Rent Seeking Activity: A Mechanism that Distorts Economic Growth

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donatus Chukwuemeka Ojide
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Rent Seeking

Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth

1991 ◽  
Vol 101 (408) ◽  
pp. 1186 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Gelb ◽  
J. B. Knight ◽  
R. H. Sabot
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Public Sector Employment

scholarly journals Does Institutions Effect Growth in Pakistan? An Empirical investigation

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Danish Ahmed Siddiqui ◽  
Qazi Masood Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Policy Implication ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Social Technologies ◽  
Risk Reducing

This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies for Pakistan, covering its two main dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies and in turn covers several social, institutional, political and economic aspects. It is also analyzed empirically whether the overall index as well as sub-indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affects economic growth. The results show that over all, institutions promote growth in long run for Pakistan. Therefore, for a policy implication, success of any policy could be influenced by the soundness of institutions.

Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth

Public Choice ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Vedder ◽  
Lowell Gallaway
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Relative Prices

scholarly journals EFFECTS OF RENT-SEEKING ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-220
Author(s):  
Zi Wen Vivien Wong ◽  
Fanyu Chen ◽  
Thian Hee Yiew
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Low Income ◽  
High Performance ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Method Of Moments Estimator

Sluggish growth in low-income countries, despite the high performance in other economic indicators, motivates the literature to switch attention to institutions. Despite its crucial economic implications, there is limited attention on rent-seeking as a driver of economic growth in low-income countries. This paper investigates the effect of rent-seeking on growth in low-income countries from 2004 to 2017using the system generalized method of moments estimator. The empirical results reveal that rent-seeking negatively affects growth, implying that it obstructs the pace of economic development in low-income countries. Hence, it is necessary for policymakers in these countries to adopt anti-rent-seeking policies to promote a rapid and sustainable growth.

The Staple Trap in High-Rent Trinidad and Tobago

2018 ◽  
pp. 70-93
Author(s):  
Richard M. Auty ◽  
Haydn I. Furlonge
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Natural Gas ◽  
Trinidad And Tobago ◽  
Oil Prices ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Political Consensus ◽  
High Rent ◽  
Development Trajectory ◽  
The 1960S

The development trajectory of high-rent Trinidad and Tobago since the 1960s provides an example of the staple trap model. An extra-parliamentary disturbance combined with large oil windfalls through 1974–78 and 1979–81 to deflect an initially cautious developmental government into executing an overambitious strategy of gas-based industrialization. The economy experienced a growth collapse when oil prices faltered, which was protracted and sharply reduced average incomes. Eventual recovery relied on monetizing natural gas, however, which proved a minimum diversification away from hydrocarbon dependence, testifying to the inertia of rent-seeking once established. Governments need to build a political consensus to deploy rent for efficient economic growth. Chapter 5 shows how Mauritius achieved this.

scholarly journals FACTORS OF ETHNI CHETEROGENEITY IN RUSSIA: INSTITUTIONS, INCOMES, DEMOGRAPHY

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-223
Author(s):  
Nikita I. Suslov ◽  
Anastasia I. Ivanova
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Population Growth ◽  
Social System ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Ethnic Heterogeneity ◽  
Regional Heterogeneity

The report is devoted to a factor analysis which influenced the regional ethnic heterogeneity in Russia between two population censuses of 2002 and 2010.The theoretical basis of this investigation was a model of variety optimization suplimented by subjective differences of social system groups. Empirical analysis provided to found the factors active to change the levels of regional heterogeneity between the 2002 and 2010 censuses. Theoretical model suggested that an optimal level of social variety does exist being a result of interaction of collaboration cost and variety outcomes. Other factors defining this this state are rent-seeking propensity and ethnic groupsalienation level. We found out that the ethnic heterogeneity increased and supported the economic growth. Both the international and intra-Russian migration together with natural population growth were those mechanisms increasing the level of ethnic heterogeneity.

Two Differential Games Between Rent-Seeking Politicians and Capitalists: Implications for Economic Growth

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850011
Author(s):  
Darong Dai ◽  
Wenzheng Gao ◽  
Guoqiang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Current Context ◽  
Spirit Of Capitalism ◽  
Bargaining Table

We comparatively study two differential games between politicians and capitalists in terms of reducing rent-seeking distortions and stimulating economic growth. These two games imply two relationships — top-down authority and rational cooperation — between politicians and capitalists. In the current context, we prove that cooperation leads to faster growth than does authority, and simultaneously satisfies individual rationality, group rationality, Pareto efficiency and sub-game consistency. We thus show that setting a bargaining table between capitalists and politicians may create desirable incentives for reducing rent-seeking distortions, developing the spirit of capitalism and stimulating economic growth.

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