and their wide variation in parameters within transmission pipeline facilities, there is benefit in developing a reliability-based model to guide the integrity management of flange connections. A reliability model that works in two stages was developed for this purpose. The pre-inspection assessment stage was designed to utilize available inputs to prioritize groups of flanges for inspection, and the post-inspection assessment (second) stage is then applied to select the specific flanges that require maintenance action. Enbridge utilized industry guidelines, relevant standards, historical failure data, and subject matter experts’ inputs to develop the station piping and flange models. This paper will discuss the design concepts, model architectures, the contributing factors, and their sensitivities to the likelihood of failure results. These concepts may be utilized by any operator managing such assets, and the model designs may be tailored to suit a wide range of facility environments.

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