Two Differential Games Between Rent-Seeking Politicians and Capitalists: Implications for Economic Growth

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850011
Author(s):  
Darong Dai ◽  
Wenzheng Gao ◽  
Guoqiang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Current Context ◽  
Spirit Of Capitalism ◽  
Bargaining Table

We comparatively study two differential games between politicians and capitalists in terms of reducing rent-seeking distortions and stimulating economic growth. These two games imply two relationships — top-down authority and rational cooperation — between politicians and capitalists. In the current context, we prove that cooperation leads to faster growth than does authority, and simultaneously satisfies individual rationality, group rationality, Pareto efficiency and sub-game consistency. We thus show that setting a bargaining table between capitalists and politicians may create desirable incentives for reducing rent-seeking distortions, developing the spirit of capitalism and stimulating economic growth.

Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth

1991 ◽  
Vol 101 (408) ◽  
pp. 1186 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Gelb ◽  
J. B. Knight ◽  
R. H. Sabot
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Public Sector Employment

scholarly journals AGAMA DAN EKONOMI KAUM TERTINDAS

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 245
Author(s):  
Muh. Yunus
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Work Culture ◽  
Spirit Of Capitalism

<p>As what Weber and Mc. Lelland view, it is assumed that values in certain religion and culture are believed to be able to influence the followers' behavior which are implied on the economic growth. Although indirectly they influence the economic development. Although Islam teaches about the work culture, the relity shows that Indonesian econmy has been well-develop yet. Religion (Islam) as Weber critisizes, does not result in capitalism industrialization as the motivator of economic development because the culture is in line with The Spirit of Capitalism.  It is different from Calvinism; its theology is able to move the economy development of its followers. Therefore, the Moslems' problem of economic decrease has to be solved with a right strategy. In this paper, the strategy used to solve the problem is macro analysis through the model of M. Chapra' s cycle theory.</p><p> </p><p>Seperti apa Weber dan Mc. Pandangan lelland, diasumsikan bahwa nilai-nilai dalam agama dan budaya tertentu diyakini dapat mempengaruhi perilaku pengikut yang tersirat pada pertumbuhan ekonomi. Meski secara tidak langsung mereka mempengaruhi perkembangan ekonomi. Meskipun Islam mengajarkan tentang budaya kerja, relitas menunjukkan bahwa ekonmy Indonesia telah berkembang dengan baik. Agama (Islam) seperti yang dikemukakan Weber, tidak mengakibatkan industrialisasi kapitalisme sebagai motivator pembangunan ekonomi karena budayanya sejalan dengan The Spirit of Capitalism. Hal ini berbeda dengan Calvinisme; Teologinya mampu menggerakkan perkembangan ekonomi para pengikutnya. Oleh karena itu, masalah penurunan ekonomi umat Islam harus dipecahkan dengan strategi yang tepat. Dalam tulisan ini, strategi yang digunakan untuk memecahkan masalah adalah analisis makro melalui model teori siklus M. Chapra.  </p>

The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth. By Liah Greenfeld. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Pp. xi, 541. $45.00.

2003 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 300-302
Author(s):  
John A. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Rational Calculation ◽  
Spirit Of Capitalism ◽  
Universal Norm

The title of this book attests to the fact that the author “communed” with Max Weber's famous thesis whilst doing her own research. She is absolutely at one with Weber—and Keynes!—in insisting that there is a spirit of capitalism, an irrationality underlying rational calculation whereby one continues to work even when one's needs have been met. Spirit of this sort is held to be a cultural idiosyncracy rather than an a universal norm. However, this spirit has nothing to do with religion, not least for the central reason given by Tawney—namely that Protestant reformers sought to control the economy quite as much as did their predecessors. The author offers us a bold and sustained alternative view: economic growth resulted from one thing and one thing only—the presence of nationalism.

scholarly journals Does Institutions Effect Growth in Pakistan? An Empirical investigation

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Danish Ahmed Siddiqui ◽  
Qazi Masood Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Policy Implication ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Social Technologies ◽  
Risk Reducing

This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies for Pakistan, covering its two main dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies and in turn covers several social, institutional, political and economic aspects. It is also analyzed empirically whether the overall index as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affects economic growth. The results show that over all, institutions promote growth in long run for Pakistan. Therefore, for a policy implication, success of any policy could be influenced by the soundness of institutions.

Behind the Growth

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Tian
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Curriculum Design ◽  
Design Development ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Rapid Urbanization ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
Planning Education ◽  
The Future ◽  
Education In China

This article examines the evolution of planning education in China in response to rapid social and economic changes, the growth of planning schools and students, and curriculum design development in various planning schools. It argues that the legacy of the planned economy still influences planning education, which means top–down, elite-driven, and blueprint-style planning that lacks a wide social foundation. With the advent of rapid urbanization and explosive economic growth, further changes to planning education in terms of values, approaches, and targets will be needed in the future.

A TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION FORMULA FOR BARGAINING PROBLEM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (04) ◽  
pp. 1450016 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEON A. PETROSYAN ◽  
DAVID W. K. YEUNG
Keyword(s):  
Differential Games ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Payoff Distribution ◽  
Consistent Solution ◽  
Cooperative Differential Game

This paper presents a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a bargaining problem in cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. In particular, individual rationality is satisfied for every player throughout the cooperation period.

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